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6A B S T R A C T
This thesis analyses the efficacy of DNOCS irrigation schemes 
against problems of drought in the sertao, the interior of North-East 
Brazil, Chapter I traces the history of drought effects in the region 
and describes the institutional framework set up in response.
Chapter II distinguishes conceptually between the purely climatic 
aspect of drought phenomena and what I term the 'socio-economic1 problem 
of drought, I argue that the so-called 'drought problem' of the North-East 
is not only, nor even principally, a climatic problem. The human tragedy 
of the drought is a direct product of the way in which the rural structure 
of the sertao places particular groups of rural producers, notably 
sharecroppers and smallholders, at the economic margin, vulnerable to even 
the slightest variation in the rainfall cycle.
Subsequent chapters examine the effectiveness of current irrigation 
strategy in solving problems of rural poverty, unemployment and rural-urban 
migration traditionally associated with the drought. Chapter III looks at 
the history of irrigation in the region and lays out in detail the goals 
which irrigation planners (BNOCS and GSIDA) have established; that is,
(l) to create rural employment and tie people to the land, stabilizing the 
population and lessening rural-urban migration, (2) to increase rural 
incomes, and (3) to increase agricultural production of high-value crops 
which would generate increased incomes and justify the heavy capital 
expenditure into irrigation.
The evidence from three case-studies of BNOCS projects suggests that 
these goals are not being met. Chapter IV shows that irrigation is 
capital-intensive and creates few permanent jobs. Recruits to schemes 
come overwhelmingly from the humid valleys and have rarely been forced
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off their land, either onto emergency work fronts or to the towns, because 
of drought. Poorer farmers from the less protected and drier caatinga 
away from the valleys, those most vulnerable, do not benefit from 
irrigation. Moreover, the implementation of schemes in densely populated 
valleys has resulted in the dislocation of from three to six times the 
number of families absorbed by the projects. As DNOCS has no relocation 
policy for the dispossessed, more unemployment than jobs is created and 
the rural-urban drift is accentuated.
In Chapter V it emerges that only 5% of irrigation farmers enjoy 
the high incomes predicted for them. Most are in debt to DNOCS. The 
major reasons for this highly skewed income distribution are examined. 
Chapter VI shows that DNOCS has been largely unsuccessful in producing 
and marketing high-value fruits and vegetables but relies on commercializing 
crops which are already traditional to the sertao. thus severely limiting 
the income-earning capacity of projects. Relations between the DNOCS 
administration and irrigation farmers are examined and the agency’s 
policy of ’cooperativism’ is considered.
The final chapter concludes that current irrigation policy is at 
best marginally positive and at worst marginally negative in relation 
to the problem of drought as defined earlier on. In order for anti-drought 
strategy to be effective it must be aimed specifically at the weakest 
and most vulnerable groups, and not benefit the already privileged. 
Modifications to existing irrigation techniques, as well as anti-drought 
policies not based on irrigation, are suggested.
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CHAPTER I
DROUGHT IE THE! NORTH-EAST - A GENERAL PICTURE
Drought in North-East Brazil has given rise to widespread human 
suffering for at least two hundred years, hut only during this century 
has the Brazilian government tried to tackle the problem. Drought 
effects are manifested in the form of widespread rural unemployment, 
poverty, starvation and subsequent migration from affected areas. Such 
characteristics, while to some extent a permanent feature of rural 
society in the sertao, the interior of the North-East, become seriously 
accentuated during prolonged periods of scarce rainfall. Such periods 
are inevitably labelled 'droughts1 and occur in their most extreme form 
about once every century, the last being in 1877 “ 79« Milder, more 
recurrent periods of sparse rainfall take place every 10 - 12 years,
1970 being the last example. The present thesis attempts to analyse the 
efficacy of irrigation schemes, the latest government strategy designed to 
cope with the 'drought problem'.
The government agency responsible for fighting the drought, the 
Depa,rtamento Nacional de Obras Contra as Secas (DNOCS) experimented with 
irrigation in a very small way as far back as the 1930's, but until 
recently no systematic attempt had been made to expand it as a development 
strategy capable of tackling the drought problems on a broad scale.
Rather, as will be shown in greater detail below, efforts were concentrated 
on building reservoirs (apudes), boring wells and constructing roads.
The first broad study of the potential advantages of irrigation in the 
North-East was produced in 1968 by the newly created Grupo Executivo de 
Irrigapao para o Desenvolvimento Agricola (GEIDA), in conjunction with an 
Israeli firm of consultants (Tahal).
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Out of this preliminary analysis GEIDA published the Programa 
Plurianual de Irrigapao (PPI) in 1971, which laid out comprehensive 
plans for irrigation in the North-East as part of a national strategy.-^
It also forms part of the government's overall development plan for the 
country under the Plan for National Integration (PIN), brought to the 
statute books in 1970* Within the terms of the PPI, DNOCS was entrusted 
with the responsibility for irrigation projects falling within a large 
part of the ’’drought polygon”, the semi-arid region which covers almost 
one million square kilometres from the state of Piaui in the north to 
Minas Gerais in the South, and which has a rural population of some 18 
million. The Superintendencia do Yale do Sao Francisco (SUVALE), recently 
renamed as the Companhia de Desenvolvimento do Vale do Sao Francisco 
(CODEVASF), was charged with developing irrigation along the valley of 
the river Sao Fransisco, the largest in the North-East,
Limitations imposed by the time and the resources available 
necessitated some narrowing down of the area for study, and it was 
therefore decided to concentrate on the DNOCS irrigation programme. This 
was mainly because DNOCS, with 12 projects in operation, has been rather 
quicker off the mark in implementing schemes than CODEVASF which has only 
two projects functioning. It was thus concluded that the greater volume 
of experience and information regarding DNOCS irrigation would offer a 
more realistic basis from which to draw conclusions concerning the efficacy 
of irrigation strategy,
DNOCS has three basic objectives behind its irrigation programme:
(l) to stabilize the rural population by providing employment to families
^  GEIDA, Programa Plurianual de Irrigapao (PPl), MINTER, Brasilia, 1971 
(10 vols).
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which would otherwise he forced to migrate because of drought, (2)
to increase family incomes thus attacking the problem of rural poverty,
2 /and (3) to increase food supplies for the North-Eastern market.-*^
Using general documentary information as well as primary data collected from
three case studies of DNOCS projects, I intend in this thesis to examine
whether or not these objectives are being met and whether the 'drought
problem' is being effectively tackled. Having placed the aims of my study
within a very general historical and institutional context, it is worthwhile
examining in greater detail the record of drought effects in North-East
Brazil and of the official attempts to deal with them.
Droughts had been recorded in the sertao as early as the sixteenth
century. Father Fernao Cardim first documented their effects in 1583 when
he described how the indigenous tribes migrated' to the coast when rainfall
was scarce. He estimated that during the 1587 drought, for example,
3/5,000 Cariris and Tabajaras fled the interior.-" However, the human 
impact of the drought was minimised by the fact that, until the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the sertao held little attraction 
for the Portuguese colonizers. Its harsh climate and relatively infertile 
soils when compared with the rich land along the humid Atlantic coastline, 
as well as resistance from the indians, discouraged early penetration 
and settlement. The Dutch appear to have made some journeys into the 
interior during the mid-seventeenth century, notably along the valleys 
of the rivers Acarau and Jaguaribe.^ However, they did not venture too
2/
1/
4/
Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. IQ - 18 and, Evandro de Souza Lima, A Irrigapao no 
Nordeste, SUDENE, Fortaleza, 1973•
Joaouim Alves, Historia das Secas, Instituto do Ceara, Fortaleza, 1953>
p. 20.
Ibid., p. 25.
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far into the sertao but were content, as one observer put it, "to stay
5/on the coast, barely penetrating a few leagues."-"
The drive to settle the interior and establish cattle estates or
fazendas received its main push during the late seventeenth century-
after the Dutch had been expelled. Land grants were made by the
Portuguese Crown to colonizers who travelled inland and subdued the
indians. Several of the early explorers came from the south of Brazil
in order to make their fortunes in the North-East; early bandeirantes
such as Domingos de Freitas de Azevedo who penetrated the Sao Francisco
Valley, and Domingos Jorge Velho, Matias Cardoso de Almeida and Morais
Navarro who conquered the indians along the rivers Apu and Jaguaribe.
The main valleys taken over, other areas of the interior were quickly
gained by the end of the eighteenth century.^ Even by the early 1800's
cattle fazendas had become well established in many parts of the sertao
7 /some, in Pernambuco for example, branding up to 500 head per year.-"
During the early colonial period, then, individual families came to 
acquire estates which often covered enormous areas, up to hundreds or 
even thousands of square m i l e s . T h i s  division of land into large, 
private properties in rural areas was to play a major role in determining 
the concentration of economic and political power into the hands of 
latifundistas and, as we shall see, had important repercussions on the 
nature and efficacy of future drought relief measures.
^  Luis da Camara Cascudo, Geografiado Brasil Holandes. Jose Olympio, 
R.J., 1956, p. 182.
^  Capistrano de Abreu, Cauitulos de Eistoria Colonial (1500 - 1800), 
R.J. pp. 187, 216-7.
7/ Alves, op cit., p. 32.
^  Antonil., cited by E. Silva Bruno, Historia do Brasil, Vol. VII, 
Cultrix, Sao Paulo, 1967, pp« 84 - 5«
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These estates, which supplied the more densely populated, 
sugar producing coastal zone, the zona da mata, supported very few 
people themselves. The landowner needed only a-small number of vagueiros 
and moradores to look after his cattle. By the end of the eighteenth 
century the sertao population consisted of landowners, the indians and 
a few mestizo labourers. The indigenous tribes often raided the estates 
when drought drove away the game. They were also defending their major 
sources of fish and game, the fertile river valleys and more humid 
uplands (serras), which were the first areas to be colonized in the 
interior.
During the colonial period, the human impact of the drought was
reduced by the fact that the population at risk was rather small. It
has been estimated that the sertao had a population of 726,000 in 1800,
9/although clearly such evidence must be treated with caution.-"
In addition, cattle estates were relatively well protected from the 
drought by virtue of being situated on river margins which provided 
pasture during the dry season. Many landowners also moved their cattle 
to graze in the cooler and more humid serras such as Baturite,
Ibiapaba and Araripe. nevertheless, the primitive methods used by the 
colonizers, as well as the lack of concern for providing an adequate 
system of food supply and storage for what population there was, led to 
the death of many cattle and reports of quite severe human suffering.
One contemporary observer noted that in 1792 the drought in Ceara 
killed 11 t h o u s a n d s w h i l e  another reported a death toll of 30,000 
during the drought of 1 8 2 5 The scarcity of food supplies resulted in
9/■" Spix and Kartinius, cited by Alves, op cit.t p. 92.
Ibid.. .pp. 102 - 3.
George Gardner, Travels in the Interior of Brazil, 1836 - 4 1 . London,
1846, p. 157.
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manioc flour being sold at ten times its normal price during the 
drought
Up to the mid-nineteenth century the North-East had seen a dozen
serious droughts, but it was the human calamity of 1877 - 79 which
eventually led to government action being taken for the first time,
although somewhat belatedly. A combination of hunger and disease
resulting from migration and the herding together of refugees (known as
retirantes or flagelados) into camps is reputed to have claimed
13/500,000 lives during this period.—1^  This was far more serious than 
any drought which had beer experienced before, and was due chiefly to 
the fact that, from the mid-nineteenth century the population at risk 
had increased considerably. Until then the drought impact had been 
limited because the cattle economy of the sertao had absorbed very little 
labour. However, this picture was radically changed from 1850 onwards. 
Aided by a total absence of droughts from 1845 - 7^, a drought-resisting 
type of arboreal cotton (moco) was introduced into the interior. Cotton, 
of course, required much more labour than cattle raising and, stimulated 
by the cotton shortage resulting from the American Civil War, the crop 
prospered and attracted large numbers of rural labourers from the 
neighbouring agreste region. A mixed cattle and cotton economy was thus 
set up which complemented each other rather well. Amongst other 
advantages, cotton seed cake provided fodder for cattle. A cotton boom 
took place in which other crops were sacrificed and rapid profits 
were made. Exports of cotton from Ceara increased sharply from 165,265
Henry Koster, Travels in Brazil, London, 1816, p. 123.
13/—" Eudolpho Theophilo, Historia da Seca no Ceara, 1877 - 80. 
Imprensa Ingleza, R.J., 1922.
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kilos in 1845 to 7*906,944 kilos in 1871
In order to feed themselves, the rural work-force cultivated
subsistence crops (maize, beans and manioc) in conjunction with, and
frequently on a similar sharecropping basis to, arrangements regarding
cotton. However, although adequate in years of normal rainfall, during
a drought subsistence crops failed, removing the only source of food
for the labouring population. The economic situation was worsened by
the drop in cotton prices after 1871, decreasing both profits and 
15/w a g e s . ' T h e  crop failure caused by the 1877 - 79 drought combined 
with a precarious economic situation so that, unable even to feed 
themselves, huge numbers of rural inhabitants were forced to migrate in 
search of relief elsewhere. Landowners were either unwilling or unable 
to shoulder the economic burden of supporting their employees during 
this difficult period.^/
For the first time., then, a drought was documented in graphic detail 
and the vulnerability of the low income rural mass became tragically 
apparent. As the winter rains failed to arrive and their stocks of 
food dwindled rapidly, the rural workers of the sertao and their families 
started migrating to the humid serras, to the rubber boom in the Amazon 
and to the towns. The population of Ceara!s state capital, Fortaleza, 
was swollen from its normal 40,000 in 1877 to 160,000 in 1879 by 
incoming flagelados. The poor conditions which awaited them and their 
herding together into camps which, by 1915, had become known as 
"concentration camps", caused 60,000 deaths from disease (cholera and
^4/ ibid., p. 25.
^  Ibid., p. 28.
Celso Furtado, Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis, University of 
California Press, Berkely and L.A., 1965.
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17 /smallpox) and hunger in this city alone.—i/
Crimes were committed both by starving refugees struggling to
survive and by citizens undertaking reprisals against the unwelcome
nev/comers. The latter*s crimes, Theophilo notes, "often went unpunished
because the retirante was considered a leprous dog who was going to
stain the land".^/ Betirantes flocked to the city, only to be sadly
disillusioned with the lack of provision made by the government for
their care. Theophilo observed.
"The sad procession paraded along the streets 
of the capital at all hours ... Beal animated 
skeletons, with skin blackened by the dust 
from the roads and stuck to their bones, 
held out their hands begging from everyone 
they met." 19/
However, although for the first time, in 1877, a drought had come
to be considered officially as a national disaster, relief was not
plentiful and came in the form of short-term food supplies, its
effectiveness reduced further still by corruption amongst officials
20/in charge of distributing aid to refugees.— ' Theophilo complained
bitterly about the lack of government relief, not just during the 1877
drought, but during those of 1900 and 1915 also. A large proportion
of what official aid was forthcoming seems to have been spent on
subsidizing emigrants’ sea passages rather than on helping those who
21/
had no option but to stay,— '
During the three decades following the 1877 drought the government
17/—u R. Theophilo, op cit., p. 417 and, A Secca de 1915* Imprensa 
Ingleza, H.J., 1922, p. 54.
Theophilo, Historia. da Seca no Ceara, p. 108.
^2/ ibid., p. 109.
^  Ibid., pp. 141, 258 - 40.
B. Theophilo, A Secca de 1915. pp. 14 - 15.
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made a slow start at devising projects which, it hoped, would lessen the 
drought impact. In December, 1877 a National Commission of Enquiry 
was set up which recommended the construction of reservoirs (agudes), 
the improvement of communications by building railways, roads and 
improving the harbours, as well as better water control to be achieved 
through digging wells and the building of a canal to link the rivers 
Jaguaribe and Sao Francisco. For a variety of reasons, however, 
including technical difficulties, poor administration, lack of funds and 
sheer lack of government interest, most of these proposals did not get 
beyond the planning stage.
One project which was completed was the Agude Cedro (later renamed
Q.uixada), constructed by the French engineer Jules Revy between 1884 -
1906. It was, however, criticized at the time by President-elect
Afonso Pena as "pretty but u s e l e s s , D e s p i t e  this observation,
reservoir-building or agudagem was to set the pattern for drought relief
works over the next sixty years; stored water which benefitted large
landowners and protected their cattle by providing pasture and watering
facilities but which, although affording some protection to a handful
of adjacent smallholders, left most of the low income agricultural
population untouched. Three technical missions were also established
from 1904 - 6 to deal with public works in Ceara and Rio Grande do Norte,
23/but achieved very little.—"
Increasing dissatisfaction with the lack of action taken against the 
drought and with the limited success of what measures had been implemented
J. Alves, op cit., p. 137*
DNOCS, Poligono das Secas, Fortaleza, 1968.
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led to the creation of the S~uper.intendenc.ia dos Estudos e Obras Contra os 
Efeitos da Seca in 1906, renamed two years later as the Inspectoria de 
Obras Contra as Secas (IOCS) and again as the Inspectoria Federal de 
Ohras Contra as Secas (IFOCS) in 1918, with its headquarters in Rio de 
Janeiro. Dominated hy natural scientists and civil engineers, IFOCS 
believed that the most effective way of fighting.the drought was to build 
dams in river valleys and accumulate water in agudes. This was its 
major emphasis but, apart from reservoir-building, IFOCS also started to 
bore wells, to give subsidies to private landowners for building their 
own small reservoirs, to set up meteorological stations, carry out 
geological surveys and build roads. Highway construction was seen then, 
as it still is today, not only as a means of employing labour, but also 
as a way of improving communications in order to facilitate the rapid 
evacuation of the drought-affected population and the faster shipment 
of relief supplies.
Several factors have influenced the flow of federal funds to finance 
drought relief works in the North-East. Of primary importance has been 
the advent of a drought itself, when public alarm is at its peak and 
the urgency of the need is brought home more vividly. During the 
aftermath of a drought there has inevitably been a tailing-off period 
when both interest and funds seem to decrease. The flow of funds to 
IFOCS was not only influenced by the immediacy of the drought but by 
the general economic situation and by how much influence North-Eastern 
politicians had at federal level. Consequently, there were enormous 
fluctuations in the flow of federal money. Under the administration of 
Epitacio Pessoa, a native of North-Eastern state of Paraiba, the amount 
of drought relief rose from four million milreis in 1916 - 19 to 142
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milreis in 1921 - 22, financed bv borrowing from national banks and 
from abroad (including 75 million U.S. dollars raised in New York). 
American and British engineers were brought in and many new projects 
were started.-^/ These included, as one contemporary English observer 
noted, the building of 1,400 kilometres of roads, 196 public and
25/private reservoirs, numerous wells and 500 kilometres of railway.— 7^
However, many of these projects received setbacks during the subsequent
government of the mineiro* Nilo Bernardes at a time of financial crisis.
The serious drought of 1950 - 52 stimulated relief work and, with
paraibano Jose Americo de Almeida as his Minister of Public Works,
President Getulio Vargas increased spending on the North-East to 10% of
federal revenue in 1952. In 1954 under the new Constitution 4% of
26/total tax revenue was set aside for drought relief.— ' After the 1945
drought IP0CS was given its present name, the Departamento Nacional de
Obras Contra as Secas (DNOCS) and its headquarters was transferred from
Rio to Fortaleza. The onset of a drought, however, still meant that
short term, emergency relief had to be supplied in order to avoid mass
starvation. In the 1952 crisis, for example, IFOCS employed 220,000
27/flagelados building reservoirs and roads.—u Apudagem continued to be 
the main longer-term anti-drought strategy, so that the volume of water 
stored in publically owned reservoirs rose from 2.9 billion cubic metres
A.0. Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress, 20th Century Fund,
New York, 1965, pp. 18 et seq.
25/—^ Arno S. Pearse, Brazilian Cotton, Manchester, 1925* Ch. Ill: 
"Brazilian Public Works", pp. 58 - 9.
Hirschman, op cit., pc 21,
Luis Carlos Pinheiro, "Notas Sobre as Secas", Boletim do DNOCS,
20 (6), Nov. 1959, P. 87.
* a native of the state of Minas Gerais, which is outside the drought-
affected zone.
- 22 -
in 1955 to 7*8 billion in 1960,*^/ reaching- the figure of 11*4 billion 
cubic metres (in 253 reservoirs) by 1 9 7 2 . In 1945 the Companhia 
Eidroel&ctrica do Vale do Sao Francisco (CHE'S?). was set up to develop 
hydroelectric resources along the river Sao Francisco. Three years 
later the Commissao do Vale do Sao Francisco was established to expand, 
the economic and social infrastructure of the valley.
During the 1950’s it became increasingly clear that DNOCS’s policies 
were doing very little to provide long term protection for the mass of 
the rural population in the North-Eastern interior. As the above figures 
show, however, the agency was not to be discouraged from its reservoir- 
building strategy. Nevertheless, the fact that it was necessary to 
provide relief for 60,000 flage1ados during the 1951 drought underlined 
the need for new thinking and for broader socio-economic policies which 
would have a wider impact than mere apude-building. As a first step 
the Banco do Nordeste do Brasil (BNB) was set up in 1952 with funds set 
aside by the 1946 Constitution. The BNB was, however, a commercial 
bank rather than a development bank and gave credit to farmers and 
industrialists on that basis. Nevertheless, its research division 
(ETENE) examined social and economic problems of the region and set a 
precedent in this respect. Preoccupation with examining regional 
problems in depth also led to the formation of a special study group, 
the Grupo de Trabalho para o Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (GTDN) in 1956.
It was the calamitous 1958 drought which finally discredited the 
politica hidraulica of DNOCS and set in motion a series of events which
Luis Carlos Pinheiro, ”A9udagem Publica”, Boletim do DNOCS, 20 (6), 
Nov. 1959.
DNOCS, Apudes PuDlicos no Nordeste* Fortaleza, 1972.
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eventually resulted in the realignment of long-tezm drought relief 
strategy away from reservoir construction and towards irrigation.
When the drought struck the North-East had accumulo/ted 6.7 billion cubic 
metres of water in over 200 public apudes not counting the thousands 
of small, private reservoirs belonging to landowners. The region had 
three times the average national road milage, commercial credit was 
available to support private investment and the electricity-generating 
capacity had doubled upon completion of the Paulo Affonso Falls in 1956* 
Nevertheless, none of these infrastructural improvements prevented 
the number of refugees employed on work fronts from reaching 536,000 or 
13% of the total North-Eastern population in 1958- At the height of the 
drought the total number of people affected reached 2-f million,
30/including dependents, or 21% of the 'drought polygon' population.-^-7 
Thousands of retirantes were forced to leave the region in search of tem­
porary employment in the Centre-South and coastal towns of the North-East. 
Profits were made by exploiting their hardship to provide cheap labour 
for the construction of Brasilia. The unfortunate emigrants or candangos, 
as they became known, were taken in droves on open trucks, the infamous
pau de araras, often to be abandoned on the roadside by drivers
31/anxious to avoid discovery by the police.
Due to the severity of the drought, BNOCS was granted a record amount 
of funds by Congress for relief work, to be used principally on work 
fronts building dams and roads. Money was also provided to assist private 
landowners to build their own reservoirs, as well as for using stored 
water capacity to improve domestic supplies and electricity generation.
Raul Barbosa, A Seca de 1958, BNB (ETENE), Fortaleza, 1958, p. 5> and 
Pinheiro, "Notas Sobre as Secas", p. 125.
Ibid., p. 130.
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President Kubitschek ordered construction to be resumed on the 
enormous Oros dam in Ceara which had been started under Epitacio Pessoa,
Its four billion cubic metres would, at a stroke, double the amount of 
stored water in the North-East forming a virtual inland sea and having 
the capacity to irrigate 100,000 hectares.
However, although to all intents and purposes BNOCS was riding on 
the crest of a wave, it soon became discredited by tales of bribery and 
corruption in the administration of relief funds, as well as by its 
dubious unofficial role in the 1958 state govematorial elections.
BNOCS became closely associated with what were known as the "drought 
industrialists", the industriais da seca, a term used to describe anyone 
who exploited the drought situation for his own profit. These included 
simple thieves of relief shipments, corrupt officials in charge of 
public works and those in search of quick profits caused by the food 
shortages. At higher levels political pressures and connections were
32/often used to influence BNOCS officials in the siting of roads and dams.-^ -7 
Landowners bundled their labourers off to a work front when the drought 
struck so that the government and not they should support them during the 
unproductive period. This tactic also had the advantage of keeping cheap 
labour in the area, minimising the risk that workers would emigrate 
permanently. Federal deputies used their influence to secure relief 
funds for their electoral zone, insuring their clients1 votes for the 
f u t u r e I t  was not uncommon, either, for relief to be administered on 
an individual basis, receipt or non-receipt depending upon the recipient’s
32/ Hirschman, op cit.t p. 70*
Antonio Callado, As Industrias da Seca e os'Galileus’ de Pernambuco, 
Civilizapao Brasileira, R.J., I960, p. 29.
past voting habits. One critic condemned DNOCS as "serving the politics
of the North-East and not the North-East itself. Its function is to
34/serve the important families of the region.""7
DNOCS’s poor reputation was made worse by its role in the 1958 
October elections in which several important state governorships were 
disputed. The ruling groups tried, although unsuccessfully as it turned 
out, to use the power that DNOCS held to influence voting through the 
selective distribution of relief to those who promised to vote for PSD and 
PTB candidates. In addition, it was alleged that DNOCS employees were 
used to frighten voters, DNOCS trucks were used to transport voters in
35/project areas, election officials were bought and votes were purchased.-"-7
By the late 1950’s DNOCS was totally discredited, its association
with the industrias da seca and electoral corruption known, and its
apudagem philosophy demonstrably a failure. In retrospect it is
surprising in some ways' that irrigation as an anti-drought tactic was
not more widely adopted earlier on. As early as 1931 DNOCS had been
legally entitled to expropriate lands downstream from dams for irrigation
36/projects, although it does not seem that these powers were ever used.-"7
It had, in fact, been realized very early on, in the days when the first
anti-drought measures were being planned, that reservoir-building would
have to be supplemented by irrigation if the benefits of water storage were
to be more widely spread. In the 1890fs engineers were ignoring the
37/advice of irrigation experts in the North-East.-"-7 Arrojado Lisboa,
■24/ Ibid.. p. 12.
A.F. Montenegro, "Tentativa de Interpretacao da Eleicoes de 1958 no 
Ceara", Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos, April, 1988, pp. 43 - 8.
^  Article 19 of the Inspectoria Statute of Feb. 20th, 1931» cited by 
Hirschman, op cit.. p. 78.
37/■"/ Alves, op cit., pp. 137 ~ 8.
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director of IFOCS from 1909 - 12, stressed the need for irrigation,
as did Jose Angusto Trinidade, first director of IFOCS's research and
38/extension division.*"7 Even in 1937 a report commissioned by IFOCS
stressed most emphatically the need to utilize stored water for
irrigation, "Irrigation will solve the problem ... Only in this way will
39/it be possible to keep the sertanejo in the sertao.""7 In 1950 the 
then director of DNOCS, Vinicius Berredo, restated the need for carefully 
controlled irrigation projects on the expropriated lands of the hydraulic 
basins of existing reservoirs.-^/ By this time, however, the only land 
irrigated under the initiative of DNOCS was a few hundred hectares on 
five or six projects, the land in which belonged to private owners, 
and which dated from the 1930's.-
DNOCS was reluctant to expropriate lands for two basic reasons. 
Firstly, the organization was dominated by civil engineers who measured 
their success by additions to the amount of water stored in acudes made 
during their term of office. In the second place, the DNOCS bureaucracy 
had developed close links with local power holders and were careful not 
to antagonize any more large landowners than necessary. This was 
expecially so since many large property owners had seen their lands covered 
by public reservoirs already. Official publications today, however, lay
Hirschman, op cit., p. 43*
Evaristo Leitao, 0 Problema Social e Economico das Obras Contra a Seca, 
IFOCS, R.J., 1937, pp. 38 - 41.
^ /  J. Guimaraes Duque, Solo e Agua no Poll go no das Secas, DNOCS, Fortaleza., 
1953, PP. 181 - 2.
^  These projects were Lima Campos, General Sampaio, Aires de Souza, Sao 
Gonqalo, Condado, Piranhas, Itans.
Paulo de Brito Guerra, "Evolucao e Problemas da Irrigacao no Nordeste", 
Boletim do DNOCS, 28 (2), July - Dec., 1970.
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most of the blame for the slow process with irrigation on the
"unreceptive" attitudes of landowners rather than on DNOC's reluctance
42/to compromise itself politically,— '
The period immediately following the 1958 drought was, then, one of
crisis caused both by the size of the human catastrophe, as well as by
the political controversies surrounding DNOCS, In this atmosphere, a
group of economists at the National Development Bank (BNDE) had, at the
request of President Kubitschek, prepared an economic analysis of the
North-East's problems. Under the leadership of Celso Furtado, the
'Purtado Report', as it became known, recommended a comprehensive
development programme designed to redress the severe economic imbalance
between the North-East and Centre-South, based on three strategies: the
use of reservoir water for irrigation schemes, organized colonization
of wetter areas such as Maranhao and more efficient use of the sugar-cane
45/lands along the coast,-"
The failure of existing organizations to cope with the North-East's 
problems, together with the new ideas put forward by Furtado's report in 
this crisis atmosphere, led President Kubitschek to set up a new body, 
the Superintendencia do Desenvoivimento do Nordeste (SUDENE) in the 
following year, SUDENE was given unprecedented powers to coordinate 
the activities of existing agencies in the region such as DNOCS, CVSF and 
the BNB as well as formulate policies of its own.
In order that SUDENE should have control over DNOCS's activities 
the latter agency had to be transferred from the Ministry of Building 
and Public Works to join SUDENE in the Ministry of the Interior, This was
42/ Ibid., pp. 6 - 7»
"The population did not assimilate irrigation, they didn't understand 
it ... it progressed very slowly."
43/—"  Hirschman, op cit., pp. 72
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in line vdth the changed emphasis away from pure dam and road building
to a broader irrigation programme, DNOCS strongly opposed this move,
to the extent of engaging in the attempted character assasination of
SUDENE*s director, Celso Furtado, with accusations that he was a
Communist. However, with the support of the nine North-Eastern state
44/governors on SUDENE*s board of directors, the measure was passed,—u 
It was really the formation of SUDENE with its stated emphasis 
away from reservoir construction in favour of irrigation which therefore 
forced DNOCS to seriously start considering the latter as an anti-drought 
strategy. Rhetoric would no longer be enough; practical results v/ere 
expected. DNOCS had eventually come around to admitting the "limited 
effects of large-scale aqudagem as a source of employment for the 
population of the semi-arid z o n e .  "4^/ However, official publications 
of the period take pains to express DNOCS*s considerable apprehension 
over irrigation as involving "unique and complex p r o b l e m s .  " 4 ^ /  
Nevertheless, the point was re-emphasized in SUDENE*s regional development 
plans so that there was really no getting away from the fact that, for the 
forseeable future at least, irrigation as an official strategy was here
to stay .42/
In fact it was SUDENE and not DNOCS which took the initiative in 
starting serious study of irrigation potential. In conjunction with a
44/ Ipid., pp. 82 - 3* Maranhao had just been included for planning 
purposes into the North-East, increasing the number of states from 
eight to nine. The governors' support for SUDENE was no doubt 
strengthened by DNOCS's abortive attempts in 1958 to influence voting 
against them.
4^/ DNOCS, 1° Plano de Obras e Estudos, I9&5 ~ 68, Fortaleza, 1985* P» 26. 
4^/ DNOCS, Obras e Frogramas, Rio de Janeiro, i960.
42/ SUDENE, IV Plano Director, 1969 - 73. Recife, 1968, pp. 281 - 90.
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French mission-^ SUDENE carried out a detailed study of the Jaguaribe 
Valley between 1962 - 65, the second largest of the region and with a 
huge volume of water stored in reservoirs from the apudagem period.
The research team recommended the establishment of irrigation projects on 
the basis of already existing reservoirs,-^/ This led in 1968 to the 
start of work on the first publicly owned irrigation scheme in the 
North-East, the Morada Nova project, fed by the Banbuiu reservoir. It 
will be examined in greater detail below as one of my case studies.
During the same period, in 1967* the CVSF was renamed the 
Superintendencia do Vale do Sao Francisco (SUVALE) and alioted 1% of federal 
tax revenues per annum. However, most of its activities were devoted 
towards improving access roads and minor port facilities as well as 
medical and vetinary services. Like its partner in water resources 
development, DNOCS, the agency had accomplished little in the way of 
longer term projects such as river regularization or irrigation.
During the 1960's, then, there was some optimism that irrigation 
had the potential to provide protection against the drought where 
reservoir-building had failed. STJDENE's initial efforts and DNOCS's 
official change of strategy were followed up by the formation of GEIDA 
in 1968 to undertake a comprehensive study of irrigation potential in 
Brazil. The 1970 drought served as a grim reminder that the rural 
population of the sertao, or certain sectors of it at least, were still as 
vulnerable as ever to the drought. The late arrival or absence of winter 
rains from April to December of that year forced thousands of small
^ /  Associacion oour L'Organisacion de Missions de Coooeration Technique
'(asnic) .
■^/ Grupo de Estudo de Base do Vale do Jaguaribe (GVJ), Estudo Gera,! de 
Base do Vale do Jaguaribe, SUDENE/ASKIC, Fortaleza, 1967 (ld™"vols).
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farmers off the land in search of employment elsewhere. Dependent
on traditional subsistence crops for their food supply, these groups
saw a drastic reduction in the volume of production because of the
drought. From 1969 “ 70 in drought-affected areas, production of beans
decreased by 78%» maize by 86% and manioc by 61% ,- ^  62% of the drought
polygon was affected, throwing 35% of the labour force out of work. At
the height of relief operations in October-November of 1970, 500,000 men
were employed on 112 work fronts. This made some 3‘g' million people
totally dependent on drought relief, 19% of the total North-Eastern, rural
51/population of 18 million.-"*—'
Apart from using flagelado labour to build roads and dams on work
fronts (at a daily wage of two cruzeiros), food was distributed, medical
assistance was given at special posts and accomodation provided for the
refugees. It is estimated that the total cost of the drought in terms
of lost agricultural production and emergency funds was in the order of
US$400 million.-^/ The distribution of relief seems to have been
relatively free of corruption compared with the 1950 drought thanks,
to some extent perhaps, to close army supervision. Nevertheless, one
indication of how little times have changed lies in the reports of root
53/poisoning suffered by the desperately hungry in 1970, ^  reminiscent of 
the graphic accounts given by Theophilo a century earlier.Similarly, 
the hardships imposed by the drought manifested themselves in ways which
Clovis Cavalcanti and Dirceu Pessoa, Carater e Efeitos da Seca 
Nordestina de 1970, SIRAC/SUDENE, Recife, 1973, pp. 173 - 5.
Ibid., p. 80 and DNOCS, Frentes de Servipo, Fortaleza, 1971» PP» 57 ~
52/ Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., p. 7&.
^  Ibid., p. 42.
Theophilo, Historic- da Seca, pp. 99 - 102.
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had long been familiar in the region - prostitution, banditry and other
55/crimes of violence
The period during and immediately after the 1970 drought resounded 
with clashes between the North-Eastern state governors and the federal 
government. Although a substantial amount had been allocated for 
relief measures, some US$13 million, there was considerable disquiet 
expressed about the possibility of the North-East being 'abandoned1 by 
the government. In June, 1970 after a visit to drought-affected areas, 
President Medici made a much-quoted and emotional speech in the SUDENE 
auditorium in Recife in which he affirmed his committment to the North- 
East thus:
"I want to say to the people of the North-East
that I do not promise you anything. I do not
promise miracles or transformations, nor 
money nor favours, nor do I solicite 
sacrifices or votes, nor organization of 
charity. • I only say that everything has to 
• begin to change." 5§J
The amount eventually allocated for drought relief was more than
that set aside for irrigation under the SUDENE plan for that period,
CR$349 million.'Nine days after Medici's speech the Plan for National
Integration (PIN) was launched which officially announced the government's
intentions for colonizing the Amazon region with emigrants from the
drought-affected North-East. Led by the governor of Paraiba, Joao Agripino,
the other North-Eastern governors expressed their concern about what they
saw as the implicit neglect of long-term development strategy for their
region which seemed to accompany these proposals. At least one contemporary
^  Latin America (newsletter), reports 22nd May and 12th June, 1970.
56/ Emilio Garrastazu Medici, Yisao do hordeste, sneech at Recife 7th June, 
1970.
5 1 / SUDENE, IV Plano Diretor, 1969 - 75. pp. 530 et seq.
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observer saw the Amazon strategy as "an escape mechanism by which the
political system can no longer be captured by the close-knit North-
Eastern bloc of politicians, once political activities such as direct
58/election of governors are restored. ’'— '
However, the latest government plans seem to restore the balance
between the two regions. Under the Second National Development Plan
(II PND, 1974) resources are divided between the Programa de Polos
Agropecuarios e Agrominerais da Amazonia (POLANAZONIA) and the
Programa de Desenvoivimento de Areas Integradas do Nordeste (POLONOEDESTE).
The latter concentrates specifically on the North-East and embraces rural
development proposals for the humid valleys, the high serras. the
caatinga or dry sertao and the coastal table-lands. Irrigation in the
sertao receives considerable emphasis as "playing a very significant
59/role in the rural development strategy for the region.
Undoubtedly influenced by the human catastrophe of the 1970 drought 
and the inadequacy of measures to date in having long-term or wide- 
ranging impact, 1971 saw the publication of the first systematic 
irrigation plan for the North-East and other parts of Brazil, the 13 
volume Programa Plurianual de Irigayao (PPl). It was financed by funds 
from the National Development Plan (II PND), and its proposals envisage 
irrigating 195»000 hectares* of land in the North-East from 1971 - I960, 
requiring a total investment of CR$3»188*7 billion at 1971 prices.
DNOCS, with responsibility for 78,000 hectares, will have 36 projects under 
the plan. CODEYASP is responsible for the valley of the river Sao Francisco
V.A. Bacchus, The Political Dimensions of Water Resource Development:
A Study of the Brazilian Northeast. 19^4 - 71» University of Connecticut, 
Ph.D., 1973, p. 1094.
SEPLAlJ, Prorrrama de Desenvolvimento de Areas Integradas do Nordeste 
(POLOKOTIDESTE), Brasilia, 1974.
* 1 hectare = 2.47 acres.
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ana. will irrigate 112,000 hectares in 17 schemes
The situation over goals is a little confusing, however, since 
in its own publications DNOCS states that it plans to irrigate 100,000 
hectares by 1980, installing 24,000 rural families.The  PPI makes 
optimistic forecasts about the social and economic profitability of 
irrigation in the North-East, anticipating the creation of 350,000 jobs 
and the raising of agricultural production and incomes by substantial 
amount s.
However, although irrigation was never expected to be a panacea 
for the problems of the 'urought polygon’, results so far can only be 
classed as disappointing. C0DEVASF has only managed to start work on 
two projects and DNOCS on 12. DNOCS has irrigated around 9»000 hecatres 
or 9?'o of its 1980 target, and absorbed some 900 families, or 4% of the number
63/
it hopes to accomodate by the end of the decade.—^
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed on any analysis of the DNOCS 
programme by the sheer slowness in getting schemes off the ground, it is 
my intention to clarify the types of irrigation strategy currently 
being pursued and to try and relate these to the specific problems 
associated with the drought. Before going on to analyse the 
characteristics of irrigation projects I wish, therefore, to devote 
Chapter II to examining in detail the exact nature of the 'drought 
problem', the problems, da seca which has so often been freely used to 
explain the backwardness of the North-East, but which has been subject
GEIDA, or cit., Vol. I, pp. 16, 57 and Table 4 - 8.
DNOCS, Irrigapao, Fortaleza, 1975•
GEIDA, op cit., pp. 6 - 9  and GEIDA, Plano Kacional de Irrigapao, 1970,
pp. 1 - 20.
For further information on goals see Chapter III below.
SUDENE, Belatoric Sintetico: Andamento de Irrfgapao do Nordeste,
I'ilNTHR, Recife, 1974. Updated with additional information from DNOCS 
for 1974 - 75.
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to almost no systematic analysis. In Chapter II I shall shift the
emphasis away from the preoccupation v/ith climatic uncertainties
and more towards an analysis of the underlying social and economic
weakenesses or rural society in the sertao. which exposes so many of
its members to even minor rainfall variations. Observers of the
’drought problem1 have traditionally concentrated on the climatic aspect,
while ignoring the more fundamental problems of the way in which rural
64/society is organized to resist the drought.—^ The perpetuation of
what, I suggest, is largely a misconception, has been encouraged by
North-Eastern writers such as Graciliano Ramos and Rachel de Queiroz,
65/whose novels—^ tend to focus on the punitive climate rather than the 
social roots of the drought phenomenon.
I shall argue, however, that the so-called 'drought problem' is not 
only, nor even principally, a climatic problem as its name suggests. The 
human tragedy of the drought is a direct result of the way in which the 
rural structure of the sertao places thousands of peasants at the 
economic margin, vulnerable to even the slightest climatic vicissitude. 
After examining firstly the climatic aspect of the drought and, secondly, 
which are the vulnerable groups and why they are so adversely affected 
by dry periods, I shall proceed to an analysis of whether the 'drought 
problem1 redefined in these terms, is being effectively tackled by 
current DNOCS irrigation strategy.
y Djacir Meneses, 0 Outro Nordeste. Jose Olympio, R.J. 1937* P* 64. 
5/-1 See for example:
Graciliano Ramos, Vidas Secas. Martins, S.P., 1974.
Raouel de Queiroz, 0 Quinze. Jose Olympio, R.J., 1974*
CHAPTER II
0 PROBLEM DA SECA 
PART I: THE CLIMATIC PROBLEM
There are two related but conceptually distinct facets to the 
'drought problem' in North-East Brazil. Cn the one hand there is the 
climatic problem which causes rainfall shortages or delays the arrival of 
winter rains essential for the growing of subsistence food crops. The 
•drought problem' is not simply one of climate, however. The situation 
in the sertao is not, as will be shown below, that of a typical desert 
region such as the African Sahel, which has experienced a gradual decline 
in rainfall, thus destroying the adaptive mechanisms developed by the 
population to deal with long, dry seasons. In the North-East no such 
adaptive mechanisms have been evolved on any scale to offer protection 
against the frequent 'droughts', which occurr once every 10 to 12 years.
In addition to the climatic problem, what has to be explained is 
why the rural population in the sertao is so vulnerable to variations in 
the rainfall regime. The other side of the 'drought problem', then, is 
not directly concerned with climate at all but is social and economic 
in nature. One of the main reasons for suggesting that the rural 
population of the interior is particularly vulnerable to the climate is 
that phenomena usually associated with full drought situations (such as 
1970), are clearly observable even when the winter rains in the sertao 
are delayed by as little as a few weeks. In 1975 “ 76, for example, 
the rains were delayed in many parts of the interior, crops failed, relief 
supplies had to be distributed and impoverished rural workers started 
migrating to seek employment in the towns. The arrival of the rains in
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time for sowing saw an immediate return to normality. The distinction 
between a drought situation and a normal situation is, therefore, a 
very fine one.
Part two of this chapter will examine in detail the social and 
economic characteristics of the sertao rural population, showing why 
some groups are protected from the drought effects, but how the majority 
of low-income producers, and in particular some occupational groups, 
are especially liable to suffer as the result of climatic vicissitudes.
This section will be devoted towards clarifying the climatic aspect of 
the ’drought problem', an understanding of which is crucial to a broader 
comprehension of the drought’s impact upon the rural population.
The sertao of North-East Brazil, often referred to in translation as 
"the semi-arid backlands" or its equivalent, is far from being the barren 
desert that is sometimes suggested. It is, rather, a vast region of 
extremely diverse geography with considerable variations in topography 
and climate. Euclides da Cunha, in his classic work on the region, aptly 
named his book Os Sertoes rather than 0 Sertao. Covering some 650,000 
square kilometres, the sertao includes six major river systems as well 
as several fertile upland serras^  That part of the sertao usually 
referred to as "semi-arid" is known as the caatinga, an indigenous word 
meaning "white forest". This covers the drier, less fertile lowland 
areas away from the floors of the river valleys. The caatinga which starts 
on the valley-sides and extends over the surrounding hills, is characterised 
by drought-resistant xerophytic vegetation such as cactii, shrubs and 
small trees. The roots of trees such as the umbuzeiro, jurema and juazeiro 
accumulate w^ ater for the dry season which extends from June to December;
The river systems are; Sao Francisco, Jaguaribe, Apodi, Piranhas-Aqu, 
Parnaiba and Ceara-Mirim. The serras or chapadas include; Ibiapaba, 
Baturite, Araripe, Martins Brejo, Teixeira, and Triunfo.
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.the caatingueira loses its leaves during- the surmoer months in order to
minimize loss of water through evaporation. Numerous types of cactii
2/
abound which shed their leaves for the same reason.—'
The mean annual rainfall for the sertao as a whole is quite high 
at 700mm. but varies from around 400mm. in the driest areas to well 
over 1,000mm. in the humid serras; as much as.1,700mm, for example, has 
been recorded in the Serra do Baturite in Ceara.^/ This rainfall 
pattern permits extensive cattle-raising on the caatinga during the wet 
season (January to Kay approx.) until the dry months arrive, when the 
animals are usually transferred to the margins of rivers or reservoirs, 
or to the high serras for pasturing. In the river valleys a type 
of agriculture has grown up peculiar to the North-Eastern interior known 
as agricultura de vazantes. Under this system small farmers grow their 
food crops such as beans, rice, maize and some vegetables on the 
dried-up river beds or around the edges of reservoirs, enabling a 
second harvest to be made during the dry season when the nearby lands of 
the valley, whose fertility depends solely on rainfall, are unproductive. 
Drought-resisting plants form the basis of extractive industries 
which are very important in the rural economy of the sertao. They not 
only include moco cotton, but also the wax-yielding carnauba palm, 
the oiticica tree whose nuts yield oil and the palma forrageira, a 
spineless cactus which is shredded for use as cattle-fodder. Up in the 
cooler, more humid serras a vast array of crops is produced; fruits,
These cactii include the xique-xique, facheiro, alastrado, mandacaru, 
and coroa-de-frade. Eucliaes da Cunha, 0s Sertoes, R.J., 1968, p. 32 - 9»
3/ Polonordeste, p. 9«
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vegetables, manioc, sugar-cane, and even tobacco and coffee.—^
The mean annual rainfall of the sertao compares favourably with 
many parts of Europe such as Paris, which has 650mm., and London with 800mm. 
The mean annual rainfall however, has little significance in a region 
where distribution over the year is very assymetrical and the median 
monthly rainfall is much higher than the average monthly precipitation.
The climatic problem of this region is not, therefore, one of scarcity 
of rainfall in absolute terms but that of irregular distribution over
the year. Even during a .’normal1 year 80 - 90% of the rainfall
is concentrated during the wet season (January-May)• The duration 
of the rainy season is fairly constant but its starting point, which 
coincides roughly with sowing time in the agricultural calendar,
may vary by between 55 - 85 days, with an 80% probability of correspondence.
The reduction of total rainfall by one-third can have disastrous effects 
if the start of the rainy season is delayed for long enough to make the 
crops fail, as in 1879, 1915» 1958 and 1970 The distribution of 
rainfall can be so erratic that both rainfall and floods (enchentes) 
may occur in the same region within the space of two or three years.
The effects of poor distribution are further aggravated by the high rates 
of run-off and evaporation of rainwater. In the caatinga especially, 
impermeable, crystalline rock formations are common, which slope towards 
the rivers, facilitating rapid run-off, soil erosion, silting up of rivers
Manoel Correia de Andrade, "A Terra e o Povo do Sertao", Revista 
Geografica, 15, Oct. 1975* L.F. Raposo Fontenelle, Rotina e Fome em-uma 
Regiao Cearense Imprensa Universitaria do Ceara, Fortaleza, 1969*
^  GVJ, Estudo Geral de Base do Vale do Jaguaribe; A.presentapao e Sintese,
sudens/asmic, 1967. p. 33.
and evaporation.
The drought of 1970 presents a good example of the effects of
these climatic features. It is sometimes assumed that a drought
necessarily implies a severe decline in the total volume of rainfall
falling v/ithin the affected area. It has even been suggested that the
drop in precipitation is usually as high as 70% of the normal level
during a drought year in the North-East.-^ However, evidence from the
1970 experience, typical in all respects of other serious droughts in
the sertao, does not support this idea. A systematic analysis of the
climatic changes which occurred during the drought concluded that the
total volume of rainfall during the year had fallen substantially in only
a few areas of the sertao, in Ceara and western Pernambuco. The losses
in agricultural production that were suffered in 1970, they concluded, were
due far more to the irregular distribution of rainfall during the rainy
season (January-May approx.) than to a severe decline in the overall
7/volume of rainfall.—' The remainder of the sertao registered deviations 
of less than 25% from the normal mean annual rainfall, while some areas 
even shov/ed a substantial increase (north-eastern Rio Grande do Norte, 
western Paraiba and parts of Bahia). Such a deviation of less than 25% 
is not significant in determining the intensity of a drought since this 
sort of decrease may occur once every two to five years; it is, in fact, 
representative of 'normal' climatic conditions in those areas. Once 
the deviation reaches 30-50% or more it becomes exceptional, occurring 
once every ten to twenty years, and is more likely to produce a drought
^  Otamar de Carvalho, Plano Integrado Para o Combate Preventivo Aos 
Efeitos das Secas no Nordeste, MIKTER, Brasilia, 1973» P» 22.
7/ ✓ A—■' Clovis Cavalcanti and Dirceu Pessoa, Carater e Efeitos da Seca
Nordestina de 1970, SUDENS/SIRAC, Recife, 1973» PP* 52 - 71•
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situation.
However, this sort of absolute decline in total rainfall only 
affected limited areas of the sertao in 1970. A significant factor in 
the 1970 drought was the severe irregularity of rainfall between 
December, 19&9 and May, 1970, during which time four relatively dry 
months alternated with two quite wet months to frustrate the agricultural 
calendar of subsistence farmers. In some areas of the sertao there was 
insufficient rainfall at the time of sowing, while in other -parts the 
first rains were not followed up quickly enough by second and third 
rains, so that the crops could not mature in the ground. Harvests were 
lost and, once peoples’ relatively small stocks of food were exhausted, 
they began to suffer the effects of the seca. Landowners with cattle, 
on the other hand, felt the drought effects far less severely. Evidence 
from the above-quoted study of the 1970 drought clearly shows that 
medium and large landowners were far less adversely affected by the 
seca than the mass of subsistence farmers and rural workers.-^
The relatively recent expansion of the sertao population which 
resulted initially from the nineteenth century cotton boom has been 
described in Chapter I. The population of the region has grown steadily 
ever since so that today the sertao rural population of 18 million 
accounts for 60% of the total North-East population of just over 30 
million. The rural population of the sertao tends to be concentrated in 
the humid valleys, away from the drier areas of caatinga. In the . 
valleys population density is quite high at around 16-17 people per 
square kilometre, and can be as high as 25 per square kilometre in more
This is explained in greater detail in Part Two of Chapter II, 
below.
/ *
fertile areas such as the Car i n  in Ceara, In drier areas such as the
sertao of Crateus in Ceara, however, the figure drops to around 10
9/people per square kilometre.^ 17 Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the
population at risk during a drought is fairly substantial for a region
which is often dismissed as infertile, semi-arid scrubland. These two
factors, then, those of high population density and the effect of an
erratic rainfall regime on a precarious subsistence agriculture, go
much of the way toward explaining the large-scale human impact of the
drought in the sertao.
The particular vulnerability of the sertao rural population to
irregular rainfall distribution was well illustrated during the first half
of 1975 when the winter rains, which usually start in January-March,
depending on the region, did not in many cases arrive until late April.
In the sertao tradition holds that if it does not rain by March, 19th,
St Joseph's Day, a seca is bound to follow. By the middle of April it
was reported that many small farmers were in danger of losing a large part
of their crops such as beans, manioc and maize, upon which they depend for
their food s u p p l y D u r i n g  the same month North-Eastern state governors
took part in a special meeting at SUDENE headquarters to discuss
contingency plans for the setting up of work fronts if the situation
deteriorated further.-^/ In the state of Rio Grande do Norte it was
reported that hungry peasants had tried to ransack food stores in a region
12/where subsistence food stocks had reached a particularly low ebb.— '
2/ SIRAC/SCET, Diagnostico e Fotencialidades, Fase II, Vale do Jaguaribe, 
Vale do Piranhas-Apu, and Sertoes Cearenses, Recife, 1975*
10/ Diario de Pernambuco,
11/ Diario de Pernambuco,
12/ Diario de Pernambuco
However, during1 the last week of April the winter rains arrived and a 
’drought1 situation was averted.
Again, in 1976, delays in the arrival of the winter rains in certain
parts of the interior was enough to necessitate the distribution of
emergency relief to the hungry rural population. As early as January
it was reported that in the Irece region of Bahia.three sowings of beans
and maize had failed and rations were being given out, although it was
certainly not a drought.-^/ In Ouricuri, situated in the sertao of
Pernambuco, bus and trainloads of refugees.made their way to Sao Paulo
in search of employment. Many of the unemployed that remained were given
jobs on work f r o n t s . Y e t  soon afterwards the winter rains arrived and
a full-scale drought did not occurr. However, for those with no
resources to tide them over until the arrival of the rainy season, the
effect on their lives was similar even though, technically speaking,
it was not a drought situation. The events of 1975 and 1976 therefore
demonstrate very clearly how delicate is the dividing line between normality
„ 15/and a drought for, the rural inhabitants of the sertao
The sertao of North-East Brazil is a region of highly diverse 
geography which has both drier areas of semi-scrubland and more humid, 
fertile valleys and highlands. References to its aridity and desert-like 
qualities abound in the writings of DNOCS engineers who have traditionally
—^  "Seca-Por enquanto um aviso”, Ve ja, 21st January, 1976.
”Seca-A precaria sobrevivencia”, Veja, 4th February, 1976.
15/—^  The difference between a normal situation and a drought can be very 
fine in areas of the sertao where water supply facilities are very 
poor. During the dry season peasants are often forced to travel up to 
50 miles to find another source if they are unable to pay for water 
brought in privately by lorry. This was the case in parts of western 
Pernambuco during October-November, 1975* a non-drought year: See 
Jornal do Brasil, 7th November, 1975*
been more concerned with problems of water supply as a solution to the 
drought, than with those of land-ownership, labour relationships 
and access to rural credit. The preoccupation with climate has
resulted in the more politically controversial questions of rural structure
in the sertao being virtually ignored in official plans such as the 
politics, hidraulica of DNOCS. Climate is only one side of the problem 
and, as I hope to demonstrate in Part Two, the way in which the rural 
economy and society in the sertao are organized is as important, if not more 
so, in explaining the vulnerability of the sertanejo to the drought.
Nevertheless, the preoccupation of many observers with climate 
persists. The sertao was recently compared, for example, with the 
Sahelian-Sudanic region of Africa.-^/ It is worth drawing out in some 
detail the fundamental differences between these perhaps superficially 
similar regions. This will illustrate the ambigous nature of the 
Brazilian drought and its origins in socio-economic factors rather than 
climatic hardships. Any attempt to compare the sertao with true deserts
should therefore be treated with some caution.
The Sahelian-Sudanic region of Africa lies south of the Sahara and 
extends through the ex-French colonies of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, 
the Upper Volta and Chad, an area of two million square miles with a 
population of sixty million. During 1973 - 5 it was estimated that between 
five and ten million people were facing starvation as the result of 
drought in the western part of the region, generally known as the Sahel, 
an area with a population of about 25 million. In Etheopia it is thought 
that between 50 and. 100 thousand people died as a result of the drought.
Diario de Pernambuco, 22nd June, 1975*
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Comparisons between the Brazilian sertao and the Sahel are, however, 
very misleading because drought in the African region is relatively 
abnormal•
The nomadic pastoralists from the northern Sahel, where rainfall 
averages a low 100 - 350mm. p.a. have, over the centuries evolved a 
balanced system of exchange with the sedentary population of subsistence 
farmers in the south who enjoy a mean annual rainfall of 350 - 600mm. p.a. 
During the dry season in the north the tribesmen move their herds of 
cattle to graze in the south and, in exchange for pasturing and 
watering rights, the animals deposit manure to fertilize the farmers' 
lands. Some migration southwards after the rainy season is therefore 
quite normal.
Between 1968 and 1973» however, a severe and progressive decline in
mean annual rainfall took place over the whole Sahel. Livestock
perished (50% in Mauritania, 40% in Mali), crops failed and pastures did
not replenish themselves. This caused heavily inflated migratory
movements of northern tribesmen southwards, increasing the already
substantial pressure on the. diminished resources there and creating
conflicts over land and water rights. The important point as far as
this study is concerned, however, is that this drought was abnormal,
brought about by a progressive deterioration in climatic conditions
over recent years due to external factors. Until 1968 there existed a balance
between northern and southern agricultural populations which had enabled
those in the former region to adapt itself very satisfactorily to the 
17/semi-arid climate.— '
Victor Du Bois, The Drought in West Africa, American Universities Field 
Vol. 15 (l), 1974• Howard Brabyn, "6,000 kilometros da Africa 
abandonados a seca", Correio (UNESCO), 3> (6), June, 1975*
Jacques Bugnicourt, "Um povo privado do seu meio secular", Ibid.
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In the Brazilian sertao, on the other hand, the instability 
generally associated with droughts is quite normal, and is commonplace 
after even slight rainfall shortages. This is enough to produce catastrophic 
results in human terms precisely because the agricultural population has 
not adapted itself to the semi-arid climate and a large part of the 
low-income rural mass lives a highly precarious and unpredictable existence, 
totally dependent on their few subsistence crops to support themselves 
over the dry season. The balance between survival and starvation in 
the sertao is so delicate that even during a normal dry season many small 
farmers experience considerable difficulty in making ends meet.
In summary, the sertao population is vulnerable to even slight 
variations in the normal rainfall distribution whereas in the Sahel it 
took a substantial decrease in mean annual rainfall over a, number of 
years to produce a drought situation. A series of external factors was 
responsible for this climatic deterioration; two theories advanced 
suggest that changes in the position of high pressure zones occured 
recently and tha,t there has been a change in the world distribution of 
temperatures, which caused the steady decline in mean annual rainfall 
in the Sahel. Pressures on the ecology have been further increased by 
other factors: pastures have been overgrazed because of a large increase 
recently in the number of cattle caused by amongst other factors, cattle- 
health improvement schemes. Improper land-use characterised by slash-and burn 
agriculture and deforestation has also left soil vulnerable to erosion 
while decreasing its fertility. Consequently, the water-table has been 
lowered by up to 50 or 100 feet in some parts of the Sahel, ruining oases 
and immobilizing hydro-electric installations.^^ As a result of these 
factors a process of 'desertification* is taking place in which the 
Sahara Desert is reputed to be advancing by as much as 30 miles a year in
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some areas, invading the seini-fertile zone. In the last 50 years it is 
estimated that the Sahara has claimed 250,000 square miles of arable 
land.-^/
Generally spea,king it may be said that these characteristics do not
apply to the sertao of North-East Brazil. The mean annual rainfall
is fairly consistent, with deviations of more than 25% an exception.
The drought problem is, rather, one of a precarious subsistence
agriculture dependent on rainfall which is subject to an irregular
distribution throughout the growing season. Some observers have suggested,
however, that the sertao has been subject to at least some of the features
of 'desertification*. Overgrazing, slash-and-burn agriculture and poor
soil-use are blamed for the disappearance of much of the vegetation that
caatinga used to support. This has facilitated soil erosion and
has affected the hydraulic regimes of major rivers, making them more
erratic. It is alleged, for example, that this is one of the reasons
for the drying up of the tributaries of the River Sao Francisco and of its
sharply decreased volume of water in 1970. Deforestation of large areas
along its banks in order to provide fuel for paddle steamers over the
past century has also, it is said, led to increased soil erosion which
has made the river shallower. C0DEVASF has, in fact, started a
20/reafforestation programme in response to this phenomenon.-— '
There is an inherent danger, however, that if too much generalization 
takes place on the basis of such evidence, attention will be drawn away 
from the central problem, which has to do with neither the climate nor
19/ USAID, Desert Encroachment on Arable Lands: Significance, Causes and 
ControlV 0ST/AID, V/ashington, D.C., 1972*
Vasconcelos Sobrinho, cited in "Um Deserto no Coracao do Brasil", 
Manchete. n.d.
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the ecology of the sertao. Sensationalist newspaper articles have
already talked of the "desertification of the North-East", with very
21/
little evidence to substantiate this claim,— ' Such arguments reinforce 
the popular image of the sertao as a region whose misfortunes are 
entirely the product of a harsh climate and poor natural resources, 
and whose salvation lies in a climatic solution. Thus, much has been 
made of claims that it wall soon be possible to create artificial rainfall 
in the interior, to the extent of being able to do away with the drought 
completely. One scientist recently proclaimed that artificial rainfall 
will "resolve once and for all the drought problem in the North-East, 
modifying the climate of the region, reestablishing a perfect hydrological 
cycle and regulating rainfall". This would be achieved by burning 
petroleum at strategic points in order to create carbon particles which 
would rise and form rain-bearing clouds that would be carried across 
the sertao by the wind.^^ The announcement of this technique inspired a 
major North-Eastern newspaper to proclaim "The End of Droughts in the 
North-Eas t"
Despite the enormous technical difficulties involved, the same 
assumption is present that control of water availability on its own is 
sufficient to solve the drought problem. This false assumption was, to 
a large extent, responsible for the failure of DNOCS's politica hidraulica. 
based on reservoir construction, to have any substantial impact on the 
drought. DNOCS still places considerable emphasis on rainfall distribution 
as the main problem facing the sertao. comparing drought in the North-East
Diario de Pernambuco, 22nd June, 1975*
"Project for the Modification of the North-Eastern Climate", announced 
by the Technical Aerospace Centre, Sao Paulo, 0 Povo. 8th October, 1975*
Reports in 0 Povo, 8th - 9th October, 1975*
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to the "world problem" of arid and semi-arid l a n d s . I  wish, in 
part two of this chapter, to change the climatic emphasis somewhat, 
by analysing the rural structure of the sertao in order to show how its 
evolution and present-day characteristics influence the vulnerability of 
its population to climatic uncertainties.
.-u" r ? K
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DNOCS, Programa e Obras, Fortaleza, 19&0, p« 3*
PART II: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF THE DROUGHT
In this section I intend to demonstrate that the human tragedy of
the drought in North-East Brazil is due as much to the social and
economic organization of the region as to climatic vicissitudes* I
shall argue that the agricultural economy of the sertao places certain
clearly definable groups of rural producers in a situation of weakness
and dependency which leaves them with few resources to fall back on
in times of hardship when a drought occurrs. The task of identifying
these groups and accounting for their particular vulnerability is clearly
central to any analysis of the problem. Any government strategy aimed
at alleviating the impact of the drought, such as irrigation, must
somehow reach these people if anti-drought measures are to have any
substantial or visible counter-effect.
Some 8 million people or 32% of the total population of the North-East
falls within the boundaries of the drought-affected zone,^ During a
drought overall agricultural production declines significantly over 
2/previous years,—' a loss which, in 1970, amounted to an estimated 300 
million U.S. dollars, equivalent to a 17% decrease in production over 
1969. In 1951 and 1958 the drop was in the order of 10%.^ The drought 
creates such havoc amongst certain groups of the low income rural 
population, however, because it is precisely those crops upon which they 
depend for their livelihood and their own diet that are most adversely 
affected, namely cotton and staple foods such as beans, corn and manioc.
^  Clovis Cavalcanti and Dirceu Pessoa, Carater e Efeitos da Seca 
Hordestina de 1970, SUDENE/SIRAC, Recife, 1973, P. 76.
^  See Table 1.
^  Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., pp. 74 - 6.
-  50 -
As table 2 shows, in drought-hit areas total production of these crops 
fell by over 80% in 1970. This fact is of crucial importance in 
explaining the severity of the social calamity since these staple foods 
make up the diet of large sections of the rural populace and represent 
their only means of support during a drought. This is especially true of 
sharecroppers (parceiros) and smallholders (minifundistas) who have 
remained, if not totally outside the money economy, connected to it 
only in an indirect fashion. This argument is developed in greater detail 
below, but it is worth making the basic point here that because of the 
small cash income received by these groups, either from the 
commercialization of their produce or from wage payments, they are 
primarily dependent on a few meagre stocks of staple foods to see them 
through long dry spells.
During a drought the scarcity of food supplies causes prices to rise
considerably*^ This has a compensatory effect for those producers
(usually large and medium-sized landowners) and merchants who are able to
store produce and can take advantage of their more direct links with the
market economy to exploit the price increases. Many in fact make large
profits from the shortages, as in the infamous "industrias da seca”
5/already discussed in Chapter One.«*" Pressures on already scarce foodstuffs 
are increased by the entry of previously self-sufficient producers onto 
the market with what little money they have at their disposal. Work 
fronts relieve this pressure somewhat by injecting money into the 
drought-hit economy, but it is possible to take the view that they 
encourage landowners to dispense with their workers temporarily. This
4/ See Table 2.
Antonio Callado, As Industrias da Seca e os ’Galileus1 de Pernambuco, 
Civiliza9ao Brasileira, R.J., I960.
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removes from employers the onus of having to support their dependents while 
minimising the risk of losing labour through migration from the area.
In summary, then, sharecroppers and, to a lesser extent smallholders, 
are likely to suffer most during a drought because they lack the 
resources to maintain themselves on their plots. An important factor 
which influences the farmer’s decision whether to migrate or not is the 
availability not just of food but of water. Shortages of permanent, local 
supplies of drinking water for human consumption provide an additional 
pressure on families to leave a drought-hit region. This problem is 
compounded by the practical difficulties of distributing sufficient 
quantities of the liquid in lorries (carros pipas) to isolated rural 
communities. Neither are smaller fazendeiros totally immune. If 
natural pastures and smaller acjudes dry up in extreme cases, cattle 
deaths may be caused by lack of water and undernourishment caused by 
inadequate fodder from cactii and leaves.^
It was recognised long ago that in North-East Brazil rural
labourers, as opposed to landowners, are particularly vulnerable to the
seca. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the travellers Spix
and Martius noted with alarm how landowners were reluctant to allow their
workers to plant food crops on land which could be put to other use,
”... owners of large fazendas do not wish to cede the smallest area of their
land (for food production) because they consider these large tracts
7/mdespensable for cattle raising".-L/ More recently a government report 
recognized that the harmful effects of the drought are "concentrated 
on a group with no means of defence".^ However, only in 1970 was the
^  0__Globo, 11th January, 1976.
7/ * *J. Alves, Hlstoria das Secas, Instituto do Ceara, Fortaleza, 1955» P* 95*
8/ / ^G.T.D.N. lima Politica cle Pesenvolvimento Economico para o Nordeste.
SUBENE, Recife, 196?, p. 67.
differential impact of the seca on various rural groups analysed in any
detail. Nearly 3,000 interviews were conducted on work fronts and
9/agricultural establishments in the drought zone.-7 The results show 
quite clearly that sharecroppers (parceiros) are the worst affected, 
accounting for 42% of work front members but only 7% of the total rural 
labour force in the sertao Smallholders are the next most adversely
affected group, constituting 31% of front recruits. According to 
Cavalcanti and Pessoa the impact on minifundistas is proportional to 
their membership of the rural labour force (30.68%)• This figure is 
derived from statistics fcr the whole North-East, however, rather than 
just the interior. Information from the 1970 Agricultural Census permits 
a breakdown to be made and it emerges that the real figure is 19,29%
(see Table 3)* The effects of the drought are thus felt disproportionately 
by both parceiros and minifundistas.
The drought has a far greater adverse effect on smallholdings 
than larger properties. Contrary to the opinion sometimes voiced that 
larger fazendeiros are more prone to evicting workers, in 1970 it was found 
that 85% of work front members came from properties of under 10 hectares.1^  
In the sertao as a whole, minifundios in this category account for 61% of 
the total number of holdings and only 4*6% of the total cultivated area,
12/although clearly the density of population is much higher in this group*— ' 
Furthermore, despite the fact that sharecroppers obliged to leave small 
properties formed the largest section of work front recruits in 1970, 
parceiros tend to be concentrated on latifundios. The Agricultural Census
9/^  Cavalcanti and Pessoa,- op cit.
^  See Table 3.
Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit*. p. 113,
12/ See Table 4*
does not "break down forms of rural employment "by property size, but a
recent survey suggests that in the sertao sharecroppers make up 1% of
the labour force on properties of under 10 hectares, rising to 25% on
13/holdings of over 500 hectares,—
The drought also discriminates geographically as well as
occupationally and by property size. The areas of highest population
density in the sertao, in the states of Ceara, Paraiba and Rio Grande
do Norte, are the worst affected by the drought in terms of the proportion
of the population recruited onto work fronts In addition, it is
precisely these three states which have the highest proportion of
15/subordinate sharecroppers in their rural work-force.—a-/ A combination, 
then, of high population density and popularity of sharecropping helps 
explain why certain areas require inordinately heavy government emergency 
relief during a drought. This is corroborated by Table 6 which 
demonstrates that it is.again these regions which sustain the heaviest 
losses in both food and industrial crops during the drought.
Larger properties are protected from the drought by concentrating 
their assets into cattle rearing and cotton cultivation. Extensive 
cattle-raising formed the economic basis for the colonization of the 
sertao and it has always been relatively resistant to the rigours of 
periodic droughts. This is not to say, of course, that fazendeiros were 
such a privileged elite as to be totally immune. Cattle ranches were not, 
on the whole, very wealthy in absolute terms. Their herds were fairly small 
with a low annual production and the cattle left to graze on the open
13 / f—'y  JBRD/SULEilE, Pesquisa do Tamanho Tiulco da Unidade de Produqao
Agricola no hordeste, preliminary data (unpublished), Recife, 1975*
^  See Table 5.
See Table 12.
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range for most of the year* Most fazendas in the Sao Francisco Valley, 
for example, produced an average of 50 to 100 calves per year in 1860rs, while 
the figure was nearer 30 per annum in Rio Grande do Norte* If we accept 
contemporary evidence, it seems that most of the profits from the sale 
of cattle went into the pockets of the middlemen or marchantes rather 
than the landowners 1
Nevertheless only the most severe droughts such as that of 1877 - 80 
seriously depleted the cattle population. Cattle has the advantage of 
being a geographically mobile asset so that, during a dry period, owners 
could move their herds to the more humid valleys and serras. These 
retiradas of animals were a common feature of nineteenth century life in
1n Ithe interior.— ^ Nevertheless, transport difficulties were greater then
and the mobility of ranchers with fewer resources more limited* Until the
late nineteenth century additional watering facilities were extremely
scarce. Nowadays many cattle raisers have access to better grazing and
watering for their animals near private or public apudes. as well as
motorised transport for transferring their livestock to better pastures
should the need arise. Fazendeiros also switch areas of cotton and staple
18/
food production to grazing in order to protect their cattle*— ' In this 
way the burden of the drought falls unequally on the shoulders of the 
sharecropper who, faced with the extra problem of trying to eke out an 
existence on drier soils, sees his means of support being consumed by 
forraging animals. As a subordinate worker with no legal or other power to
w
11/
18/
Roger Lee Cunniff, The Great Drought; Northeast Brazil. 1877 — 80, 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1970* PP* 18 - 24.
Lopes de Andrade, Introdupao a Soclologia das Secas, Editora A. Noite, 
R.J., 1948, p. 154.
Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., p. 177*
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stop this process, his only alternative is usually to leave the land.
The degree to which agricultural activity in the sertao is organized
to protect cattle rather than other sectors during a drought is
illustrated by the fact that while staple food production declined
substantially in 1970 (Table 2), cattle showed a slight increase over
19/the previous year, in line with the national trend.—a The price of cattle 
went down slightly in most states but this was a temporary fall in their 
value which was not prolonged. The main impact of the drought on cattle 
producers seems to have taken the form of a short term disincentive to 
invest further in cattle stocks and permanent c r o p s . T h e  protection 
afforded to cattle producers during a drought is well illustrated by 
Table 8, which shows, that during 1970 large estates were able to switch 
their resources rapidly into livestock, as the situation demanded. The 
income from cattle of properties under 10 hectares decreased from 28% to 
24%, while the income from livestock for larger establishments rose from 
27% to 46% of the total.
Larger properties also have the advantage of having a substantial 
portion of their commercial assets in cotton-growing, which complements 
cattle-raising rather well. Cotton is harvested in the dry season, 
leaving the land free for grazing cattle when the natural pastures dry up. 
Cotton may be interplanted with sliort-cycle crops such as beans and corn, 
permitting the development of sharecropping arrangements. Finally, cotton­
seed cake and corn husks provide valuable cattle fodder. During a drought, 
however, cotton production declines for two reasons: firstly, the land is 
obviously less productive and, secondly, having land under cotton normally
i^See Table 7.
20/— ' Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit.. pp. 92 - 4» 212 - 13.
allows this area to "be converted into pasture when returns are maximised 
by grazing cattle there rather than using it to produce a small cotton 
crop. This decline in cotton production is clearly shown in Table 2, 
which also indicates that producers received compensation for reduced 
output in the form of price rises. Latifundistas. v/ho deal directly with 
wholesalers or even with cotton gins, are less likely to suffer a drop 
in income than smallholders and sharecroppers who are often obliged 
to deal throiigh intermediaries and more likely to receive either a 
smaller price than is their due, or to be paid in kind rather than cash.
The 1970 study suggests that the real income of properties below 
25 hectares suffered most during the drought. Holdings of between 25
21/and 1,000 hectares, on the other hand, seemed to be the least affected.—J 
These conclusions can only be tentative, however since methodological 
difficulties of limited sample-size and of quantifying '’subsistence” food 
production do not allow a complete comparision of income according to 
property size. Nonetheless, as a general rule it seems reasonable to 
assume that larger holdings are better protected from the seca by concentrating 
their activities on selling cattle and its by-products. Cotton also 
provides an income as well as an alternative source of grazing land at the 
expense of staple crops. The IBRD/SUDENE survey also documents the higher 
net income of larger properties. Despite having to support a far denser 
population, holdings of less than 10 hectares enjoyed an income equal to 
11% of those in the 50 to 100 hectare group and to a mere 2% of properties 
over 500 hectares.'An additional consideration in the case of 
fazendeiros is that many have alternative incomes from interests outside of
Ibid., pp. 191 - 5* 
SUDENE/IBRD, op cit.
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agriculture. Their dependence on a drought-affected agriculture is thus 
likely to be less than for the mass of rural workers.
The 'drought question1 in North-East Brazil, then,which is still 
thought of by many as principally one of water shortage, is centred 
less around climatic uncertainties than social and economic factors. The 
rural structure of the sertao places thousands of .low-income farmers, 
predominantly sharecroppers and smallholders, on the economic margin, 
vulnerable to even minor disruptions of the agricultural calendar. It is 
worth contrasting again, very briefly, this situation with that in the 
Sahelian region of Central Africa. In the latter region, until severe 
falls in the total volume of rainfall over several years hit the cattle 
economy, the nomads of the arid north were able to adapt adequately to the 
long, dry summers by moving their herds southwards and coexisting 
harmoniously with the sedentary subsistence farmers there. No such 
adaptive mechanisms exist within sertao agriculture for the flagelados. 
who are obliged to migrate to urban areas or to seek assistance on 
emergency work fronts. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to 
explain why this is so.
The vulnerability of particular groups to the drought is a direct 
product of the landownership structure in th© sertao and the system 
of tenancy relationships which has grown up around it. The commercializable 
rural surplus (cattle, cotton and some staple foods)is extracted by a 
relatively small minority of large and medium-sized landowners as well as 
a variety of merchants or middlemen, while a large part of the poorer 
population remain dependent on a precarious, largely subsistence* 
agriculture susceptible to minor reductions in rainfall.
'Subsistence* production is taken to mean that part of the crop consumed by 
the farmer and his family and which does not enter the market, either
directly or indirectly.
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Landownership in the interior is very heavily skewed. Table 10 
breaks down rural establishments into size categories for the sertao. 
showing that 6l% of holdings are under 10 hectares and occupy less than 
5% of the total area. At the other end of the scale, properties of 
over 1000 hectares account for only 5% of the total number but cover 
69% of the area. Criticisms have been levelled at Brazilian Census 
statistics on the grounds that they understate the degree of concentration 
of ownership.* Use of 'rural establishment’, an administrative division, 
rather than ’rural property’, a juridical unit, does not take into 
account multiple ownership of several holdings administered by third 
parties on the owner's behalf. The latter criterion is that adopted 
by INCRA in their surveys of rural areas but, even so, both the IBGE and 
INCRA deal with continuous areas of land under the same administration or 
ownership respectively. No survey has yet shown the distribution of 
total areas of land owned by the same person, whether the properties are 
together or seperated.
However, comparison of Census statistics with data obtained from 
independent studies of selected areas in the sertao suggests that IBGE 
estimates reflect fairly closely the real distribution of total property 
ownership. In the valley of the river Piranhas, Paraiba, it was found 
that 72% of properties were under 10 hectares but occupied only 19% of the 
land, the average size being 5*6 hectares. Larger holdings of more than
50 hectares, only 4% of the total number, took up 47% of the area, with an
23 / /average size of 160 hectares.— *-' In the neighbouring state of Ceara in
the valley of the river Banabuiu 67% of the land was owned by the largest
Hidroservice, Recuperapao Hidroagricola da Bacia de Trrigacao de Sao 
Gonpalo. Vo. VI. Hidroservice, Sao Paulo, 1971* p. 1 - 3* 2.
* See for example: SUDENE/lERD, op cit.
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16% of property holders Along the Jaguaribe this pattern is repeated,
where 30% of all establishments are under 10 hectares and occupy a mere
3% of the land while those of over 100 hectares account for 10% of the
25/number but nearly 50% of the area.— ^ Similar conditions are to be found 
in all the densely populated river valleys of the sertao.
The severely unequal distribution of property ownership in the 
interior is a product of the fact that, from the earliest days of colonial 
expansion, the cattle fazenda was the basic unit of occupation end territorial 
expansion in the interior. Until the nineteenth century the sertao economy 
was based exclusively on extensive cattle rearing using open-range 
methods on relatively large properties. The most common form of dividing 
the land amongst donatarios was for each to be granted a distance of 
river frontage. The boundaries of the property would extend vertically 
backwards from the water, frequently for an unspecified distance. Each 
landowner would have a section of wetter, more fertile soils as well as a 
slice of caatinga where his cattle could be pastured in winter months.
During this phase the sertao was sparsely populated. The typical fazenda 
would employ a vagueiro and perhaps some assistants on larger ranches.
The only other components of the rural labour force consisted of a few 
peasants who were allowed to squat on the land if they agreed to provide 
food for the ranch. Farming was merely an appendage of the cattle 
industry.
During the nineteenth century, however, the situation changed 
radically. Cotton became established as a commercially successful crop, 
encouraged by a 32 year period without droughts in the sertao between
SIRAC, Vale do Bgnabuiu: Zona de Tranzipao. DN0CS, 1973* p. 50*
SIRAC, Baixo Jaguaribe: Estudo de Viabilidade. Vol. II. Part 4♦ 
DN0CS, Recife, 1974, p. 52.
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1845' - 77 and boom conditions on the world market resulting from
shortages caused by the American Civil War# Food-crop farming for the
subsistence needs of an increasingly large rural population thus came to
constitute an important activity in its own right. Simultaneously
with this vast influx properties were becoming more fragmented owing to the
absence of primogeniture. In 1867 Sir Richard Burton observed that
three generations of the same family had divided up an estate which
used to run along 11 leagues* of the River Sao Francisco into many smaller
farms Orville Derby reported the same phenomenon in the area around
27/the Paulo Affonso Falls caused by inheritance and land sales.—"
As a result of this fragmentation process many landholdings are nowadays 
too small to provide a livelihood for their owners. In the Jaguaribe 
Valley, for example, properties exist of less than one metre in width 
which stretch back from the river for perhaps several hundred metres.
The most extreme case encountered was a property only 20 centimetres widej^/ 
This period of expansion in the interior saw the emergence of a 
variety of tenancy arrangements between landowners and rural workers. In 
addition to the vagueiros and the few small farmers who provided food for 
the large estates new categories were formed: tenant farmers (rendeiros)# 
sharecroppers (parceiros), day labourers (.jornaleiros) and squatters 
(ocupantes). These categories were adopted from the neighbouring agreste 
region closer to the coast which had been settled far earlier. These 
relationships had the effect of extracting for the landowners that portion 
of production which could be sold for a cash profit, namely, cattle, 
cotton and some food products. At the same time they gave the peasant the
Sir Richard Burton, The Highlands of Brazil, 2 Vols., London, 1869, II, 
p. 432.
Orville Derby, Reconhecimento Geologico do Vale do Sao Francisco, 
Typografia Nacional, R.J., 1880, p. 23#
Data from ray own field research in Ceara, Brazil, 1975*
* 1 league = 3*8 miles (6 kilometres)#
right to occupy the land in return for payment either of a cash rent or, 
as was more usually the case, for a stipulated share of the crop.
On the one hand agricultural production was clearly linked to capitalist 
markets and was stimulated by the profit motive as far as the fazendeiro was 
concerned. On the other hand it was only possible to extract this surplus 
through the maintenance of what may be termed 'feudalist-type' relations 
between, landowners and their work force such as debt-bondage, reinforced 
by ties of conrpadrasco or godparenthood and patron-clientage. The 
majority of rural labourers had few direct dealings with the cash economy, 
paying their rent and receiving their rewards in kind predominantly.
It has been argued that in the nineteenth century sertao the wealth 
of the landowning class depended on the area cf land owned and on 
maintaining the lowest standard of living for the rural mass in order to 
maximise profits. Monopolization of the land, it is alleged, made it 
possible to determine the conditions of the poor by controlling their access 
to it.^/ Whether or not this was a conscious strategy on the part of 
most landowners is debatable. Certainly during this period the 
identifiable rural groups which were formed seem to have led a very 
precarious existence. This is true of squatters, sharecroppers and day 
labourers, the landless ambulatory agregados who constituted the largest 
and poorest section of the peasantry. Tenant farmers seem to have been 
better off.
The economic position of low-income farmers in the sertao was 
aggravated by increased pressure on land caused by population growth and 
migration. Gradually the most fertile areas in the valleys and uplands 
became occupied, a process which was accellerated by the 1845 drought.
V. Cadaxa, Rural Tra.de Unionism and Politics in N.E. Brazil, mimeo., 
London University, 1973, p* 10*
In 1850 the serras, which until then had been the territorial patrimony 
of the indians, became jjublic domain. By I860 small farmers had 
reached the stage of invading the more arid caatinga, while settlers 
too poor to buy land became tenant farmers, squatters, sharecroppers and 
labourers for the landowners, forming a pooj^of cheap labour. The last 
three groups, the migratory agregados with no fixed contracts on fazendas, 
were particularly affected by the drought given their less secure positions. 
The disastrous impact of the 1877 - 80 seca may partly be explained 
by the high proportion of agregados employed in agriculture, an estimated
200,000 out of a total population of half a million in the state of 
Ceara alone
An additional strain on the rural work fnrce was produced by changes
in the composition of the peasantry resulting from the cotton boom.
Evidence suggests that many herdsmen and small farmers producing for
their own subsistence needs switched to growing cotton, becoming marginal
commercial farmers. The end of the boom period coincided roughly with
the end of the 1877 drought, leaving farmers with a severely reduced
income from cotton as well as fewer staple food crops with which to sustain 
32/themselves s*—*
Apart from the economic and social mechanisms underlying the system of 
domination, there existed an important political dimension. Coronelismo 
is the name given to the system of political behaviour which allowed 
individual landowners or cliques of fazendeiros to control the vote in 
rural areas in exchange for favours from local, state and national elites.
Cunniff, op cit., pp. 28 - 31«
33 / ~Thomaz Pompeu de Souza Brasil, Ensaio Estatistico da Provincia do
Ceara, 2 Vols., Fortaleza, I867, II, p* 393*
Cunniff, op cit.. p. 96.
•Colonels* were originally imperially-appointed, officers of the now 
extinct Guardia Nacional, a post either given to or bought by the most 
powerful landowner in a municipio. After the military post had been
33/abolished the term was used as an unofficial title for local bosses,
First established in the sugar plantation society of Pernambuco and 
Bahia, coronelismo spread with the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
into the sertao. The power of a local coronel depended on the number of 
votes he could direct, frequently reinforced by various extra-legal 
methods such as fraud, threats of violence and the use of hired henchmen 
(capangas) to intimidate victims. Not only was he immune from the police, 
he frequently used them for his own personal ends, administering justice 
as he saw fit.-^/
At a broader level, then, the local boss was able to use his 
influence to exert pressure on state legislatures, party machines and
juridical procedures as well as gain access to additional financial resources
*5/ 'such as bank c r e d i t T h e  example of the Inhamuns area in Ceara
illustrates how effectively one family could dominate the economy and 
political life of a region for over two hundred years despite the 
penetration of external threats to its authority such as the arrival of the
36/police corps and the creation of political parties,-^
In times of extreme need the colonels were not averse to recruiting 
the services of independent bandits (cangaqeiros) to supplement their own 
strong-arm men. If really desperate they would ally with each other, a
33/
P. Singleman, "Political Structures and Social Banditry in Northeast 
Brazil", Journal of Latin American Studies, VII, I, 1974*
34/ /—  M.V. Vilaipa and R.C. de Albuquerque, Coronel. coroneis, Tempo Brasileiro, 
R.J., 1965, pp. 38 - 9.
^  Ibid.
36/
—  B.J. Chandler, The Feitosas and the Sertao dos Inhamuns, University of 
Florida Fress, Gainsville, 1972.
case in point being the 1911 pacto dos coroneis in the Cariri Valley.-*-^ 
At the same time, however, class solidarity amongst coroneis was 
undermined by often profound vertical splits when families would fight 
each other for control of local political offices or land. Despite the 
system of heirarchical interdependence of local, state and national 
levels of patronage, however, ultimately the power of the coronel rested 
on the dependence of his rural followers and the amount of grass roots 
support he could muster.
The significance of coronelismo at the level of the estate was that 
political and socio-economic controls reinforced each other. It has 
been suggested that this political activity was an essential partner to 
economic exploitation, allowing landlords to squeeze the maximum possible 
surplus from their work-force, eliciting submissiveness and crushing any 
resistance or attempts to challenge their monopoly over the land,-^^
While no doubt there is a good deal of truth in this argument, it can 
be carried too far,' If a landowner’s degree of political leverage did 
depend on the number of votes he controlled and hence on the number of 
followers, he would surely risk losing his dependents to another patron 
if he treated them too harshly. There must have been some freedom of 
mobility, although this was probably reduced by the coercive power of the 
landowner, by debt-bondage, difficult communications and similarity of 
working conditions overall.
In turning to an analysis of the existing system of tenure 
arrangements, principally those of sharecropping and minifundismo, it 
is precisely the more subtle forms of social and economic coercion, along
37/ Singleman, op cit,, p, 77*
V, Cadaxa, op cit., p. 10 and M.A. Ferraz de Sa, Dos Velhos aos Novos 
Coroneis, PIKES, Recife, 1973» PP* 23 - 5*
v/ith the more obvious pressures, which determine the dependence of these 
groups and their consequent vulnerability to the drought. Firstly, 
however, a few comments are in order on the problem of actually 
classifying rural occupational groupings. It is often rather difficult 
to establish hard and fast definitions between the various groups such as 
smallholders (minifundistas), tenant farmers (arrendatarios), sharecroppers 
(parceiros), squatters (ocupantes) or wageworker (assalariado or diarista), 
In theory a tenant farmer pays rent in cash while a sharecropper gives 
a certain portion of his crops to the landlord. In practice, however, 
both groups sometimes pay a combination of goods, cash or services. 
Similarly, a smallholder who cannot support his family from his plot of 
land may supplement his income by working as a day-labourer for a local 
fazendeiro. In one survey it was found that 4 out of 608 parceiros 
interviewed paid money as rent in addition to supplying goods and services 
to the landlord. Of ’JO arrendatarios 44 paid exclusively in cash while the 
remainder supplemented this with labouring and part of the crop,-^/
Another study of the sertao of Caninde, Ceara, discovered that 36% of 
sharecroppers supplemented their income by working as wage-labourers at 
some stage in the year.^^
Despite these apparent anomalies, it is felt that distinctions between 
rural groups are drav/n sufficiently clearly in the major sources of 
reference used in the present study. Particularly relevant is the 
parceiro fs relationship with the landlord for, as the 1970 drought survey 
by Cavalcanti and Pessoa showed, it is this group which is especially 
badly hit by the drought. All sources quoted adopt the standard definition
39/ Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., p. 139*
40/*3-/ G.F. Patrick and J.J. de Carvalho Filho, Grupos de Pobreza na
Agricultura Brasileira: Relatorio Prellminar, FIPE, Sao Paulo, 1975* 
p. 28.
parcerio as a worker who received payment mainly in kind and who 
pays rent in the form of an agreed share of the various crops (one-half, 
one-quarter, one-third, etc.)* This is also the criterion adopted by 
the Brazilian Census Division (IBGE) and allows comparison of micro-studies 
with broader trends as indicated by official statistics.
An important conceptual problem which cannot be overlooked, of course 
is how to establish a sharecropper*s exact degree of dependence on a 
particular landowner. Some indication may be given by breaking down payments 
of goods, services and cash to the landowner. Alternatively, it may be 
possible to show whether the parceiro is 'responsible* for administering 
the property or whether he is subordinate to someone else, as does the 
Agricultural Census. Ideally, a number of variables should be taken into 
account which have a bearing on the sharecropper's situation but which are 
difficult if not impossible to quantify using standard questionnaire survey 
techniques. These may include pressures such as intimidation or debt- 
bondage. Descriptive evidence has, therefore, to be used to complement 
quantitative data. The fact of parceiros' economic weakness and 
disproportionate vulnerability to the drought is, nevertheless, well 
established.
Sharecropping is more common in the sertao than in any.other region 
of the North-East. A study of Pernambuco showed that, as a percentage of 
total cultivated area, twice as much land is sharecropped in the interior
as in the more fertile agreste.-^^ In terms of the percentage of rural
establishments administered by sharecroppers as opposed to arrendatarios. 
parceria in the sertao do Pa.jeu is 2.2 times as common as in the agreste
setentrional. Por the interior as a whole one and a half times as much
See Table 9.
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42/land is sharecropped as is rented by cash-paying farmers In the
coastal zona da mata sharecropping is virtually non-existent.
About 85% of agricultural labour in the interior is provided by the 
person administering a property and his f a m i l y  . 4 2 /  The landowner 
who wishes to recruit additional workers on a longer term basis than 
temporary assalariados employed during busy periods such as the harvest, 
is faced with few alternatives. The other major tenancy arrangement 
apart from sharecropping would be to lease the land to a tenant farmer 
or arrendatario. In 1970» according to the Agricultural Census, of
500,000 'responsible' producers in the sertao some 84,000 consisted of 
tenant farmers, or 5*25% of the total labour force. The number of 
sharecroppers (both .'responsible' and subordinate) totalled 186,000 or 
7.2% of the sertao rural labour force of 750*000. Although many landlords 
employ tenant farmers, then, parceria is clearly the most common tenure 
arrangement after ownership of land itself (19.3% of the work force).44/
The sheer force of tradition could be used as an argument to help 
explain the continued use of sharecropping in the sertao. Ideally one 
would like to undertake a comprehensive study of the economic rationality 
behind the use of parceria in this region of Brazil. However, such an 
analysis is beyond the scope of the present thesis. It seems reasonable 
to suggest, nevertheless, that parceria offers certain advantages over other 
types of arrangement. Broadly speaking, under this system the landlord 
is able to extract a substantial economic surplus in kind which he is then able 
to commercialize. This effectively minimises the sharecropper's
4^/ Agricultural Census, 1970. 
42/ See Table 12.
44/ Agricultural Census, 1970.
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participation in the market economy and helps to stabilize employees
on the land. The owner's share of the crop may vary considerably, but a
typical example is the case of parceiros in the Valley of the River
Piranhas, Paraiba, who occupied 78% of the land rented out by landowners.
The latter were generally paid one-half of the permanent crops (cotton,
bananas) as well as one-third to one-fifth of all temporary crops
(beans, corn, manioc), the remainder being for the share tenant and his
45/family to consume, sell or exchange.-3-^
Johnson concludes that sharecropping is an adaptive form of
production which enables parceiros to meet subsistence needs and make the
46/best of things in their struggle for existence.-3—7 Cheung also points
out in relation to Taiwan that share tenancy is not necessarily an
inefficient way of allocating resources but may be a rational means of
47/maximising wealth under given circumstances.-3-37 Johnson argues, furthermore, 
that a parceiro can express his independence from a landlord by being 
able to leave the fazenda quite freely if he wishes, confident that he 
can find work with another l a n d o w n e r . 4 2 /  However, freedom of movement 
does not necessarily signify freedom from the system of parceria, which 
studies indicate to be similar in its basic features all over the sertao.
Even Johnson admits that there are, in practice, considerable restraints
on the share tenant leaving the fazenda of his own free will. He has
invested his labour in planting cotton and other crops which have a value
and can be sold to the landlord or consumed. If the worker suddenly 
leaves he forfeits the right to any compensation, a restriction which was
42/ Hidroservice, on cit.. Vol. 6.
44/ \v,A. Johnson, Sharecroppers of the Sertao, Stanford University Press, 
California, 1971*
47/—u Steven Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago' and London, 1969.
42/ Johnson, on cit., pp. 31 - 40.
felt by most except the newly arrived on the farm that the author 
studied
A large degree of freedom of mobility is only theoretically
possible in areas where labour is scarce and its supply relatively
inelastic, as appears to be the case in the area of Ceara studied by
Johnson*-^/ It is doubtful, on current evidence, whether this region
is typical of the sertao as a whole. Firstly, several studies indicate
51/
a surplus of labour, especially in the more densely populated valleys.—^
Secondly, the degree of rural underemployment in the sertao is hidden
by the fact that the unpaid, family labour sector absorbs much of the
excess which remains after emigration. The importance of this group
should not be underestimated since 1970 Census figures Indicate'
O' 52/that it accounts for 83% of the rural labour force in the sertao,— '
A recent study estimated that in 1970 the ’surplus’ rural labour force was 
as high as 547*000 or 21% of thetotal.-^/ The presence of such 
additional labour diminishes the bargaining power of labour generally 
because it acts as a reserve of manpower which can be tapped by landlords 
when required.
For the landowner, then, especially the larger fazendeiros, share-
42/ Ibid., pp. 40 - 1,
50/— Ibid., p. 38, and V/.A. Johnson and B.A. Siegel, "Wages and Income in
Ceara, Brazil", Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 25,1, Spring, 1969* 
pp. 4 - 6.
Hidroservice, op cit., and DNOCS/SUDEC, Estudo Socio-Econoraico de Uma 
Area Rural do Yale do Acarau, Fortaleza, 1973* PP* 76 - 80, and 
W.K. Nicholls and Huv Miller Paiva, Noventa e Nove Sitios e Fazendas:<• - ............. -  1 1 ■ ■ .........    —  — —— —  f
Estrutura e Produtividade da Agricultura Brasileira, III Regiao do Carin 
Crato, FGV, E.J., 1968, p. l05.
52/-£/ See Table 12.
53/ /
™  Vicenzo d’Apote, Bases Para uma Politica de Colonizayao e Reforma Agrarxa 
no Hordeste do Brasil, SUBSNE, Recife, 1972, pp. 115 - 17-
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cropping is a reasonably profitable means of acquiring labour for his 
property. The payments in kind mentioned above as the basic fes,ture of 
parceria, mean that the landlord ms,y keep his workers on the land throughout 
the year without having to pay wages for the entire period, as he would 
have to with assalariados permanentes, This system also reduces costs 
of production since the parceiro is inevitably required to pay for
such items as seeds himself. In order to do this he will probably request
a loan from his employer against the subsequent crop. At this stage the 
sharecropper has made a medium to long term obligation towards his 
landlord which places the former in a decidedly subordinate position. The 
overwhelming majority of agreements between share tenants and landlords 
are v e r b a l a n d  liable to different interpretations according to who 
happens to have the upper hand. Committed to repaying the loan, the 
parceiro is frequently forced to sell his share of the harvest to the 
landlord v/hile it is still in the ground (venda na folha) at a price well 
below that which the employer will obtain on the market. If he sells his 
produce immediately after the harvest the tenant will still get a low 
price because supply is at its maximum and the parceiro is unable to store
his cotton or beans for sale during the off-season.
Sharecropping is not a totally repressive relationship with no 
advantages for the parceiro. For the landless worker parceria represents 
a more attractive proposition than daily wage-labour which is unpredictable 
in supply and whose rewards are subject to inflationary pressures
Of 435 contracts surveyed in the sertao do Pajeu, only 5 (l%) were
written and the rest verbal, SIRAC, Estudo de, Rentabilidadet Table 4?2,
In the Acarau Valley, Ceara, wage workers (alugados) are almost 
totally unemployed for six months of the year, employment opportunities 
being limited by the high degree of family labour used. Their general 
economic situation is more desperate as they do not grow their own 
food. MOCS/SUDEC, op cit., p. 101,
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The sharecropper* -unlike the assalariado, does not have to buy his major
food supplies, and one of the advantages of receiving payment in kind is that
56/it acts as a hedge against inflation*-6^  Such benefits may be offset 
by weather risks or by competition amongst labour in reducing either 
land allotments or crop shares, but such divisions are usually fixed by 
tradition rather than by competitive forces*
On the whole sharecroppers in the sertao are better off than wage­
workers but worse off than tenant farmers or smallholders in terms of 
total income. A recent analysis of parceria in the North-East concluded 
that they fared better than assalariados despite the instability of
57/employment and disincentives to modernization inherent in sharecropping.-6^
In the sertao of Caninde, Ceara, the net family income of parceiros was 
found to be 28% lower than that of m i n i f u n d i s t a s A similar conclusion 
was reached in the Cariri where sharecroppers are better paid than wage- 
labourers but are worse.off than tenant farmers or resident cowhands 
(vaqueiros)
As a general estimate it seems that in the interior of North-East 
Brazil approximately one-third to one-half of sharecroppers1 produce 
is consumed by the labourer and his family (’subsistence* production 
or ’autoconsumption1),^2/ This may vary according to individual contracts, 
to the size of establishment or even the general area. Some studies
56/ W.H. Nicholls and Ruy Millar Paiva, "The Structure and Productivity 
of Brazilian Agriculture", Journal of Farm Economics, 47 (2), May 1965* 
p. 358.
Yony de Sa Barreto Sampaio, "Modelos de Otimizaipao na Agricultura no 
Nordeste do Brasil, Com Enfase em Agricultura de Consorciapao em 
Parceria", Comrnunicapoes, 9» PII'SS, Recife., 1975*
5§/ Patrick and Carvalho Filho, op cit., p. 57»
62/
Miller and Paiva, Noventa e Nove Fazendas, III, p. 106.
Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., p. 191> also Patrick and Carvalho Filho, 
op cit., pp. 55 - 4.
indicate a higher level of autoconsumption for particular regions:
✓ 61 /
examples include the Valley of the Banabuiu, Ceara (45%)'—  and the
Valley of the Acarau (50%) With certain staple food crops the
level of subsistence consumption tends to be especially high, 80% of
65/
beans, manioc and other vegetables in the Jaguaribe Valley, for example.—6“  
The same survey informs us that cotton (75%)» caju (98%) and camauba 
(90%) are mainly commercialized.
Although there is a high level of subsistence consumption, 
therefore, there exists a sufficient amount of direct market contact 
to allow us to place sharecropping in the category of "semi-subsistence" 
agriculture. That is, farming which is devoted primarily towards 
autoconsumption and paying the landlord in kind, but a proportion of 
whose surplus also provides some sort of cash income for the parceiro.
There is a conspicuous lack of reliable evidence on how much of his 
income the sharecropper receives in his hand free of any further obligations 
towards the landlord. The size of such an income, as well as any cash 
reserve, would clearly be important factors in determining how vulnerable 
parceiro is during a time of need such as a drought when he could not 
necessarily count on the landowner’s help to tide him over.
A sharecropper is fairly heavily dependent on his stock of 
subsistence crops to see him through to the next harvest but it is 
unlikely that a family will be able to go through a whole year without 
needing at least some cash for other purchases or emergencies. Wage 
labour may provide a useful supplement to a parceiro’s income. Unless 
there is a special demand for such labour which keeps rates up, as in the
O f  SIRAC, Vale do Banbuiu. p. 100.
MOCS/SUDEC, op cit., p. 64.
—^  SIRAC, Baixo Jaguaribe: Estudo de Viabilidade, Vol. II Dados Basicos, 
pt. 4 Sltuacao Atual, Recife, 1974> P* 67.
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sugar engenhos of the Cariri,^^ it is normally only used as a last 
resort by sharecroppers, \7age working in Ceara was calculated as 
representing less than half the value of a sharecropper’s labour on his 
own land, and share-tenants avoided it if they had the chance to till 
their ov/n plots instead.^/
Where subsistence agriculture has been replaced by wage-labour in 
the sertao the effects on the rural population do not appear to have 
been beneficial. In Bahia, for example, sisal was introduced as an export 
crop and regarded favourably at first because it freed the population 
from their dependence on traditional agriculture. However, the 
substitution of wage-payments for subsistence farming caused a severe 
drop in the population's standard of living, including a marked increase 
in the incidence of malnutrition
The parceiro may also earn money by selling his share of the 
commercial crops, usually cotton and perhaps a few staple foods. Such 
benefits are substantially reduced in effect, however, for the share-tenant 
faces monopolies at every turn which reduce his bargaining power. When 
it comes to selling, the sharecropper faces three alternatives; he may 
deal with his landlord, he could sell to a local bodegueiro or a 
travelling comerciante may take his produce away by lorry. Quite often 
these categories overlap, reducing further still the farmer's choice of 
market. The village shopkeeper, for example, may also be a landowner or 
a lorry-owning middleman collecting from many small producers. These 
intermediaries then sell to wholesalers (atacadistas) or even directly to
Hicholls and Paiva, Noventa e Nove Fazendasc pp. 102 -
65/ Johnson and Siegel, op cit.. pp. 8 -
D.R. Gross and B.A. Underwood, "Technological Change and Caloric Costs: 
Sisal Agriculture in N.E. Brazil", American Anthropologist. 75 (l97l)*
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the cotton gin. Commercialization of agricultural produce in the 
North-East is characterised by a long chain of intermediaries between 
the farmer and the purchasing public, each subtracting his profit 
margin. This helps to drive up prices for the end product and hold them 
down for the producers of the raw m a t e r i a ls,These basic features 
apply to agricultural marketing in the sertao whether cotton, fruits or 
vegetables are involved.
The dependence of the small-scale producer is typified as much by
the low price he receives for his crop as by the high price he is obliged to
pay for his inputs. This arises from the fact that because he has few
assets and storage facilities, the poorer farmer is obliged to sell his
crops when prices are lowest. To repeat, venda na folha is common still
and may involve prices up to 40% below the subsequent market value
This is typical not just of sales to the landlord but of dealings with
other middlemen or bodegueiros. who advance supplies from their stores
69/on the same basis before the harvest.—4^  Payment in cash is frequently 
replaced by payment in merchandise at prices above those which prevail 
locally (escambo) A l t h o u g h  this situation has improved with the 
extension of agricultural credit, venda na folha and other forms of price- 
cutting which prejudice the small farmer are still widely used, especially
C. Slater et al., Market Processes in the Recife Area of Northeast Brazil, 
Michigan University, East Lansing, 1969*
BNB, Mercado e Comnercializa<?ao do Algodao no Nordeste, BNB/SUDENE, 
Fortaleza, 1964> p. 101.
BNB, op cit., pp. 103 - 4, and OESA, Vale do Fidalgo: Estudo de Pre-
Viabilldade, Vol. I, Pt. 1, DNOCS, Teresina, 1973*
BNB, op citt . p. 101, and OESA, Vale do Fida.Igo: Estudo de 
Viabilidade, Vol. I, Pt. 2, DNOCS, Teresina, 1973» P* 566.
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71/whenever there is a reduction in demand by the gins.-1—'
Clearly, then, these restrictions on the bargaining power of
parceiros, as well as on other small farmers, are bound to affect their
position vis a vis the drought. This is particularly significant for
the sharecropper because, by the very nature of his tenure arrangements,
his contact with the market is already minimised in comparison with
other occupational groups. These additional pressures limit the cash
reserves which he can build up and, as a consequence, restrict his
ability to diversify his assets as protection against the drought.
Discussion so far has been focussed principally on how the sharecropper
is exposed to the effects of the drought by the landownership structure,
the system of tenure arrangements and the process of commercialization.
Much of what has been said applies equally to the smallholder or
mintfundista who also tends to be badly affected by the seca. Property
owners make up 19*5% of the rural labour force but constituted 31% of work
front members in 1970."^^ 85% of work front recruits, come from
properties of under 10 hectares,- a fact which reflects the considerable
pressures that small establishments are put under. Minifundios are
73/invariably more densely populated than larger holdings-1-'" and their 
resources have to be used more intensively in order to support dependents.
A recent survey found that the product per hectare in the sertao on 
properties of less than 10 hectares is five times that on holdings of 
over 500 hectares. Conversely, the product per head on la/bifundios is
71/ BUB, op cit., p. 104, and Hidroservice, op cit., p. 2 - 4 *  8.
^  See Table 3.
SIJDENE, "Estudos Preliminares11, p. 66.
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74/five times greater than that on the smallest establishments 
Nominally free, fragmented minifundios are often dependent economically 
and politically upon large landowners and merchants. Like parcoircs 
their relative lack of assets obliges them to commercialize their 
produce with larger landowners and middlemen who command a superior 
bargaining position.
Luring a crisis, however, minifundistas are generally in a better
position to resist the drought than parceiros. They are not liable to
be expelled by a landlord, nor do they suffer their land being invaded
involuntarily by foraging cattle which devour the cotton and vegetable
crop. They are more likely to have their own few head of cattle which
can be sold in the event of a seca; the land itself is another asset
which may be sold as a last resort. Evidence of land sales during the
1970 drought suggests that minifundistas sold property and other capital
75/goods disproportionately more than large landownersU'uu Most small 
properties, however, do not have the facility to decapitalize in the 
face of an emergency, either by selling cattle or land, and have to 
concentrate on maximising their returns on crop cultivation. Using 
his family's labour and putting all his efforts into planting and 
replanting cotton as well as staple foods, the smallholder is in a 
somewhat better position to resist the drought than the parceiro. His 
real income is higher, as we have seen, his position more secure and 
less subject to the arbitrary decisions of landlords.
Institutionalised credit is one means by v/hich the vicious circle 
of debt dependence may be broken. Unfortunately, those most vulnerable
SULENS, "Estudos Preliminares", p. 66.
75/ Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., pp. 151 - 3*
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to the drought, because of their economically weak position, do not receive
credit assistance in proportion to their needs. It has already been shown
that larger holdings oriented towards extensive cattle rearing are relatively
cushioned from the drought for several reasons. Their position is further
strengthened by both emergency credits and by normal agricultural loans,
which have tended to ignore the urgent needs of the cotton and staple food
crop sectors, precisely those from which most flagelados originate.
Agricultural credit in the horth-East has always been monopolized by
larger landowners by virtue of the collateral they are able to offer banks.
The Bank of Brazil (BB), for example, has always favoured lending to cattle
enterprises rather than for the production of food crops since the collection
and sale of animals in the event of default is much easier than if land as a
guarantee has to be sold. The market for cattle is considered more secure
and less liable to fluctuations than food crops. In normal years, therefore,
properties of over 100 hectares tend to receive far larger bank loans than
77/smaller properties.'-L-u
The bias towards cattle rather than perennial or food crops was reflected 
in the distribution of emergency credit during the 1970 drought. The GRAN 
programme (Special Credit for the Recuperation of North-East Agriculture) was 
authorized by the Central Bank in March, 1971 and replaced the CEN.-^^ CRAN
77/J-L/ Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., pp. 211 - 12.
78/J—  Emergency Credit for the North-East.; CEN was designed to subsidize
employment-creating investment on the fazendas in an attempt to stem the 
flow of unemployed to the work fronts. At the same time it would ref5u.lt in 
permanent capital formation, in contrast to the fronts which were considered 
by many to be a wast of public money in the long run. The cost of CEN was 
small (Cr./20 million compared v/ith a Cr./332 million expenditure on work 
fronts) but it was claimed to.have created 5^,000 jobs against the fronts’
450,000 a very impressive ratio. Funds ’were disbursed only upon receipt 
of proof of wage payment to his vrorkers by the borrower and a committment 
to keep them on the land.
Mailson Ferreira da Nobrega, "Desenvolvimento da Agro-pecuaria Nordestina;
0 Banco do Brasil e A<?ao Governamental”, Boletim do Banco do Brasil, VII,
1973.
vm
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was a one-year scheme which was intended specifically to finance, through 
the BB, BNB and BNCC, special loans to medium and small producers with an 
annual production of up to 100 times the minimum-wage in the case of the 
former and 1,000 times in the case of the latter. These limits could 
be exceeded in special cases where perennial crops (cotton mainly) and 
cattle (chiefly pasture-formation) were concerned. These exceptions, however,
79/subsequently came to make the rule and dominated lending activities.*1^
CRAN was replaced and absorbed by PECR0 (Special Programme of Guided 
Rural Credit) in June, 1971• The emphasis given to PECR0 was more long 
term (1971 - 4) and on overill agricultural development. PECR0 and CRAN 
subsidized credit together accounted for 37% rural lending in the North- 
East by the BB in 1971* Credit was concentrated in livestock; pasture 
formation (26%), reservoirs (12%) and land clearing (7%)*^/
The respective shares of cattle and cotton may have been in 
proportion to their contributions to regional agricultural production 
approximately (25% and 9%)» But livestock’s share of emergency credits 
seems to have been disproportionately large in relation to losses incurred 
during the seca. Cattle production actually increased during the drought 
year, as we have seen (in Table 7)> while cotton production fell by as much 
as 87% in drought-affected areas, although the overall decrease in cotton 
production may have been nearer 40%*““~/ Staple food crops fare particularly 
badly during a drought. At the first sign of a seca or abnormally dry 
period banks withdraw their loans for fear of losing their money and renew
■22/ See Table 14.
22/ Ibid.
22/ George Patrick, Desenvolvimento Agricola no Nordeste, IFEA, R.J.,
1972, pp. 36, 45» 53» and, IBGE, Anuario Estatistico do Brasil, 1971
pp. 148., 161- 2, 165.
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them only when the first rains arrive, which may be several weeks after 
planting starts. This is true of both the BB and BNB which together 
account for virtually all institutionalised lending to agriculture in 
the s e r t a o ^ Subsistence crop production is concentrated on smaller 
properties, precisely those which stand the smallest chance of maintaining 
the pre-drought level of credit.-^/ In 1972 basic staple foods (beans, 
manioc and corn) accounted for 19% of the total value of crop production in 
the North-East and 42% of the total cultivated area, but received only 
19% of agricultural credit in that region.-^/
The PROTERRA credit programme,— ^ which took over from PECRO and CRAN 
in 1972, continued this bias. The maintenance and acquisition of 
livestock was given preference, with PT cattle loans as a proportion of 
the total PT loans increasing from 45*7% in 1972 to 51.6% in 1973*~“^
This is also reflected in the large size of cattle loans compared with those 
for crop production. Livestock loans went up by 27% over the period 1970 - 
while loans for crops remained stable.^2/ The share of livestock credit 
in total BB lending in the North-East has risen from 25% to 33% from
1970 - 5, although the figure for Brazil has been a constant 21% over this
• * 88/ period.— '
— ^ Report in 0 Globo, 11th January, 1976.
Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., pp. 211 - 12,
Based on information from the Ministry of Agriculture, EAGRl/SUPLAN.
85/
—  Programme of Land Redistribution and Stimulii to North-Eastern 
Agro-Industry, instituted by Decree-Law 1179 of 6th July, 1972*
Based on data from the Bank of Brazil - 2nd Region.
See Table 13.
Based on data from the Bank of Brazil - 2nd Region.
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Although PROTERRA was intended to provide subsidised credit 
(actually at negative interest rates) for investment, modern inputs and 
land purchases in North-Eastern agriculture, there are indications that it 
may not be serving this purpose. The short term nature of loans under the 
plan conflicts directly with its manifest goals. Credit is given for a 
five year period under present arrangements, which has the effect of 
favouring more traditional, extensive methods of cattle rearing. Short­
term, speculative investment may be the result of this policy rather 
than the longer term committment towards modernization implied by 
PROTERRA. It is conceivable that existing pastures could be depleted or 
even cotton and food-producing areas converted to cattle grazing in order 
to obtain quick returns. If this were to happen on a large scale, the 
dislocation of sharecroppers and their families already typical of drought- 
hit regions, may become a typical feature of agricultural life in the 
sertao.
To conclude the discussion on how the rural structure of the North- 
East affects the vulnerability to the drought of certain groups more, 
than others, a word on current trends is in order. The changing pattern 
of land ownership will be looked at, along with modifications in the 
occupational structure of rural areas in the sertao. These factors are 
likely to have an important bearing on the size of groups at risk to the 
seca as well as their degree of vulnerability.
Over the past thirty years in North-East Brazil food production
has expanded in step with increased urban demands, chiefly by means of a
proportional increase in the area under cultivation rather than through
89/higher productivity.—  In fact, production of food crops has increased 
twice as fast as industrial crops.-^/ ipw0 seemingly opposed schools of
G. Patrick, op. cit., pp. 43 et seq.
90/—  SUDENE, "Estudos preliminares", p. 80.
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thought exist which try to explain how the rural population was 
mobilised to supply this increased demand. The 'pre-capitalist' model 
views the maintenance of non-capitalist relations of production as a 
prerequisite to capitalist expansion in the North-East which releases an 
agricultural surplus for the urban sector. This analysis sees agricultural 
production of foodstuffs as an almost completely subsistence activity which 
expands in relation to the needs of its members rather than in response 
to market pressures. Any surplus provides the urban food supply, and
91/the fact that they coincide is fortuitous,— '
An alternative view, the 'capitalist' model, holds that this post-war 
increase in agricultural output is a direct response of producers in the 
countryside to income opportunities generated by increased urban demand, 
facilitated by better communications and the penetration of an increasingly 
rationalised peasant marketing system. Farmers and merchants alike act 
in accordance with market incentives.22/ Another argument, compatible 
to some extent with both schools of thought, attributes the higher output 
to reduced underemployment of labour and higher productivity per capita 
resulting both from internal migration and net loss of labour.from the 
North-East as a whole .22/ This analysis is more similar to the ’capitalist' 
model and differs fundamentally from the 'pre-capitalist' in assuming 
a much greater degree of commercialization and price motivation on the
part of small producers .24/
While these analyses differ on the degree of commercialization of
9 l /  /* A2— Francisco Sa Jnr., "0 Desenvolvimento da Agricultura Nordestina e a Funpao 
das Atividades de- Subsistencia", Estudos CBI3RAP, 3» January, 1973*
22/ S. Foreman and J.F. Reigelhaupt, "Market Place and Marketing System; 
Towards a Theory of Peasant Economic Integration", Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, 12, 12, 1970*
22/ G. Patrick, op cit., pp. 169 - 70.
24/ Ibid., pp. 171 - 2.
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agriculture that exists in the countryside and on the nature of small 
producer motivation, all agree that some contact with the market, whether 
directly or indirectly, is involved. There is, in other words, more 
overlap between these apparently contrasting viewpoints than some critics 
are prepared to admit. The above discussion of sharecroppers and 
smallholders in relation to the drought labelled this sector ’semi- 
subsistence* in recognition of this fact. That is, both parceiros and 
minifundistas devote themselves principally to satisfying subsistence 
needs but are linked to the market in varying degrees by dealings with 
landowners and middlemen. The more direct contact of large landowners with 
the market economy, mainly through the commercialization of cattle and 
cotton, was found to be a major factor shielding them from the harmful 
effects of the drought. The relative isolation of sharecroppers and, 
to a lesser extent, smallholders, from the market means that these groups 
suffer disproportionately by having insufficient resources to fall back on 
in terms of cash and other liquid assets. Any expansion or contraction 
of this 'semi-subsistence* sector will, therefore, have a fundamental 
bearing on the human impact of the drought.
One clear trend which has emerged from an analysis of Agricultural 
Census data is of the polarization in the distribution of landholdings.
As table 11 shows, over the period 1940 - 70 in the sertao properties 
below 10 hectares accounted for 7»55% of the increase in cultivated area, 
while establishments of over 100 hectares were responsible for 60% of 
this increase.* There has been a large increase in the number of smaller
* IBGE Census data suffers from the disadvantage of using administrative 
rather than juridical landholding units but it has advantages also.
Firstly, data can be compared over time. Secondly, it may be broken down 
into distinct geographical areas (litoral, agreste, sertao). Thirdly, 
rural 'establishment' rather than the strictly legal 'property* division is 
conceivably more useful to indicate an economic unit of effective labour 
a-bsorbt-ion. No other source combines these features.
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properties, those of under 10 hectares rising from J>6% of the total
in 1940 to 58% in 1970* Over the same time average property size in
this category has fallen from 5*41 hectares to 3.*24 hectares. At the
other end of the scale the proportion of establishments over 100
hectares has dropped from 22% to 9%» while their share of the total
95/cultivated area has remained constant at around 75%*—  Such evidence
suggests that there is taking place a fragmentation of minifundios in the
sertao through inheritance and land sales which is comparable with
96/
trends for the North-East as a whole.—  The statistics also indicate that, 
as far as larger establishments are concerned, increased concentration 
of 1atifundios into fewer hands and, more significantly perhaps, into 
fewer economic units, is becoming increasingly evident.
Such trends can only be encouraged by current government policy over 
agricultural credit. In their desire to encourage the spread of 'agro- 
industry* Brazilian planners have made available large sums of 
subsidized credit through the banks to farmers wishing to expand extensive 
cattle-raising. As we have seen, this has happened under PROTERRA, but it is 
also taking place under SUDENE's 34/18 fiscal incentive scheme in which
over 90% of loans are going into livestock enterprises rather than other 
forms of rural activity.-^-/ Although increases in livestock production
— ^ See Table 10.
96/—  For the whole North-East the rate of minifundio fragmentation has been 
slower (including agreste and 1 itoral regions). The average size o.t 
establishments up to 10 hectares has fallen from 3*90 hectares in 1940 to 
2.99 hectares in 1970. The rate of concentration of larger holding, on 
the other hand, has been similar, with those over 100 hectares falling 
from 10.6% to 8% of the total number (1940 - 60) but maintaining their 
share of cultivated land at just over 74%«
Data compiled from SUDENE, "Estudos prelirninaresM, Table 20, and 
Agricultural Census, 1970.
97/—  SUDENE, Projetos Agro-lndustriais e Agro-Pecuarios Aprovados; Situapao 
ate Junho de 1974* SUDENE, Recife, 1974*
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and exports produce impressive economic statistics, such productivity could 
be prejudicial to the labouring population affected by this change in 
land-use. Cattle-rearing uses relatively little- labour, one of the 
main reasons for the limited human impact of the drought until the 
nineteenth century, when staple foods and cotton became important crops 
in the sertao. The spread of livestock enterprises is, therefore, likely 
to displace labour, especially if lands currently used for subsistence 
food and cotton are taken over for pasture. This has happened in 
marginal cocoa-producing areas of Bahia, in the agreste of Pernambuco and 
in the upland serras of Cear&.-^Z
It therefore seems probable that a similar process is liable to take 
place in the sertao proper. Unless such displaced labourers migrate from 
the area in search of either permanent rural or urban employment, they 
would be forced to join the ranks of temporary wage-labourers in rural 
areas which, according to past experience, tends to lower their real 
standard of living. In theory this might at least perpetuate if not 
increase the harmful effects of the drought upon this section of the 
population. If the effect of credits to livestock is as described, they 
will only be detectable in the statistics in the long run, but their 
impact will be significant.
Another discernible trend is the growth of that sector of the rural 
population classed as the head of the household together with his unpaid 
family labour. Some observers have taken this development as the 
consequence of the inability of the urban economy to absorb excess rural
98/— ' SUDENE, "Estudos preliminares", p. 15*
population.— ^ In the sertao, the unremunerated family labour sector 
has expanded from constituting 62% of the rural labour force in i960 
to no less than 83% in 1 9 7 0 This increase has been at the 
expense of other occupational groups such as hired labour and share­
croppers. The definition of sharecropper adopted by the IBGE in the table 
cited is useful for present purposes since it includes only those 
parceiros not ’responsible' for administering the land* Sharecroppers 
with such responsibility are included in the family labour group. The 
former type of share tenant (o nao responsavel) was discovered by the 
1970 drought survey to have the least security of tenure and the most 
liable to be affected. During the decade i960 - JO unpaid family 
labour almost doubled from 1,200,000 to 2,200,000 in the sertao 
Subordinate sharecroppers experienced a small decrease in numbers from
127,000 to 119,000, although as a proportion of the total this group 
fell from 6.24% to 4*58% over the same period.-^^ The decrease in the
number of subordinate parceiros could be indicative of a smaller
!
population at risk to the drought. On the other hand, the growth of 
the family labour sector on minifundios which have gradually become more 
fragmented over the years, could increase further still the pressures on 
their limited resources. Furthermore if, as some have suggested, the
Francisco Sa Jnr., op cit. The IBRD/SUDENE survey confirms the IBGE 
statistics, pointing out that family labour forms the largest single 
occupational category. The same study also shows, moreover, that family 
labour is overwhelminghly concentrated on minifundios of less than 10 
hectares. The IBGE also documents this fact; in i960 58% of family labour 
in the N.E. was concentrated on holdings of under 10 hectares, SUDENE, 
"Estudos preliminares", Table 30*
^00/ See Table 12. Figures for the sertao show a comparable rate of increase 
with the North-East generally. Family labour as a proportion of the total 
in the whole region vent up from 64% in i960 to 83% in 1970• SUDENE, 
"Estudos preliminares", Tables 29 and 30, and Agricultural Census, 1970.
Agricultural Census, 1970.
See Table 12.
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excess of rural population left after emigration tends to become 
concentrated in subsistence farming, their vulnerability during a drought 
will undoubtedly increase because contact with the market seems to act 
as a cushion against the drought and vice-versa.
This emphasis on the social and economic roots of the so-called 
*drought problem* stands in direct contrast to the official preoccupation 
of anti-drought agencies such as DNOCS with poor rainfall as the direct 
cause of human suffering during extended dry periods. It became clear 
during the first half of this century that DNOCS’s concern with reservoir- 
building in response to the seca did little to diminish the susceptibility of 
the mass of poorer sertane.jos to the drought. This was due in part to the 
fact that reservoir-building was not accompanied by the construction of 
irrigation canals that might have enabled a larger proportion of the 
rural population to benefit from the enormous volume of water that was 
stored. As it was, only nearby landowners who grazed their cattle on the 
water’s edge and a handful of small farmers who practised vazante 
agriculture were protected from the drought by the reservoirs.
Irrigation is the latest anti-drought strategy and is designed to 
correct this imbalance by helping to alleviate problems of rural unemployment 
and migration associated with the seca. The following chapters will 
examine in detail, using three case-studies of irrigation projects, whether 
this goal is being met.
CHAPTER III
THE ORIGINS AND STATE OF IRRIGATION IN NORTH-EAST ERAZIL
Por over a century the drought in North-East Brazil has been regarded 
as one of the central causes of the region’s socio-economic backwardness.
Yet it was not until the late 1960*s that irrigation as an anti-drought 
strategy was sriously considered by the government, despite the fact that 
it had been used for thousands of years in many semi-arid parts of the 
world. Indeed, small private irrigation systems have long been a feature 
of the Brazilian sertao. ^  The idea of using irrigation to fight the 
drought had been mooted as early as the 1890’s when the first large-scale 
reservoir, the enormous Apude Quixada in Ceara, was constructed. With 
a 50 kilometre network of canals, it had the capacity to irrigate 
several thousand hectares. However, no plans were made to provide 
facilities for crop production and nearby landowners.used the reservoir 
for watering their cattle pasture.
The serious drought of 1930 - 32 finally provided the impetus needed 
to get seven small irrigation projects started but they had no significant 
impact against the drought. In 1932 Yargas, aided by a north-easterner,
Jose Americo de Almeida, as his Minister of Public Works, increased federal 
spending on the region to 10% of total government revenue. In the same year 
work was started on the Lima Campos project (Ceara) followed by Sao 
Gonqalo (Paraiba) and Joaquim Tavora (Ceara) in 1933* This first 
generation of irrigation schemes came to include Condado (Paraiba), Sao
See for example: COBA-ERN, Brumado River Valley Irrigation Project. 
DNOCS, Portaleza, n.d.
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Francisco (Pernambuco), Itans (Rio Grande do Norte) and Santo Antonio de
Russas (Ceara). Progress v/as exceedingly slow, however, and by 1941 only
2/500 hectares of land had been irrigaxed.-'
Sao Gon9alo seems to have been the most successful of these early
projects and illustrates very well the limitations of the old system. An
agricultural station (posto agricola) v/as established here by DNOCS in
1941? at which time only 118 hectares had been irrigated. The 1942
drought sent hundreds of families to Sao Goncjsalo from surrounding areas
seeking shelter. Private landowners, who possessed most of the land and
bought v/ater from DNOCS very cheaply, took advantage of the influx to
expand their labour forces and the area under cultivation to over
1,000 hectares by the end of 1942. DNOCS, v/hich also owned and rented
out an area of farmland, placed a further 400 hectares of land under
3/irrigated production.-^
The benefits of this type of irrigation scheme were spread very 
unevenly, however. Only a small proportion of the land was actually 
owned by DNOCS and rented out to smaller cultiva-t<>rS“(l6%)iF-^Ie:st- of the 
project area (84%) belonged to private landowners. Over 60% of the land v/as 
concentrated in properties of over 40 hectares, v/hich is considered to 
be large for a relatively fertile, densely populated valley.^ A high 
proportion of the larger landowners were totally absentee, leaving their 
properties in the care of administrators and dividing them into small 
plots for tenant farmers and sharecroppers. The latter two groups were 
found to have a real income equivalent to just over half the official 
minimum salary in 1968, On average,large properties (50 hectares or more)
2/—' Paulo de Brito Guerra, "Evoluqao e Problemas da Irriga9ao no Nordeste", 
Boletim do DNOCS. 28 (2), July - December, 1970, p. 7*
^  Ibid.. p. 7.
4/ / ~HIDROSERVICE, Recuperacao Hidroagricola da Pacia de Irrlgapao de Sao
C-oi'iQalo; Vol. VI: Condiyffes Socio-Economicast Hidroservice, Sao Paulo,
1971, p. 5 - 3/1.
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enjoyed, an income 14 times that of medium-sized holdings (10 - 50 
hectares) and 25 times that of small properties (under 10 hectares).-^
A comprehensive survey of the area concluded that only the largest 
landlords made a Reasonable* living from the land, although other 
sources of income are not mentioned. The 0*1 - 5*0 hectare category 
accounted for 52% of properties but only 5% of the area. As a consequence 
of this intense fragmentation, three-quarters of this group of 
minifundistas earned less than the minimum salary. The proportion of 
sharecroppers earning less than the official minimum was 65% and 93% for 
moradores Family incomes were kept low, the study concluded, 
by the high proportion of dependents and lack of employment opportunities.
For almosx 50 years these few hundred hectares of largely private 
land served by DNOCS-built canals constituted the entire public effort 
towards irrigated agriculture in the sertao. Only in the aftermath of 
the disastrous 1958 drought was there a change of strategy away from 
reservoir-building. SUDENE subsequently started work on two projects in 
the Sao Francisco and Jaguaribe Valleys in the 1960's* but it was not 
until the end of the decade that irrigation's place in regional development 
plans became assured. GEIDA, formed in 1968, v/as charged with undertaking 
a comprehensive study of irrigation possibilites for the whole country.
In this year the Minister of thfe Interior, General Albuquerque Lima, 
tried to promote more redistribution and placed greater emphasis on
^ Ibid.* p. 2 - 5.7. 
y Ibid.. Table 5.3.5.
* A Franco-Braziiian mission made a detailed study of the Jaguaribe Valley 
from 1962 - 65, and shortly afterwards work on the Morada Nova project 
was started by SUDENE, although it v/as later taken over by DNOCS. See:
GVJ, Estudo Geral de Ease do Vale do Jaguaribe, SUDENE/ASMIC, 19&7*
In the Sao Francisco Valley the Bebedouro Froject was commenced in 19&9 but 
remained small scale with just over 100 families installed by 1974.
SUDENE, Relator?o Sinteticc: Andamento_do Programa de Irrlgacao no Nordoste, 
Recife, 1974.
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agriculture and irrigation. The various North-Eastern agencies were
gradually centralized under WINTER, and DNOCS lost its autonomy in
1968. During the period 1968 - 70 SUDENE and SUVALE received a more or
less constant level of funding from the federal government while DNOCS's
7 /support dropped by almost 50%. This was, no doubt, due at least in 
part to the better record of the former two agencies in contrast to 
DNOCS's reputation for misdirecting funds, acquired during and after 
the 1958 drought. However, under the GEIDA proposals, investment into 
irrigation schemes in the North-East (Region A), over v/hich DNOCS has 
almost exclusive control, will be around Cr.$1,232 million. This 
compares with investment into the Sao Francisco Valley (Region B) under 
the direction of CODEVASF v/hich amounts to Cr.#2,005 million until 
1980o These sums, at 1971 values,* are in proportion to the areas of 
land to be irrigated.^/ Irrigation seems assured of a steady source of 
financing at least until the end of the decade, v/hich is the period 
covered by the initial PPI proposals.
The objectives of irrigation strategy regarding its contribution to 
Brazilian economic development are quite specific and may be dealt 
with under the headings of employment, income and agricultural 
production. GEIDA hopes to create no less than 115,000 jobs directly 
on projects in the North-East and Sao Francisco Valley by 1980, on the 
assumption that schemes v/ill be fully operational. These jobs would 
benefit a total of 350,000 people including dependents. In addition,
230,000 jobs would be created indirectly, benefitting another 700,000.^
•2/ See Table 15.
^  GEIDA, Programa Plurlanual de Irriracao, (PPl), GEIDA, 1971> Vol. I, 
Table 2 - 4, p. 18.
^  Ibid., pp. 8 - 1 5  and PPI, Vol. Ill, Annex 8, p. 15.
* 1 U.S.# - Cr.#4.20 (1971).
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The total number of people affected is therefore estimated at over
one million by 1980, out of a total rural population in the North-East
estimated to be 19 million by then. Labour absorbtion and the
stabilization of employment is perhaps the main goal of irrigation. The
heavy incidence of unemployment and underemployment during normal times,
exacerbated by the drought v/hich throws thousands of small producers
off the land, makes the creation of permanent jobs especially relevant in
the sertao. Irrigation projects in the Centre-South of Brazil (Regions C
and D) will be more important as a source of supply for vegetables and
fruit in order to eliminate seasonal price variations
GEIDA also predicts a large increase in the incomes of rural
population which benefits directly from irrigation projects, Cr.$2,100
(U.S.^60) p.a. per capita as opposed to the estimated average of
Cr.^583 (U.S.$100) in 1980. The total annual income generated per
person directly employed is put at Cr.$6,640 (U.S.$l,58l) to Cr.$ll,200
U.S.$2,666) in contrast to Cr.$2,940 (U.S.$700) outside of irrigated
agriculture.^/ This is set against investment costs estimated at
U.S.$2,000 to U.S.$3,500 per hectare, or U.S.$4,500 to U.S.$7,000 per
worker, on the assumption that 1,8 to 2.5 hectares of irrigated land
are necessary to create one permanent job.^/
The PPI plans suggest that one of the results of this employment
and income-generating activity will be to help slow down the rural-urban
exodus in the North-East and thus diminish the pressures on a heavily
13/inflated tertiary sector in the cities.—^  Another will be to increase
^  PPI* Vol. I. p. 8.
^  PPI* Vol. III. Annex 8, p. 12.
^  Ibid., p. 18.
PPI, Vol, I, pp. 6 - 9, and GEIDA, Plano Nacional de Irrigapao, Fase I. 
GEIDA, '1970, p. B1 - 7.
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agricultural production both for the domestic market and for export 
overseas* A substantial income will be needed, GEIDA maintains, 
in order to justify the heavy infrastructural and other investment in 
irrigation.
GEIDA’s crop production plans are based on calculations of probable
demand potential for a number of industrial and food crops including
cotton, citrus-fruits and vegetables. The profitability of irrigation
schemes depends to a large extent, GEIDA maintains, on sales of high-
value crops. Projecting ahead to 1980, when projects would be operating
at a minimum 10% rate of return, output will be very diversified**
In the North-East citrus fruits head the production list (630,000
tons p.a.), followed by assorted vegetables (383*000), tomatoes (302,000),
cotton (254*000), potatoes (225*000) and fruits (l02,000)e The rest,
in order of importance, include melon, fodder crops, grapes, bananas,
sunflowers, onions, peanuts, beans, wheat, pineapple, garlic, rice, corn
and sorghum.^/ These optimistic forecasts extend to predicting
exports of several hundred thousand tons of fruit to Europe and the U.S.A.
15/by 1 9 7 6 . The total value of exports from PPI projects is expected
to reach U.S.$12.6 million for high-value fruit and vegetables, and
U.S.$34.5 million for traditional crops#1^/ Such an increase in agricultural
exports is seen as an important contribution towards the balance of 
17/
payments*—u
^  PPI* Vol. I. Table 4 - 11<
1 5 /
Ibid., p. 9*
PPI, Vol. I, Table 3 - 5 *  pp.35*
16/
12/ GEIDA, Plano Nacional de Irrlgaoao, Fase I, GEIDA, 1970* p. B1 - 6.
* All projects included in  the PPI programme will have a minimum rate of 
return of 10%.
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In achieving these three objectives, those of increasing agricultural
employment, incomes and production, GEIDA forecasts that valuable side-
effects will follow. Firstly, irrigation farmers will acquire
technical skills, organizational capacity and the ability to "co-operate
positively" with their fellow producers. In addition, it is hoped that
they v/ill develop "more rational behaviour in the'sense of maximising thei
incomeu Presumably this is based on the assumption that rural workers
are at present non-rational beings, content to earn less-than-maximum
incomes. A second side-effect will be for technological diffusion to
take place from projects to non-irrigated agriculture. In this way, it
is suggested that the transfer of ideas and production techniques will
19/boost incomes in surrounding areas as well.—"
When the GEIDA report was published in 1971 Brazil had 520,000 
hectares of irrigated land, 340,000 of v/hich consisted of rice-fields 
in Rio Grande do Sul. Federal projects in the 'drought polygon' accounted 
for under 10,000 hectares and many schemes were in a precarious state. 
During 1965 - 70 DNOCS had officially started work on a handful of 
irrigation projects but only a few dozen families were recruited to 
cultivate less than 1,000 hectares of irrigated land. The GEIDA plan 
incorporated these projects into the regional plan and tried to 
systematize their execution. GEIDA envisages irrigating 368,000 hectares 
in Brazil by 1980 in 64 "economically viable" projects.* The North-East 
and Sao Francisco Valley (Regions A and B) will account for 195»000 
hectares. DNOCS has jurisdiction over 36 projects, 31 in Region A and 
5 in Region B, covering 78,000 hectares. SITVALE will operate 17 projects
PPi, Vol. III. Annex 8, p. 18.
^2/ Ibid., p. 18.
* Defined as a minimum rate of return of 10^ 0x1 capital investment.
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in the Sao Francisco Valley which together account for 112,000 
hectares. Finally, DNOS* has charge of three schemes and some 5>000 
hectares, which fall in hoth regions DUOS is completely responsible
for irrigation projects in the Centre and South (Regions C and D), 
another 172,000 hectares organized into just eight schemes* Overall then, 
of the three agencies involved, DNOCS has the largest number of projects 
(36 out of 64) but the smallest area of irrigated land (73$000 hectares 
of 368,000).
The situation over goals is a little confusing, however, since
DNOCS's own published figures differ from those in the GEIDA study*
The North-Eastern agency has a rather more ambitious target of 100,700
irrigated hectares by 1980, as well as a further 274»000 hectares of
caatinga incorporated to combine with the agricultural calendar of
irrigated areas, i.e. pastures for grazing cattle in winter months 
21/principally.— ' DNOCS also hopes to have absorbed 21,300 families onto 
irrigated plots by the end of the decade.■££/ Perhaps these differences 
between DNOCS and GEIDA goals represent additional targets that the 
agency has set itself, over and above PPI proposals.
An additional facet of irrigation plans is the concept of 'priority 
areas'. This idea v/as originally developed in Drazil by President Costa 
e Silva in 19^7> the same year in v/hich the various North-Eastern agencies 
became subordinated administratively to the Ministry of the Interior. 
During one particular week, v/hen the President moved the site of the 
federal capital to Recife in order to focus attention on the region's
^  PPI* Vol. I. Table 4 - 8 .
DNOCS, Irrigatpao (pamphlet), Fortaleza, 1975.
22J ibid.
* Departamento Nacional de Obras de Sanearnento.
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problems, a new plan was formulated. The "Co-ordinated Action of the
Federal Government in the North-East" was a series of "principal
measures and priority projects" of the administration. The Ministries
of Planning, Housing, Agriculture and the Interior established a set
of areas prioritarias upon which efforts would be concentrated. These
included the humid valleys and uplands of the interior the coastal
table-lands the cerrados of Minas Gerais and the wetter lands of 
25/
Maranhao.-^ This has been interpreted as a means by v/hich the
government could demonstrate its interest in the region without being
24/required to release funds for specific projects.--17 However, the 
systematization of plans for the region, of v/hich the 'priority area1 
programme v/as a part, may have been motivated at least partly by the 
fact that the World Bank, the probable main external source of finance 
for agricultural projects in the North-East, wished to have evidence in 
front of it that planning progress was being made. Ultimately, loans
2*5/would only be given after specific projects had been vetted by the IBRD.—
These priorities were formalized into the POLONORDESTE strategy
in 1974 under the Second National Development Plan (II PHD). Similarly,
DNOCS itself has established 'priority projects* concentrated into five
areas; the valleys of the rivers Parnaiba (Piaui), Jaguaribe (Ceara),
Piranhas-Apu (Paraiba), Ceara-Mirim (Rio Grande do Norte) and Moxoto-
26/Gorotuba (Pernambuco), v/hich encompass 11 'priority projects'.— 7 Two 
of these schemes, Sao Gonpalo in the Piranhas Valley and Morada Nova
SIRAC, Projeto de Desenvolvimento Rural Integrado do Nordeste (Areas 
Pri0ritarias),' IPSA, 1973*
24/—37 Riorden Roett, The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast, 
Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1972, p. 149*
25/—‘Lt SIRAC, Projeto de Desenvolvimento Rural Integrado,pp. 16 - 17.
DNOCS, IrriaepSo, Fortaleza, 1975«
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in the Jaguaribe Valley, are included in my three case studies.
By late 1975 only a small fraction of DNOCS's objectives had been 
realized. Its 1974 goal of 56,000 hectares in operation^/ had long 
been forgotten. Of its 100,000 hectare target for I960 only 9,000 had 
been irrigated. Neither was there any indication that the pace was 
suddenly going to be stepped up to 20,000 — 25,000 hectares p.a, in 
operation, as GEIDA envisaged. Of 21,000 families DNOCS hopes to 
absorb by the end of the decade only 900 have so far been accomodated. 
SWALES record is worse still with only two of its planned 17 projects 
functioning and 150 families installed*-^/
The administration of DNOCS's activities in the field of irrigation 
is divided into three levels; central, regional and individual projects. 
Although the agency's representation is therefore decentralised, quite 
the opposite seems to be true of decision-making. Although the objective 
of this thesis is not to study decision-making within the DNOCS 
bureaucracy, the impression gained from contacts with staff in the field 
and at head offices is that there exists little autonomy in this respect 
at any level of the organization except perhaps the very top. Even here 
it was not possible to ascertain what constraints were placed upon DNOCS's 
operations by the Minister of the Interior or other government departments.
All major policies are formulated and decisions made by the Directive 
Council (Conselho Diretor) which is made up of a Director General and 
six members appointed directly by the Minister of the Interior. Subordinate
DNOCS, Frograma de Irrigagao, 1971 - 74, Fortaleza, 1971
SUDENE, Relatorio Sintetico: Andamento do Frograma de Irriga^ao no
Nordeste, Recife, 1974. Updated with data from DNOCS.
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to the Directive Council and responsible for co-ordinating the 
various divisions is the General Directorate (Diretoria Geral). The 
General Directorate embraces four divisions (planning, operations, 
administration and personnel) as well as the four regional directorates. 
The directorias regionais each have a central office, situated in 
Fortaleza, Recife, Teresina and Salvador, while the central administration 
occupies a large, modern building in Fortaleza. The regional offices are 
each sub-divided into several sections, responsible for project study, 
engineering, social work, administration, personnel and pisciculture. 
Individual irrigation project managers are directly responsible to their 
respective regional director.
Generally speaking, regional offices seem to have little autonomy to 
make decisions themselves wi thout prior consultation with and 
authorization from the central administration in Fortaleza. Similarly, 
project managements have a limited degree of freedom to act without first 
obtaining permission from regional head-office which may, in turn, have to 
receive the go-ahead from central administration. On the one hand this 
system has the apparent advantage of controlling the application of 
resources in the light of DNOCS's bad reputation derived from the 
industries da seca. Although this particular phase during the late 1950's 
was the only stain on an otherwise clean record, DNOCS personnel are 
still very anxious to avoid even the suspicion that there could be a 
recurrence of corrupt practices within the organization. On the other 
hand, the numerous stages involved in the decision-making process often 
lead to unecessary delays and conspicuous over-bureaucratisation.
In common with the overall administrative structure of DNOCS, the 
internal organization of individual projects is very heirarchical. There 
are three types cf project administrations, depending on the size of project,
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but all seem to share one common, fundamental characteristic. On all 
three case-study projects there exists a visible and profound split 
between the management staff (gerencia) and the irrigation farmers 
(Golonos or irrigantes)• There is little exchange of ideas and no 
collective decision making involving gerencia and irrigantes working 
together. Technical and administrative functions are housed in the 
main office or gerencia, as it is known, and decisions regarding these 
matters are imposed exclusively from the top downwards. The opinions 
of the farmers themselves regarding agricultural production, system of 
credit, payment of incomes, etc. aspects which directly concerned them, 
were, it seemed to me, rarely invited by the tecnicos. The 
organizational structure simply does not cater for this. Complaints 
by farmers regarding their lack of say in the way the projects were run 
were often matched by management’s dissatisfaction with arbitrary decision­
making on the part of regional and central offices unfamiliar with 
local conditions.
In theory the interests of colonos are represented by the project 
cooperative. All farmers are automatically members. The cooperative 
is run by a 'deliberative council', which consists of members from the 
gerencia, the technical staff in charge of cooperative administration 
and the fanners. Only one elected representative from the colonos sits on 
the council, whatever the size of the irrigation scheme. In practice the 
cooperative concerns itself exclusively with distributing credit, selling 
the farmers produce and keeping charge of the accounts. The farmers have 
little or no effective say in how the project operates. Group meetings 
of the colcros with the gerencia are rare and, when they do take place, 
criticism of existing procedures is certainly not encouraged. Most 
farmers are unwilling to speak up in meetings. The tendency is, rather,
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for the acceptance of decisions handed down from top level.
As might be expected, the distance between project administration 
and farmers is reinforced by a total contrast in life-styles. The fact 
that higher level tecnicos have completely different backgrounds, live in 
modern, large houses well away from the farmers, send their children to 
different schools and do not, as a consequence, mix socially at all, 
might seem an unnecessarily obvious point to make. It is, however, an 
important facet of day to day life which matches and strengthens the 
divisions that already exist in working relationships.
The task of planning how an irrigation project will be executed is 
not officially in the hands of DNOCS itself. A number of private companies 
have been contracted to undertake feasibility studies of the various 
river basins considered by DNOCS to be suitable sites in which to locate 
projects. These consultants are both European and Brazilian: TAHAL 
Consulting, Ltd. (Israel), SCET (France), SIRAC, HIDROSERVICE and 
Technosolo (Brazil) are a few examples. Firms are contracted on the basis 
of tenders submitted by competing companies to the Ministry of the 
Interior. Contracts are much sought after and, by all accounts, very 
lucrative. It was not possible to obtain precise information on this 
but one tecnico informed me, for example, that the viability study for the 
Vaza Barris project in Bahia cost the Brazilian government over one million 
dollars. Whatever the exact amounts, there exists the possibility that 
strong efforts will be made to 'prove* the economic viability of 
irrigation schemes on paper. It is in the interests of the company to
I
do so because favourable cost-benefit ratios justify the high costs, 
both of the study and implementation of the project. This is especially 
so in the light of the GEIDA precondition that a project to be included in 
the PPI programme should have a rate of return of at least 10%, As far as
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DNOCS is concerned favourable studies serve to justify the long 
term viability of irrigation as a development strategy and guarantee 
the flow of federal funds. The present research indicates that this 
practice has led to unjustifiably optimistic forecasts for irrigation which, 
as will be shown in later chapters, have not been matched by subsequent 
developments,
A viability study may be broadly divided into a pre-study phase and 
a planning stage. The first is taken up with assessing the general 
technical and socio-economic problems of the area, leading to a set of 
general recommendations. Such pre-studies invariably reaffirm the 
importance of irrigation to the valley in question if it is to ’progress* 
and the living standards of the population raised. No other strategies 
are ever suggested as serious alternatives. Once approved by the DNOCS 
central administration the feasibility study moves into the main planning 
phase, which consists of four stages. Firstly, the river basin’s 
resources are surveyed, including climate, soils, hydraulics, engineering 
problems, agricultural potential and socio-economic features. The 
second and third stages pursue deeper studies of the same phenomena and 
broaden the scope to encompass market studies, labour absorbtion, cost- 
benefit analysis, the planning of engineering and colonization details. 
Finally, the executive project involves detailed mapping of the area, a 
comprehensive soil survey and plans for the successive stages of the 
irrigation project as it is evolved.-^/
With a comprehensive plan as its basis, work on the project itself 
is then started. The first task is expropriation of the privately-owned 
land in the river valley. This process v/ill be discussed in greater detail
^  PPI» Vol» xii» Annex 32.
- 101
in the next chapter, but the point should be made here that 
expropriation is often hurried. A combination of political pressures 
from Brasilia and the desire of DNOCS to be seen to be making headway 
towards its official targets frequently speeds up the process, which 
exacerbates already existing hardships for the population forced to 
leave. DNOCS sometimes contracts special firms on its larger projects 
simply to make sure that families leave the project area by the deadline 
which has been set.
Irrigation schemes are located in valleys which already possess 
reservoirs built by DNOCS. The agency employs private engineering 
companies, contracted after competing tenders have been assessed, to 
clear and level the land as well as build the network of canals.
Irrigation is by gravitational flow principally; farmers draw their 
water from tertiary canals, which serve each plot of land, using flexible 
plastic tubing (sifao). Construction companies are hired to build the 
project offices, staff houses, farmers’ houses and garage and storage 
facilities. On the larger projects, such as Sao Go^alo and Morada 
Nova, colonos' houses are grouped together into several nucleii. The 
smaller schemes such as Sume have a house adjacent to each plot.
Sometimes existing houses, expropriated along with the land, are utilized 
in order to minimise costs.
In order to assess the performance of irrigation three projects were 
chosen as case studies from the 12 which DNOCS had in operation during 
the time that field research was undertaken. Limitations of time and 
other resources prevented the selection of more than three. Several 
factors influenced my choice of these specific irrigation schemes. Firstly, 
a rough cross-section of projects was required in terms of size (families 
absorbed and area irrigated). Secondly it was felt that, for the purposes
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of evaluation, all case studies should have been in operation for 
several years so that significant achievements and trends could be 
identified. Finally, adequate documentation for all three projects was 
essential. This consisted primarily of information referring to the 
characteristics of the valleys before the projects were implemented, 
crucial to any comparative analysis. In one case this was provided 
by DNOCS (Sume) but in the others (Sao Gonialo and Morada Nova) the 
information was obtained from feasibility studies made by private 
consultants.
A potential methodological problem presented by any such selective 
sampling is, of course, the degree to which one can generalise from a 
few case studies. This problem, although uppermost in my mind throughout 
field research, is not thought to detract from the validity of general 
conclusions reached about irrigation projects in their present form.
There are several reasons why this is so. Firstly, DNOCS 
adopts a similar strategy, with minor variations, for all its irrigation 
schemes, i.e. in terms of expropriation and compensation, division of 
landholdings, commercialization, authority structure, method of recruitment, 
etc. Secondly, the rural structures of the valleys upon which this system 
is imposed share common basic characteristics, i.e. structure of property 
ownership, tenancy arrangements, system of crop commercialisation and 
demographic pattern. As a result of these two facts, during fieldwork 
it was found that, again with certain exceptions, a pattern emerged on 
all three case-studies with the same basic features. This was not 
fortuitous but the logical result of a similar DNOCS strategy for 
rural areas with basically similar socio-economic situations.
Where possible, direct observations in the field are supported by 
secondary data obtained from other studies as well as information from 
irrigation experience in the Sao Francisco Valley, administered by CODEVASF.
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Both DNOCS and CODEVASF adopt similar irrigation techniques and there 
is a degree of cooperation and exchange of ideas between the two 
organizations. In fact, much of DNOCS thinking on irrigation seems 
to have been conditioned by the tactics that CODEVASF adopted on the 
pioneering Bebedouro project, started in 1968 at Petrolina.
Sume is the smallest and longest established of the three projects
studied. It covers 260 hectares of land in the Sucuru Valley, Paraiba,
/
about half of which are irrigated. It is fed by the Aqude Sume, 
constructed by DNOCS in the early 1960's, with a capacity of 37 million 
cubic metres.-^/ The project is situated in the municipio of Sume, 
adjacent to the town of the same name, which has a population of some 
2,000. The general area, known as the Sertar dos Cariris Velhos 
after the indigenous tribe whose domain it once used to be, is one of the 
driest regions in the interior with a mean annual rainfall of 4 3 7mm 
The surrounding countryside is typical caatinga; shrubs, trees and 
xerophytic vegetation used for open-range grazing of cattle. Typically, 
before the project was started, the valley provided a good deal of 
protection for the population despite the fact that the river was usually 
dry during the summer months. The land was cultivated by a fairly dense 
population of semi-subsistence farmers and larger landowners using 
traditional sertao techniques and, producing the usual crops of arboreal 
cotton, beans and corn (algodao, feijao, milho).
The first families were installed in 19&9 anc* successive intakes had 
brought the total number to 26 by late 1975* Sume is considered to be
Luiz Carlos Pinheiro, Apudagem Publica, Separata do Boletim do DNOCS,
20, 6, November, 1959 (November^ I960J".
DNOCS, Projeto Sume, Recife, 1968, p. 16.
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an economically successful project which DNOCS prides itself in showing
to visitors* It was because of this fact, rather than in spite of it,
that Sume was chosen as representing many of the features which the
agency would like to see develop on its other projects and which it
encourages. The official aim of DNOCS is that Sume should become
32/something of a ’model* for other irrigation schemes to follow.—
Sao Gonpalo was the second project visited and, as already stated,
was one of the first generation of irrigation schemes set up by DNOCS
(then IFOCS) during the 1930’s. It lies within the municipio of Souza,
Paraiba in the area of sertao known as the Depressao do Alto Piranhas
(Higher Piranhas Depression), named after the River Piranhas which runs
through the area and the project. Average yearly rainfall is quite high
at 900mm. and is concentrated during the winter or rainy season from
January to April. Even during the 1970 drought the valley received 500rem. 
33/of rainfall.^^ In terms of climate the area is privileged compared with 
some parts of the sertao where mean annual precipitation can be as low as 
250mm. in a normal year. The Apude Sao Gonpalo v/as built in 1936 and,
y
together with the more recently constructed Engenheiro Avidos reservoir, 
has a capacity of 300 million cubic metres. As well as supplying the 
project, they serve the nearby towns of Souza and C a j a z e i r a s . - 2 4 /
Under the old system most of the benefits of irrigation accrued to 
a few large landowners. They purchased water from DNOCS very cheaply 
but were not involved in any of the capital expenditure entailed in
22J Ibid., p. 35.
33/— ' Data from Sao Gonpalo meteorological station.
■24/ DNOCS, I- Plano de Obras e Estudos, 1965 - 68, Fortaleza, 1965.
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reservoir or canal building. Of 4*700 hectares covered by the scheme, 
divided into 182 properties, 84% of the land belonged to private 
landowners who either cultivated it directly or rented it out to farmers. 
Three properties occupied 51% of the total area, while large and medium- 
sized holdings absorbed 40% of the total income (in cash and kind).
DNOCS’s direct participation in agricultural activity was limited to 
a small area of land let to tenant farmers and a research institute 
which conducted crop experiments.
Following the 1970 drought Sao Gonijsalo, along with other DNOCS projects,
received new impetus from the recognition of the failure of attempts
until then to alleviate the so-called ’drought problem’. A viability
study was commissioned which recommended expropriation of all private
property within the project boundaries, in view of the incompatibility
of private ownership with a rationalized irrigation scheme (i.e. reformed)
55/meant to transfer benefits to a larger population.—^  The project now 
occupies 4,100 hectares, of which 2,100 will eventually be irrigated.
By February, 1975* 600 hectares were in operation. A total of 545 
colonos and their families is envisaged by 1976, the first of whom were 
installed in 1971* reaching the figure of 126 families by early 1975*
The system of distributing land on Sao Gon9alo is similar to that on 
all DNOCS projects basically. Each family is given* around five hectares 
(depending on factors such as cultivation plan and soil fertility), three 
of which are irrigated in the form of a family plot (lote familiar).
HIDR0SSRVICE, Recuperapao Hidroagricola da Bacia de Irrigapao de Sao 
Gon9alo; Relatorio Final - Carta de Apresentapao, Hidroservice,
Sao Paulo, 1971*
-#*
Distributed land is still currently the property of DNOCS although it is 
being debated by the agency if, and how, the land can be handed over to 
the farmers (either as a gift or bought).
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Two hectares consist of grazing land, held in the form of common
pasture by the irrigantes.
Sao Gon9alo was chosen as a case study precisely because it formed
one of the earlier type of irrigation project. As such, it was possible
to compare the effectiveness of present-day irrigation strategy based
on public ownership and direction, with the former type which did not
alter the pre-existing social and economic structure of the valley
based on private property. In addition, a wealth of information
concerning the situation in the Valley before 1971 was made available by
the reports of the consultants (HIDROSERVICE)•
Morada Nova, in the state of Ceara, was the third project studied.
It is situated in the valley of the River Banabuiu, the major affluent of
the Jaguaribe which, along with the Sao Francisco, is the only perennial
river in the sertao. The valley is typical of many in the interior;
relatively humid and protected compared with the surrounding caatinga,
it supports a dense rural population. Rainfall averages 700mm. p.a.
A research team originally surveyed the area in 1962 - 5 with a viewto
using the Jaguaribe Valley’s 60 billion cubic metres of stored water 
36 /for irrigation.— ' DNOCS has plans for irrigating large areas of the
Jaguaribe Valley as one of its ’priority regions'. It covers 75»000
square kilometres and has a population of two million. The agency plans
to establish eight projects in the valley eventually covering a total
37/area of over 100,000 hectares and absorbing some 15»000 families,— '
Morada Nova v/as the first of these projects and started operating in 
1971. Of the 12,500 hectares that will eventually be controlled by DNOCS
— ^ GVJ, op cit.
37/— 7 DNOCS, Jaguaribe; 0 Vale e o DNOCS, Fortaleza, 1975* These projects are 
Morada Nova, Baixo Jaguaribe, Ico-Lima Campos, Varzea do Boi, Quixabinha 
Santo Antonio de Russas, Ema and Riacho do Sangue.
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in the Banabuiu Valley, 8,000 will be taken up by this scheme. One-third 
of the area will be divided, up into irrigated plots while the remainder 
is to be used for common pasture. By September, 1975 one-half of the 
irrigated land had been prepared and 255 of the eventual 550 families 
accomodated. The goals of 2,500 hectares irrigated and 550 families 
settled on the land was officially supposed to be met by the end of 1975 
but this was clearly not possible. At least another two or three years' 
work will be needed to achieve this.
This particular project was chosen, again, because it has made
considerable progress compared with the majority of DNOCS schemes, which
were still in the planning stage. Only 12 of DNOCS1s perimetros irrigados
had started to function by the end of 1975* The agency regards Morada
/
Nova as its showpiece par excellence and, as with Sume, DNOCS presents 
it as an example of what it hopes to achieve with irrigation. Considerable 
human and financial resources have been devoted towards making Morada 
Nova work. If it is to set the pattern for future projects, knowledge 
of the way in which it has developed could provide lessons about 
probable developments later on. Taken together, my three case-studies 
accounted for 2CP/o of the total area irrigated by DNOCS and 45% of the famili 
installed by the end of 1975*
The prospect of trying to obtain information concerning the internal 
organization of irrigation projects was rather daunting at first. This 
was particularly true about delicate matters such as incomes and 
expropriation procedures. As it turned out, however, a combination of 
documentary evidence and information given by project personnel provided 
adequate data. At the level of face-to-face contact with DNOCS staff and 
irrigation farmers the degree of co-operation varied considerably.
Generally speaking, the higher the official status of an interviewee the
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less likely was that person to commit himself or divulge information 
which could be said to do anything but bolster the image of the 
administration. Project directors would invariably produce optimistic 
estimates of the numbers of families absorbed, area irrigated and other 
achievements. Conversely, less flattering statistics on the number of 
people dislocated from their homes by schemes would always be under­
estimated, Only one of the three directors openly offered constructive 
criticism of DNOCS tactics. At best, informants avoided giving 
embarrassing answers and simply withheld information. At worst, 
deliberate deception was attempted with incorrect answers on fundamental 
points which could not fail to have been known by those interviewed. 
However, because my own enquiry had official backing, the general respons 
of higher office-holders was one of polite tolerance.
Consequently, of course, all information gathered from such sources 
had to be cross-checked. This was relatively easy to do using official 
documents, obtained after some persistence, as well as independent studie 
and interviews with lower-level employees. Gradually, all the facts 
fitted into a comprehensive picture. Tecnicos lower down in the 
heirarchy such as social workers and agricultural technicians were 
particularly helpful in providing information. These tended to be people 
with more day-to-day contact with grass roots problems of the project. 
Partly because of their greater experience and partly because they felt 
freer to divulge a whole series of facts which the higher administration 
was anxious to conceal, DNOCS staff at this level were extremely 
expansive.
The fact that two such contrasting reactions to my presence were to 
be found within the projects studied, especially in the two larger scheme 
is itself significant. It is indicative of organizational structures in
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which there are considerable restrictions on the exchange of ideas and 
flow of information between the levels. As far as field-work in such 
a situation is concerned, it obviously had important repercussions.
Apart from influencing the reactions of higher employees to my presence, 
it also conditioned the responses of the irrigation farmers. Being 
obviously an outsider, they usually thought at first that I was a DNOCS 
official on some supervisory mission. This made the colonos reluctant to 
communicate, especially if approached formally and/or accompanied by 
a project staff member (with the possible exception of certain social 
workers who did not have this effect on their reactions). Consequently,
I attempted to clarify my independent position, keeping interviews as 
informal and at casual as possible. This tactic produced surprising 
results. Previously taciturn colonos voiced their opinions on the project, 
frequently with constructive suggestions on how agricultural production 
could be improved to produce what they felt would be better results.
Much valuable information was obtained in this way concerning colonists’ 
views on what was being achieved with irrigation. It provided a useful 
alternative picture to that portrayed by DNOCS.
Project directors never encouraged me to talk to the farmers directly. 
I got the strong impression that the exercise was not looked upon 
favourably by the gerencia. Y/hen I was taken on conducted tours by 
higher officials it was always, as I subsequently learned, to the houses 
of better-off farmers and to the more attractive plots. Although this 
was perhaps understandable, it did not serve to present a balanced 
picture of what happens on an irrigation project. My own enquiries, 
assisted by lower-level staff, corrected this imbalance. To cite one 
example, on the Sume project the director first took me to visit an 
irrigation farmer who had been particularly successful. His house boasted
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a T.V. set, refrigerator and electric sewing machine. The suggestion 
made to me that he was somehow typical did not stand up in the light 
of my own subsequent research, which showed that he was very much 
the exception to the rule.
These, then, are some of the main methodological problems encountered 
while undertaking research on the three irrigation schemes. In order to 
assess the impact of irrigation on the agricultural economy of the 
sertao it was decided to use official goals as a yardstick; the effect 
on employment, incomes and agricultural production. Simultaneously, 
the question was asked whether irrigation, in its present form, 
is an effective anti-drought strategy.
CHAPTER IV
EMPLOYMENT AND STABILIZATION OP THE RURAL POPULATION
When drought conditions begin to disrupt the agricultural calendar 
for thousands of semi-subsistence farmers in the sertao and the 
production of staple foods becomes impossible, one of the first visible 
effects on the population comes with the abandoment of the land and 
the search for alternative means of support. In 1970 almost half a 
million refugees from the drought were employed on emergency work 
fronts building roads in the interior, the usual method which the 
government uses to provide temporary employment and attempts to stem the 
outward flow of labour to the towns. The creation of permanent jobs 
in the rural sector, ”fixar o homem a terra” as DNOCS calls it is, 
therefore, perhaps the most important of the three goals behind irrigation 
in the North-East. However, the inescapable conclusion reached, even 
assuming that official employment targets are met, is that irrigation in 
the sertao will do little to create more permanent jobs for the 
impoverished rural population. Moreover, there is every indication 
that current irrigation strategy displaces far more labour than it 
absorbs, thus exacerbating rather than ameliorating the problem of rural 
unemployment.
Although there is an abundance of labour in the interior of the 
North-East, irrigation projects are capital-intensive. It takes two 
hectares of irrigated land to create one permanent job. This is 
equivalent to a level of capital investment per unit of labour absorbed 
of U.S.$4,800 or over seven times the Brazilian average for agriculture.^
William R. Cline, "Analise de custo-beneficio de projetos de irrigacao no 
nordeste”, Pesouisa e Planejamento Economico, 2 (2), December, 1972, p. 2
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The fact that schemes are capital-intensive means that they absorb 
little labour in relation to the capital expenditure involved in their 
implementation* Even if DNOCS's optimistic target of 22,000 families 
settled bjr 1980 is realized, this will represent only 1.3% of the 
calculated excess rural population by that time in the North-East 
(1,700,000). If only the sertao is considered, this goal will still be 
equivalent to a mere 2.3% of the excess low-income rural population by the 
end of the decade (952,000).-^/ Assuming that plans for incorporating 
274*000 hectares of drier caatinga (area seca) are fulfilled in addition 
to the 100,000 hectares of irrigated land, the total impact will be 
minute in relation to the problem. Their significance diminishes further 
still when one realizes that by the end of 1975 only 4% of the 1980 target 
had been realized in terms of labour absorbtion.
Despite the small number of permanent jobs created by DNOCS 
irrigation schemes the level of investment is formidable. Over the period 
1975 ~ 79 alone the agency plans to spend three billion cruzeiros or 
Tj.s.^375 million.-^/ Investment into irrigation under the GEIDA proposals 
for the North-East is put at U.S.$550 million at 1971 values.^ This sum 
represents almost half the total capital formation in all sectors in the
5/region in one year, although spending on irrigation will cover a decade.-7 
With the delays typical of project implementation so far, though, capital 
costs are likely to be driven up further still while the number of jobs 
to be created remains constant.
^  Calculated from Vincenzo d'Apote, Bases Para uma Politica de Colonizaqao 
e Reforma Agraria no Nordeste do Brasil, SUDENE, Recife, 1972, pp. 115 - 18,
^  DNOCS, Irrigapao, Fortaleza, 1975*
^  W.R. Cline, op cit., p. 259*
5/ SUDENE, Produto e Formapao Bruta de Capital, 1965 - 71* Recife, 1973* 
p. 18. 7.9 billion cruzeiros or U.S.$1.5 million in 1971•
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A certain amount of labour is temporarily employed during the 
construction of irrigation schemes, mainly in the building of canals, roads 
and buildings. During 1970, in fact, SUDENE established a number of 
work fronts on such projects in cooperation with DNOCS. While the 
infrastructure of a project is being laid out there is no doubt that 
additional employment is created which helps to compensate in part for 
the jobs lost through expropriations. However, such work is only 
temporary and does little to stabilize the population permanently.
Colonists also hire outside wage-labourers to supplement the manpower 
provided by their family labour. It is difficult to estimate the precise 
extent to which outside labourers are used, especially as no records 
are kept and there is a good deal of overlap, i.e. one diarista may work 
for several families. However, the cost of hiring extra workers is quite 
high for the farmer's limited income to bear. Many farmers experience 
considerable difficulty in paying diaristas on the projects visited; one 
study has put the proportion of colonists who have such problems at 
35 ~ 50%.-^ Consequently, there is reason to believe that the amount 
of temporary employment created is not high.
Although the overall impact of irrigation in creating stable jobs is 
low, the number of people forced into a state of unemployment by the 
process of dislocation from their homes is considerably higher. On all 
the projects studied, six times the number of people were obliged to 
leave the land they had worked because of the expropriation as have so far 
been reabsorbed by the irrigation schemes subsequently built in those areas. 
Such severe social costs are certainly not taken into account by the
Lynn H. Distelhorst, Difusao do Espirito Enrpresarial na Extensao Rural; 
Avaliacao do Suceso nos Penmetros Irrigados do Sertao Nordeste 
Brasileiro. 1972 - 73. DNOCS, Fortaleza, 1973*
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traditional methods of cost-benefit analysis used in the GEIDA
7/programme calculations«-L/ It is frequently a source of acute embarrassment 
to DNOCS personnel and the dislocation policy is one which, if irrigation 
is intended to be labour-absorbing, is difficult to justify. This 
is reflected in the fact that higher administrators were often unwilling 
to reveal the true extent of dislocations and, on several occasions, 
provided misleading information which, subsequently cross-checked, proved 
to be untrue. Feasibility studies usually avoid mentioning or grossly 
underestimate on paper the size of the forced exodus from river valleys 
which necessarily accompanies irrigation in its present form. Generally 
speaking it was regarded as something of a necessary evil. However,
"fixar o homem a terra1 as a catchword becomes meaningless to the point of 
absurdity when it is realized that in order to accomodate 100 families 
DNOCS has had to expel 500 to 600 families from their homes.
By their very nature, river valleys in the sertao are privileged 
areas which offer shelter from the extended dry season or drought, even 
if the rivers themselves are not perennial. Production by means of 
vazante agriculture enables basic subsistence foods to be grown under any 
conditions but the most severe, and during the drier part of the year when 
cultivation on the caatinga is not possible. As such, the rural 
population has become concentrated in the valleys, while generations of 
inheritance and land sales have caused extensive fragmentation of 
properties. Large numbers of small-holders using their family labour, 
sharecroppers, tenant farmers and squatters are thus able to make an 
adequate if not substantial income by intensively cultivating their 
small plots. The effects of expropriation on this type of population
■2/ See, for example, GEIDA, Programa Plurianual de Irrigacao (PPl), Vol. 15 - 
Caracteristicas Basicas dos Projetos Avaliados, Sao Paulo, 1971*
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in the three valleys studied will now he considered.
In Sao Gon9alo the population of the hydraulic basin before the
project reform took place in 1971 was approximately 7*000 consisting
mainly of rural producers of various types and their families.^
Expropriation and the forced emigration that accompanied it proceded
rapidly after 1971 so that today 123 colonists and their families occupy
the farmland, constituting about 1,100 people. The project will eventually
resettle 345 families, or 3*000 people, which will still represent less
than half the original population of the area. Although there are other
employees or funcionarios on the project which makes the total amount of
labour absorbed higher, as regards the population which gains its living
from agriculture, DNOCS appears to be expelling more than it absorbs.
This is especially true in the light of the fact that on Sao Gonqalo,
the target of families to be resettled on the project has fallen from
9/the original 600 to the current goal of 345*
Some dislocated labour was employed by engineering companies on 
project construction but most were obliged to leave the immediate 
area in order to seek new homes and jobs. A large number are known to have
migrated from the area completely because of the difficulty of finding
local employment. However, the eventual- destinations of these emigrants 
is largely unknown and it can only be surmised that they went to other 
rural areas or to the towns. Some stayed in the local region, their
presence made evident by newly erected urban slums in the nearby town of
Souza as well as in small communities along the side of the highway such 
as Marizopolis. The cost of living for such emigrants is substantially
^  SUCAM, Levantamento Demografico e Habitacional de Sao Goncalo. Ministerio 
de Saude, Joao Pessoa, August, 1971* P* 2.
^  HIDR0SERVICE, Recuneracao da Bacia de Irrigapao de Sao Goncalo, Vol. IX;
Vi.abi 1 idade Tecnico-Econ5mica, Fina.ncei.ra e Admlnistrativa da Recuperacao 
Hidro-Agricola« Ar^rnativa, Sao Paulo, 1971* P* 108.
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higher in town since they are no longer able to produce their own 
subsistence crops and must pay market prices for food. Sanitary conditions 
in the new favelas are visibly worse, with open sewers running down the 
centre of the mud streets.
In Sume the dislocation rate appears to have been of a similar 
magnitude. Before the private land was expropriated, according to DNOCS 
estimates, 73 families inhabited the valley, of which 47 were smallholders.-^/ 
This figure may well underestimate the original population of the area 
because in every other valley studied, non-landowning families outnumber 
property-owners by two to one. No independent source of information 
was available in order to check this fact. However, assuming this 
estimate to be realistic, the dislocation level is still considerable. The 
project has 26 families at present and will increase its total to 35 when 
fully operational. Similarly, in Morada Nova, by combining various 
sources of information* it was possible to estimate the previous population 
of the valley at 3*000 families or 18,000 people. This compares with 
a current absorbtion rate of 253 families, rising to 555 eventually.^/
A sample survey of 348 families made just before expropriation started 
in the Banabuiu Valley revealed that only 89 had made any plans for 
leaving the area and only 40% had any idea of what jobs they would take 
up afterwards.**
^  DNOCS, Projeto Sume, Recife, 1968, p. 17.
^ /  Interview with head of Expropriation Sector, DNOCS 2nd Regional 
Directorate, Fortaleza, 30th September, 1975* and SIRAC, Vale do 
Banabuiut DNOCS, May, 1973.
SIRAC survey data, as well as estimates from project engineers and 
social workers.
Faculdade de Filosofia Dorn Aureliano Matos (Limoeiro do Norte),
Projeto Morada Nova-Banabuiu: Levantamento Socio-Situacional. DNOCS, 
Fortaleza, 1973* p. 19.
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The system for compensating the dispossessed does little to 
rectify the imbalance caused by a heavy rate of forced migration 
from the hydraulic basins. Large numbers of families own no land in 
the valleys where they live and work, and are entitled to no payments 
of any kind to compensate for their loss of a house or a job. In the 
Banabuiu Valley (Morada Nova) two-thirds of those expelled from the 
land were non-property owners, or some 2,000 families. This was true 
of Sao Gonpalo and, to a lesser extent, of Sume also where one-third of 
families owned no land. Information obtained concerning two other DNOCS 
irrigation projects in Ceara, Curu and Ayres de Souza, shows that here 
also about 60 - 70% of expelled families had no right to any form of 
compensation.^^
Property owners receive varying amounts of compensation per hectare 
of land expropriated depending on both the quality of the soils and on 
the amount of possessions on the land such as buildings, fences, cattle, 
etc. (benfeitorias). A table of prices was established by SUDENE in 
1968 but this is periodically up-dated by DNOCS. The price of land is 
set according to a multi-point scale, which rises to a maximum of around 
Cr.^260 per hectare of bare land for top quality alluvial soils (1975). 
Although it is generally recognized that the price of land in the sertao 
is low, it has been suggested in some quarters that the rates paid by 
DNOCS in these relatively fertile valleys are well below market values 
in certain cases.
The tremendous variation in the rates of compensation paid by DNOCS 
derives from the fact that, of the total amount paid out, 10% is for 
the land itself and 90% for benfeitorias on the property. In Morada Nova
— Interview with Head of Expropriation Sector, DNOCS 2nd Regional 
Directorate, Fortaleza, 50th September, 1975*
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the price per hectare varied from Cr.#90 to Cr.$8,000. In Sao Gon9alo
landowners received twenty times as much money for possessions
expropriated as for the bare land.^/ Most landowners affected by
expropriation are small-holders with relatively few benfeitorias, but
a minority of fazendeiros tended to monopolize the land and, by virtue of
this fact, the lion’s share of benfeitorias. In the Banabuiu Valley 9^%
of the properties taken over were under five hectares. The smallest was
0.1 hectare and the largest 790 hectares,-^/ In Sao Gon^alo three
landowners possessed $6% of the area, while 67% of property-owners owned
15/
less than five hectares.-^' Most of those who qualify for compensation 
therefore receive small amounts, the average being from a few hundred 
to one thousand cruzeiros.
As already stated, many of the properties involved have been 
fragmented through generations of inheritance and the absence of primo­
geniture. One result of this process is that in areas expropriated by 
DNOCS only 60% of landowners, on average, have legal proof of ownership. 
Without this documentation they can be forced off the land with no legal 
compensation even though they may be the de facto owners. These 40% 
have little hope of being paid, but they may take their cases to court 
if they have the resources to do so. This may take years, however, 
during which time the value of any compensation will have been seriously 
eroded through inflation. On all three projects visited, some smallholders 
had not been paid after as much as four or five years of waiting©
The net result of all this for the population obliged to move is, to
^  DNOCS, Sao Gonqalo - Plano Anual, 1979.
Interview with head of Expropriation Sector, DNOCS 2nd Regional 
Directorate, Fortaleza, 30th September, 1975*
i5/ HIDROSERVICE, Recuperapao Hidroagricola da Bacia de Irri^apao de Sao 
Gonqalo, Vol. Vi C o n d i p c e s  S o c i o - E c o n o m i c a s ,  S a o  Paulo, 1975* Table 2.2.2.
say the least, not pleasant. Most get nothing in compensation for their 
involuntary exodus, while those who do qualify receive settlements which 
are hardly enough to enable a new start elsewhere on the same basis as 
previously. Only the elite of larger property owners may be said to 
receive enough money to compensate them for their loss, precisely those 
most likely to have other assets elsewhere to which they can turn.
A large proportion of dispossessed farmers and others working in
the areas expropriated become ineligible to join the irrigation projects
built there. In order to apply a farmer must be a head of family between
the ages of 19 and 49 and of Brazilian nationality. He should have made
his living exclusively in agriculture and have insufficient land to
make a decent living ("uma vida digna"). He must also have been living
in the same place for at least three years and he and his family should
be of proven "good conduct".^/
Following Law 4*504 (1964) 811(1 Article 8 of Law 4*595 (1965)* plots
in expropriated areas must first be distributed to ex-landowners thus
affected and secondly to agriculturalists who previously worked there.
Apart from these groups who receive preference, only landless workers
are officially allowed to acquire irrigated plots. Landowners from
outside expropriated areas who have "adequate” holdings, as v/ell as public
17/employees, are strictly prohibited from becoming members.—1J A way 
around this regulation is given to project directors, who are allowed to 
recommend applicants (up to 10% of the total) so that they do not have 
to go through the normal procedures. These may include the sons of 
irrigation farmers and "those with suitable knowledge and capabilities
DNOCS, Selecao de Families, mimeo.,1975.
DNOCS, Normas Provisorias para Selecao de Families de Irrigantes, 
mimeo*, n.d.
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18/
for irrigation11# This discretion was clearly exercised in Sume, 
where 20% of project members consisted of farmer whose previous 
occupation had been principally outside of agriculture# Geographically 
speaking, recruits should officially be drawn firstly from the areas 
expropriated, secondly from neighbouring parts of the valley, thirdly 
from drier areas of sertao, and finally from "other strategic areas
As might be expected, the local atmosphere when expropriation is 
in progress is one of heated, sometimes violent opposition. A good 
deal of friction is caused between DNOCS and the nearby population which 
often persists for years afterwards. A case in point is that of Morada 
Nova, where expropriation was hurried and people forced to leave their 
land abruptly. .DNOCS hired a private company ('Codesplan*) whose job 
it was to make sure that the farmers and their families left the 
area by.the deadline which had been set, a matter of only a few months 
from start to finish. Some of those who were particularly reluctant 
to move saw their house bull-dozed away in front of them. As the project 
director put it, "0 DNOCS pecou um pouco" (DNOCS sinned a little).
Many of those affected left the valley in disgust, which is reflected in 
the low proportion of total applications to join the project from those 
forced out (28%), despite the fact that they receive preference officially. 
Of the valley populations forced to leave their lands because of DNOCS 
expropriations, only 4 ~ 5% overall subsequently join the irrigation 
schemes established there.
An interesting reflection of the way in which DNOCS alienated the 
local population in Morada Nova was provided by my visit to the small 
village of Pedras which now lies just outside the project boundaries.
^  Ibid. 
^  Ibid#
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Because I was obviously an outsider and had arrived in an official car 
the inhabitants thought, as I subsequently learned, that I was from 
DNOCS and had come to inspect the area in connection with a feared 
expropriation. Only after I had made my independent status clear did 
the villagers feel free to offer their opinions on the impact of the 
project.
One lesson that the agency learned from their experience in the 
Banabuiu Valley is that much greater care must be taken over the way in 
which peoples1 lives are affected by expropriation. Plans exist, for 
example, to extend the Morada Nova project up the valley jf the Lower 
Jaguaribe, Its past experiences and opposition from the local clergy 
appear to be factors which are causing DNOCS to re-think its plans.
>
Population density in the Jaguaribe is even higher than in the Banabuiu 
Valley and the potential level of dislocation much greater if DNOCS goes 
ahead with its intention of colonizing the valley on a similar basis.
The harsh and arbitrary nature of this expropriation policy is 
exacerbated by the fact that DNOCS has no plans for relocating the 
dispossessed. Although the need for such a politica de occupaqao has 
been recognized by some of the agency's staff, DNOCS is run by civil 
engineers who appear to have little perception or concern for the plight 
of those forced off their lands. The agency would do well to take a 
leaf from CHESF's book in the Sao Francisco Valley, which has made such 
contingency plans. When the enormous Sobradinho dam is built upstream 
from Petrolina/Juazeiro, former inhabitants of the flooded area will 
have the option of moving to new towns such as Remanso or to agro—vilas
such as Bom Jesus da Lapa.
In Sao Gonpalo the dislocation of many farmers and their families 
from the project area increased the pressure on land outside. The influx of
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retirantes during the 1970 drought intensified this pressure further still*
In Morada Nova a similar situation occurred. Not only was the valley 
crowded with those seeking shelter from the drought, hut the government 
established a work front here which employed 15»000 men, providing an 
additional source of attraction. The pressure on resources was such that 
after the first harvest of beans on the project there was a near riot by 
the hungry flage 1 ados who threatened to raid the stores. Only the 
intervention of the project director and the distribution of food averted 
a potentially disastrous situation.
Another side-effect of the expropriation policy is that banks are 
now refusing loans to landowners whose properties are at all in danger 
of being taken over by DNOCS. If lands were expropriated with little warning, 
as happened j.n Morada Nova, they would be likely to lose their money and 
be unable to recoup their losses without considerable delays.
Discussion so far has focussed firstly on the small number of 
permanent jobs created by DNOCS irrigation schemes and, secondly, on the 
disproportionately high rate of dislocation from expropriated areas of 
farmland. An additional consideration is whether or not those few 
families a.bsorbed by the projects were in fact vulnerable to the drought 
before joining. It would seem to be a logical corrollary of irrigation 
in the sertao that if the strategy is to have any impact on the drought, 
however marginal, it must reach those sectors of the rural population which 
are liable to be adversely affected by abnormally dry periods. The 
evidence gathered on three case studies suggests overwhelmingly that this 
is not the case. By examining the geographical and social origins of 
recruits to irrigation schemes a common pattern repeated itself in all 
three areas studied: (i) very few colonists had ever been obliged to 
work on emergency fronts or migrate in order to seek employment during
a drought, (ii) most colonos came from within their respective valleys 
and were thus relatively protected from the drought, and (iii) the 
drought victims are still untouched by irrigation directly, although projec 
may provide some shelter for a few flagelados temporarily.
The information concerning recruits* backgrounds was collected by 
means of both personal interviews with colonos and analysis of the 
interview questionnaires completed when applications are made to join 
a project. All applicants to irrigation schemes are interviewed several 
times, providing a fairly comprehensive picture of their economic 
backgrounds, family size, age and recent movements. By combining these 
sources 100% samples were obtained on all three projects studied. On 
the smallest scheme, Sume, it was possible to interview all 26 colonos 
personally, but on Sao Gon<palo and Morada Nova the personal dossiers 
of all project members were made available and consulted to provide most 
of the necessary information. Each applicant may have as many as four 
interviews so that some cross-checking was possible to test the 
consistency of the answers. Although at times the information contained 
in the questionnaires appeared to be a little confused regarding the 
precise nature of an interviewee*s type of tenancy arrangement, on the 
whole the data was accurate and comprehensive. Information from individual 
projects will now be considered*
On the Sume project, situated in one of the driest areas of sertao. 
only four of the 26 colonists had ever worked on an emergency front 
and only two had ever left the area completely to find employment.
The remainder had pursued occupations unaffected by drought or lived in 
areas relatively untouched by its effects. These included eight DNOCS 
rendeiros,* several inhabitants of the valley and one colonist who had
T e n a n t  farmers who rent a small plot of land alongside the reservoir and 
a r e  t h u s  totally protected from the drought, able to cultivate at any 
t i m e  of the year, as well as doing some fishing in the jagude.
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previously worked on an irrigation scheme in the Sao Francisco Valley.
Other project farmers embraced an amazing variety of previous occupations. 
Among them was an ex-driver who had worked in DNOCS for five years before 
joining Sume, an ex-barber, an ex-market stall owner and an ex-bar owner.
It is only fair to add, however, that Sume was not typical of DNOCS 
projects in this respect. The agency's regulations state quite 
categorically that recruits to projects should have devoted themselves 
exclusively to agriculture, which clearly the latter group had not. 
Patronage may have influenced recruitment, or it could be that other local 
farmers were antagonistic towards the project because of the 
expropriations and dislocations of population and were reluctant to apply. 
Despite the facr that farmers from the expropriated area are officially 
supposed to receive preference in the selection procedure, only nine 
of the 26 fell into this category. One of the major reasons for this, 
apart from the disaffection of the local population, is that many of 
the dispossessed are ineligible to join and fail to meet DNOCS entrance 
requirements by virtue of their age, level of agricultural experience 
(sic) and even in terms of their 'personality'. This procedure is 
discussed more fully in Chapter VI.
In Sao Gonqalo 84% of the 123 recruits to the project came from within 
the hydraulic basin which had benefitted from the old irrigation scheme 
before 1971. These included a variety of agricultural occupations; DNOCS 
rendeiros or vazanteiros, (26%), DNOCS diaristas (l5%)> tenant farmers (4%) 
and ex-construction workers (5%)» all whom were protected from the 
drought effects. Sharecroppers from the drier areas of caatinga outside 
the project boundaries (faixa seca) form one of the groups most adversely 
affected by the drought, yet they are strongly underepresented on the 
project. In Sao Gonqalo they accounted for o3% of applicants yet only
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14% of recruits. These figures undoubtedly represent official DNOCS
policy of giving preference to those immediately affected by
expropriation. The familiarity of the population with irrigation also
helps to explain the high percentage of recruits from the expropriated
area, Sinai1-holders accounted for 6% of applicants to the project but no
recruits. The low proportion of minifundista applicants may be explained
by the widespread use locally of sharecropping as a tenancy arrangement,
as well as by the fact, again, that many are ineligible to join. Some
6% of colonists are, however, sons of expropriated landowners.
Of the total number of recruits to Sao Gonpalo, 81%; were born in the
immediate locality and the remainder had, without exception, been
living in the area for periods of between two and over twenty years at
the time of joining the scheme. The Hidroservice survey also confirmed
that Sao Gonpalo has continued to attract migrants from drier areas
of the sertao since the old irrigation scheme was started in the 1930’s, and
expecially in drought years, such as 1942, 1958 and 1970*^"^ On the old
scheme 42% of heads of families were from outside the municipality of
Souza, in which the project is situated. 80% of the population had lived
21/
there for over two years, and over 58% more than 10 years,~~/ Of the
42% from outside the immediate locality, one-fifth had arrived during 
1968 - 70, evidence that the apude and fertile valley continued to
attract people from less favoured areas of the interior.
In summary, therefore, quite apart from the fact that reform of the 
old irrigation system caused the net expulsion of over 5>000 people from 
the river basin, there are two additional considerations. Firstly, most
HIDROSERVICE, Recuperacao Hidroagricola da Bacia de Irrigapao de Sao
Gonpalo, Vol. VI? Condigoes S o c i o - E c o n o m i c a s ,  Sao Paulo, 1971» p. 43.
Ibid.. Tables 3.4.1 and 3*4.2.
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recruits to Sao Gonpalo were not adversely affected by the drought when 
they joined the project. Secondly, the area has been offering 
relatively stable employment for over 40 years to both the locally 
born popiilation and to retirantes from other areas of the sertao. It 
therefore seems quite clear that the project after the reform of 1971 
has made little additional contribution towards stabilizing the rural 
population.
A similar pattern of recruitment was found to exist in Morada Nova 
where only 3% of colonists had ever worked on an emergency front and 90% 
came from within the Banabuiu Valley, in which the project is located.
Like other river basins, the Banabuiu has always offered a degree of 
protection from the rigors of the extended dry season. Smaller producers 
had the advantage of growing certain resistant xerophytic crops such as 
the carnauba palm, which is highly commercializable. It can be used to 
produce a variety of by-products from building materials to wax. Before 
1970 carnauba production in the valley was second only to cotton,
65% of total production being located on properties of under 50 hectares. 
Cattle and cotton production (70%) were concentrated on holdings of over
22/
50 hectares, affording additional protection against the drought effects.-^ 
Of these recruits from within the valley, 56% were sharecroppers, 15% 
ex-landowners and the remainder other types of rural labourer.
The tendency to select farmers who are not badly affected by the 
drought is accentuated by two factors other than the obvious one, already 
mentioned, of preference being given to those from areas taken over by 
DNOCS. Firstly, when a farmer applies to join a project his character
SIRAC, Vale do Banabuiu, DNOCS, 1973. Tables 33 - 4.
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has to be vouched for by friends or acquaintances living in the area*
If an applicant can receive the personal recommendation of an existing 
colono he stands a far better chance of success than a farmer with similar 
qualifications but no such backing* Consequently, a self—perpetuating 
process is set in motion in which recruits are drawn from a limited 
geographical area and from restricted circles or networks or friends.
A second factor which contributes towards this pattern of 
recruitment is that, in order to minimise its administrative costs,
DNOCS prefers to select people from areas a,s near to the project as
possible. The expense of setting up recruitment offices, paying for 
transport and simply the time taken to locate farmers living in out of 
the way areas, ;s thus kept down. In Morada Nova in 1975* for example, 
selection was transferred away from more distant municipalities such as 
Quixere and Tabuleiro do Norte, back to that of Morada Nova itself.
Given this logic, rural producers from the more distant, drier areas of 
sertao who are most vulnerable to the drought, are virtually untouched 
by irrigation schemes under the present system of selection.
In Morada Nova, as in the other two case studies, only a minority 
of colonists come from the land taken over by DNOCS for irrigation.
In this project the figure stands at 35%* while people from the 
expropriated area account for 28% of applicants# Many of the dispossessed do 
not wish to apply, discouraged by DNOCS’s heavy-handed methods used to clear
the valley. Although 3*800 families were affected only 407 applications to
join the project had been received by the end of 1975 from amongst those 
forced out of the area. Nearly three times that number applied who had not 
been touched by expropriation, but the vast majority of whom still
•inhabited the valley.
The reputation of DNOCS for efficiency is not strengthened by the fact
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that long delays are common in absorbing families even after they have 
been accepted. This is partly due to hold-ups in the preparation of 
the land for occupation caused by bad weather conditions during the 
winter months which make soils very muddy. Other reasons are bad 
planning and co-ordination between DNOCS and private contractors, as 
well as bureaucratic delays in the authorization of funds and making of 
decisions. Delays are, furthermore, caused by the many complementary 
health tests that farmers must submit to before starting on the project. 
Irrigation schemes therefore experience quite a high drop-out rate 
after acceptance since an aspiring colono may often have to wait up to 
three years before being able to settle on his new irrigated plot.
Expropriated farmers who have reached a certain age when they lose 
their plots of land are liable to find themselves in an extremely 
difficult position. If a farmer is over 49 he does not qualify to join 
the irrigation scheme. Unless he finds alternative employment or is 
supported by his family, the only other means of support would be the 
state pension scheme under FUNRURAL.* This allows retired rural workers 
a pension equal to half the minimum salary. However, this may not be 
claimed until he has reached the age of 65, leaving a gap of 16 years 
or more in which the disspossessed farmer has to get by some other way, 
In addition , anyone claiming a retirement pension under FUNRURAL must 
present documentary proof of his age and be officially registered.** 
Consequently, many do not have the legal right to even this state 
support.
In conclusion, therefore, basic similarities in the settlement
* Fundo de Assistencia ao Trabalhador Rural, set up by Decree no. 69919 
of 11th January, 1972.
** i.e. He must have a Carteira de Trahalho e Prevedencia. Social.
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patterns of the three projects analysed enable certain general
tendencies to be identified concerning the nature of DNOCS
irrigation. Firstly, it is quite clear that those poorer farmers who
are periodically forced to seek jobs on emergency work fronts or in the
towns when a drought strikes, are virtually untouched by irrigation.
The very limited hectarage put under irrigated cultivation so far has
benefitted rural producers who already enjoyed relatively privileged
positions, protected from the excesses of climate and rarely forced
off their land by a drought.
The evidence from these projects very strongly suggests that
valley farmers are more likely to be expelled from their land by DNOCS
rather than by any climatic vicissitudes. It is, perhaps, just as
well that DNOCS*s rate of progress in irrigating the sertao has been rather
slow, since this form of project appears to create more unemployment
than jobs, dislocating thousands and reabsorbing a fraction of that
number. This, of course, stands in direct contrast to the government’s
intention that irrigation should help to stabilize the rural population
23/and help stem the rural-urban migratory flow,—  It is also in direct
opposition to DNOCS*s own stated goal of tying rural producers to the
land, "fixar o homem a t e r r a . T h e  agency is quick to publish self-
congratulatory brochures boasting of the number of families absorbed
by projects, but omits to mention at what cost these relatively small
*
achievements are made.
The disruptive nature of DNOCS*s intrustion into rural affairs is
•^GEIDA, op cit., FPI, Vol. I» PP* 6 - 9 *  and GEIDA, Plano Nacional de 
Irrigapao, Fase I, 1970, p. B1 - 7.
■^/jose Lins Albuquerque, Sobre Irrigapao em Regioes Subdesenvolvidas, 
DNOCS, Fortaleza, 1971, PP* 6 - 7 .
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exacerbated by the fact that it has no policy for relocating the 
dispossessed or assisting them in any way whatsoever to re-establish 
themselves in other areas. Neither is there any sign for the moment 
that any official change of tactics is planned. The closest thing to 
a modification of policy has been suggested by an outside institution, 
which recommended the establishment of health programmes in two planned 
irrigation schemes in order to minimise the rate of dislocation,25/
However, it is extremely unlikely that health and sanitation improvements 
would alone be enough to keep people in the area unless alternative sources 
of employment were found for the dispossessed.
Local political pressures and public opinion may well force DNOCS 
to re-think its approach. There is already some indication of
/
resistance to DNOCS strategy in the Lower Jaguaribe Valley, Ceara,
where the agency plans its largest single concentration of irrigated
land in the North-East. It is, nevertheless, heavily populated and the
social costs involved combined with local opposition after the Morada
Nova experience will probably mean that some modifications of current
tactics will be inevitable. For example, DNOCS recently abandoned its
plans to expropriate a very heavily populated area of land at the end
of the Banabuiu Valley, adjacent to the town of Limoeiro do Norte.
If a change of policy is not forthcoming, the extension of irrigation
could be held up for a long time, predjudicing the agency’s chances of
receiving a continued high level of funding from the government.
For the present, however, the Ministry of the Interior firmly believes that
irrigation can make a major contribution towards alleviating the
26/
problems associated with drought in the North-East.
— ^ IJNPS, Minuta do Ante-Pro.jeto para o Planejamento Sociologico dos 
Projetos Gurgueia e Pidalgo, UNIS, Recife, mimeo., January, 1975.
^  Interview with Jose Otamar de Carvalho, Head of Research Division, 
Ministry of the Interior, Brasilia, 19th March, 1975*
CHAPTER V
RURAL INCOMES
Apart from creating more rural employment, a second and parallel
objective of government irrigation in North-East, Brazil is that of
substantially increasing family incomes. A basic tenet of the GEIDA
proposals is that irrigation schemes will earn large incomes from the
sale of high-value fruits and vegetables in regional, national and
international markets. It was predicted that by 1976 these crops
would be finding their way to Europe and the U.S.A., reaching a value
of almost U.S.$50 million by 1980, when it was expected that all
projects will be fully operationalSuch high returns, it is
thought, would not only justify the substantial capital investment into
irrigation and produce favourable cost-benefit ratios. They would also
allow the incomes of families working on irrigation schemes to be
increased to four times the average for non-irrigated agriculture in the
North-East. In I960 this would amount to Cr.$2,100 (U.S.$360) per capita
2/
as opposed to the average of Cr.$583 (U.S.$100)
Other official studies of irrigation make similar forecasts 
regarding the ability of projects to generate higher incomes. DNOCS 
confidently predicts that family incomes on irrigation schemes will be 
six times the official minimum s a l a r y F i r m s  of private consultants
GEIDA, Programa Plurianual de Irrigagao (PPI.) Sao Paulo, 1971. Vol. 1, 
Tables 4~-~"ll, 3 - 5, PP* 9 3X1(1 33-
^  PPI? Vol. Illy Annex 18, p. 18.
^  Jose Lins Albuquerque, Sobre Irrigaqao em Regioe_s Subsesenyolvidas, 
DNOCS, Fortaleza, 1971» P- 14.
contracted by the agency to undertake feasibility studies of valleys
considered fit for irrigation also maintain that rural incomes will
increase by leaps and bounds. 'Hidroservice’ concluded in Sao Gon^alo
that if the government bore the costs of project recuperation (which in
fact it does on all irrigation projects) colonists could expect an
income five times the minimum salary.-^ A similar level of income was
predicted by SCET for families on Morada Nova.-^ In another study,
the same firm forsees a rise in farmers’ incomes of two to six times
existing levels.^
Higher earning capacities such as these would bring several additional
advantages. Firstly, they would result in higher living standards for
the rural population benefitting from irrigated agriculture. Secondly,
they would discourage rural-urban migration, which is considered 
7/e x c e s s i v e I n  the words of one survey commissioned by DNOCS, 
"Irrigation... will permit the maximum creation of new jobs with higher 
incomes than before and will allow stabilization (sic.) of the rural 
population, eliminating the climatic factor and giving a better distribution 
of income... this will prevent excessive rural-urban migration which 
industry does not have the capacity to absorb."”*^  A third effect would 
be to stimulate economic activity locally as a result of irrigation 
farmers' increased purchasing power.
^  HIDROSERVICE, Recuperacao Hidroagricola da Bacia de Irrigapao de Sao 
Gonpalo - Relatorio Final (Carta de Apresentapao), Sao Paulo, 1971.
5/ SUDENE-SCET, Vale do Rio Banabuiu: Anti-Projeto do Valorizagao Hidroagricola 
Relatorio Geral - Texto, S U D E N E ,  1969* P» 269.
y SCET, Acude Publico Varzea do Hoi: Projeto de Irrigapao, Vol. I, DNOCS, 
Fortaleza, 1972, p. 10*
^  PPI, Vol. I, pp. 6 - 9 and Plano Nacional de Irrigapao, p, B1 - 7»
y  SCET, Apude Publico Sto. Antonio de Russas; Projeto de Irrigapao, Vol. I, 
DNOCS," Fortaleza, 1972, p. 91.
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Hov/ever, evidence concerning income-earning capacity and income 
distribution which was collected on the three case studies does not 
support these optimistic forecasts. Before explaining the situation 
in some detail, the method used by DNOCS for organizing production and 
income receipt on its irrigation projects should be described. V/hen a 
new member enters a scheme he is confronted with a bare plot of land 
that has been prepared by engineers for cultivation. In order that 
he may begin work he is given credit by the project cooperative to 
finance costs of preparing the land for planting, seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides and the cost oC hiring farm machinery, which is held in a 
communal pool organised by the administration. In addition, the colonist 
is advanced money to pay for the cost of hiring extra-familial labour, 
as well as a certain amount to cover living expenses while he is 
waiting to receive his income from crop sales. All agricultural produce 
is officially marketed by the project cooperative immediately or stored 
for future sale. The accounting department of the cooperative later 
deducts the amount loaned to cover costs and family maintenance from the 
sum netted by marketing the colonist's crops. This difference represents 
the farmer's net profit for the year (saldo liquido).
Taking net profits as an indication of the level of economic 
success of irrigation farmers, the general tendency is for most to be in 
debt even after a year or more of belonging to a project. This means to 
say that the revenue derived from crop sales has been insufficient to 
cover the costs of production and family support, so that most colonos 
operate in the red according to the official accounts drawn up by the 
cooperatives.
During 1974 on the Sao Goncpalo project only 17 of the 114 members 
showed a net profit. It should be added that 57 colonists had joined the
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scheme during that year, so that they would not have had a full twelve 
month’s income to set against production costs. Nevertheless, if the 
remaining 66 are considered, (those who had spent between one and two 
years there) it emerged that 75% of this number were also in debt. The 
size of individual debts ranged from Cr.^700 to Cr.^14,000. Amongst 
those who showed a profit, furthermore, the distribution of income was 
very unequal, varying from a saldo liquido of Cr.$600 to Cr.^24,000.
Of the 17 who showed a profit, the average income was exactly Cr.$9*000 and 
the median income Cr.$6,790. The difference between the highest income 
and the heaviest debt wan Cr.$38,000.^/
On the Morada Nova scheme the situation is similar. Of 224 colonists, 
who had been on the project for over a year, only 55% (79) showed a 
profit at the end of 1974* The remaining 65% had debts ranging from 
Cr.$60 to Cr.^8,000. Those farmers with a positive saldo enjoyed incomes 
varying from Cr.#60 to Cr.^9,000. The income range was therefore 
less extreme than in the case of Sao Go^alo, with just under Cr.$10,000 
separating the best income and heaviest debt. For the profit-making 
farmers, both the average and median incomes were considerably lower 
than on Sao Gont^alo, at Cr.$1,264 and Cr.^810 respectively.-^/
Income on the third project, Sume, did not follow so closely the 
trends discernible on the two larger irrigation schemes. It was clearly 
the most successful of the three projects financially, which explains to 
a large extent why DNOCS regards Sume as a ’model1. In this sense, 
although indicative of what the agency would like to achieve on its 
irrigation projects, Sume was not typical. Since I visited the scheme 
in December, 1974* figures regarding income were only available for January
to November of that year. However, as 1974 drew to a close 21 of the 26
^  Income data taken from: DNOCS, Cooperativa dos Irrigantes da Paraiba Ltda., 
Balanyo de Encerramento Healizado em 31*12.74* Sao Gon^alo, 1975*
^  DNOCS, CIVAB - Demonstrative de Receitas e Despesas (1974): Prestacpao de 
Contas, Morada Nova, 1975*
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colonists (81%) were enjoying a net profit, Sume, for special 
reasons, was the exception in having a majority of its members show a 
profit* These reasons will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter, but basically it was because Sume, unlike Sao Gonialo 
and Morada Nova (and unlike any other DNOCS irrigation project), 
managed to successfully commercialize a high value crop (tomatoes), which 
gave the scheme its high income-earning capacity* The average income 
of profit-earning farmers on Sume was Cr.^10,230 and the median income 
Cr.$8,100. Income distribution varied considerably, however, the size 
of saldo ranging from Cr.#1,100 to Cr.$19,300 and the size of debt from 
Cr$280 to Cr*^9,000.ii/
Broadly speaking, therefore, a clear tendency is evident in the 
way income accrues to irrigation farmers. A small proportion of 
colonists enjoys relatively high incomes, a greater number have middle- 
range earnings, while the majority are in debt. Sume, as stated above, 
is not typical of. DNOCS projects since it is the only scheme whose farmers 
show such a high level of profit. Sao Gonialo and Morada Nova, on the 
other hand, are more typical because their patterns of production and 
commercialization have more in common with the general situation on 
DNOCS projects.
In Sao Gon9alo just 9% of the 66 longer-standing project members account
for 85% of the project’s income in 1974» each having a saldo liquido of
over Cr.$10,000.-^ On Morada Nova, %  of profit-earning farmers, who
15/
made over Cr.^5,000 each .in 1974 accounted for 27% of the income. In
^  DNOCS, Balanpo dos Colonos (Sume), Sume, 1974•
DNOCS, Balango de Encerramento, 31.12.74» Sao Gonqalo, 1975•
A2/ DNOCS, CIVAB - Prestapao de Contas, 1974 > Morada Nova, 1975*
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Sume the top 23% of farmers with a net profit took home 44% of total 
income, while the bottom 23% received 7%,™/
On irrigation projects, then, it was found that a small minority 
of perhaps 3% earns between two and six times the official minimum 
salary, in accordance with official targets* The remainder, however, 
receive much less* Of those who show a net profit most earn well under 
the legal minimum salary, while the majority of farmers are in debt.
This vast difference in incomes is reflected in the life-styles of 
colonos. The more successful acquire modern consumer durable goods 
such as radios and furniture for their homes. A few even buy jeeps with 
the proceeds of their agricultural labours. One colonist in Sume was the 
proud owner of a new T.V., refrigerator and sewing machine for his 
wife, and was the envy of many DNOCS employees. The most successful, 
farmers earn a good deal more than the lower grade tecnicos and office 
workers in the project administrations.
This is not true for the vast majority of irrigation farmers, however, 
who must operate in the red in order to feed their families, and who 
cannot afford basic necessities such a,s water-filters and gas for cooking. 
Overall on the three projects visited, 63% of farmers were in this 
position. The true proportion may well be larger than this since some of 
those who had spent less than a year on a project would undoubtedly have 
been joining the ranks of the indebted during their second and subsequent 
years. The reason for suggesting this is that a large part of the debt 
for any given year consists of carry-over of unpaid debts from the 
previous year. In Morada Nova, for example, 61% of colonists debts in
^  DNOCS, Ealanqo dos Colonos, Sume, 1974*
1974 had been carried forward from 1973.i§/ Two of the projects 
examined here, oume and Morada Nova, were also studied during their 
initial phases by another researcher* She concluded that at this 
time between 40% and 60% of farmers were operating in the red.-^Z 
My more recent evidence a-ppears to indicate that this proportion may 
be at least constant if not actually growing as agricultural 
production expands.
The clearly precarious economic position of many colonists on 
DNOCS irrigation projects has several unplanned side-effects. Firstly, 
the farmers market a significant proportion of their produce privately 
instead of handing it over to the project cooperative, a practice which 
is strictly prohibited by the regulations. This has several advantages 
for the colonist in need of cash* He receives his money immediately since 
he sells his goods directly to the wholesaler or public and does not 
have to wait until the end of the year. In addition he does not have to 
pay taxes (ICM at 16%), FUNRURAL contributions (2%) or internal 
administrative charges (2%). At the same time, the farmer may be obliged 
to sell his crops outside for a price below the market rate, and also 
runs the risk of being asked to leave the project* Clandestine sales 
are discouraged by the administration of DNOCS which, in Morada N0va, went 
the lengths of erecting a guarded entrance to the project complete with 
barriers, reminiscent of a border post. However, the practice continues 
unabated.
Of course, the fact that a significant, if unknown, percentage 
of farmers’ crops is marketed privately will tend to hide true income level 
The official accounts quoted above are liable to understate the real
DNOCS, Colonists Debts to CIVAB (197? - 74)> Morada Nova, 1975*
^  Lynn H. Distelhorst, Jifusao do Sspfrito J g resarial na Extensao..Rural; 
Aval iansfn do Slice so nos Prime: ros per:.metros Irri^ados do Sertao
- 73, DNOCS, Fortaleza, 1973-
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degree of profit for some and exaggerate the level of indebtedness 
for others. The obvious response that this phenomenon p>rovokes is to 
ask whether clandestine sales are motivated by farmers' poverty or 
whether this practice produces the negative figures on the balance 
sheets in the first place. The question is awkward to answer because 
by its very nature such private marketing is almost impossible to 
measure.
My reasons for believing that it is fairly limited in scale are
as follows. Firstly, if a large part of total produce were syphoned
off privately it would provoke much harsher official opposition. After
all, poor marketing figures reflect badly on the gerencia or
administration. Secondly, farmers are forced to resort to other
practices which testify to their low incomes generally, despite any
little extra gained through private sales. Many only manage to survive
by purchasisng food and other provisions on credit from local shops,
frequently at prices up to 35% above the going rate. Thus, on official
irrigation projects we see reproduced a phenomenon which is common in
non-irrigated agriculture amongst semi-subsistence farmers who do not
have sufficient resources to get by on without going further into
debt. Food is also given by relatives to irrigation farmers with no
17/
ready cash to buy their own.—
Another method that colonists use to reduce cash outlay is to pay 
their hired labour on a sharecropping basis. Instead of paying a 
diarista the regular money wage a colonist may remunerate him partly in 
cash and partly with a share of the produce. The cost of hiring labour 
is one of the heaviest expenses that irrigation farmers have to meet, 
especially for those who have little help from their families. Day
Distelhorst, op cit.
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labourers are often willing to work under this arrangement partly
because of the difficulty of finding work outside and also because the
experience thus gained in irrigated farming will stand them in good
stead if they should decide to apply to join the project themselves*
One study has suggested that, because of this, day labourers receive
less in real terms than they would normally do. “ /
One of the main criteria DNOCS adopts to evaluate the 'success1 of
its irrigation projects is financial profitability, expressed by
feasibility studies in the form of favourable cost-benefit returns.
As we have seen, economic success judged in terms of increased family
incomes has been rather limited so far. A warning that cost-benefit ratios
had been unjustifiably optimistic as calculated in the GEIDA study
(PPl) was given several years ago, however, by an independent analysis.
Using the same GEIDA statistics, Cline estimated that of 47 projects
selected for examination only 17 had a favourable cost-benefit 
19/relationship.— '
Nevertheless, the government is anxious that projects should be 
seen to be profitable and helps colonists to minimise production costs 
in several ways. The Bank of Brazil (BB) and the Bank of North-East 
Brazil (BNB) charge negative interest rates (7%) on loans made to 
project cooperatives to finance production costs. Furthermore, 
repayments are not indexed to inflation (correpao monetaria), unlike
normal commercial loans.
The major cost item does not appear on balance sheets in project 
accounts at all. That is, capital expenditure on building canals, roads 
and on levelling and preparing the land. Such works account for 91% of
Distelhorst, op cit., p. 166.
William E, Cline, Irrigation Projects i n BraanjsJjo^  
in Social Cost-BeniHt^I^is, INPES/IPEA, Rio ae Janeiro, 1971.
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total investment into irrigation in the North-East.-^/ Capital
expenditure on irrigation projects in this region is quite high in
relation to schemes in other parts of the world. I-fc has been calculated,
for example, that in the North-East it costs U.S.#54,000 on average to
settle one family on DNOCS projects.— / Another study, based on the
GEIDA estimates, put the cost per hectare at U.S.#2,800 in 1972 •■^/
This compares with a figure of U.S.#500 per hectare for irrigation in
Europe, Morocco and Australia.—^/ Cline suggests that the last figure does
not include some costs which are contained in the Brazilian statistics.
Adjusted accordingly, to cover costs of irrigation works and levelling
only (excluding items such as farm machinery and housing), the level
of capital expenditure per hectare in the North-East is U.S.#1,450.-^/
However, this is still almost three times the figure for Europe and Asia
and is excessive by international standards. Irrigation in the North-East
is basically capital-intensive and absorbs little rural labour in
relation to the investment involved.
- The costs of preparing projects have also increased rapidly
because of delays caused by engineering problems, bureaucratic hold-ups
and slowness in the selection of colonists. By the end of 1975 S5o Gon^alo
should have absorbed its full quota of 550 families yet the number
25/
remained almost stationary throughout the year at 125* Similarly, on
^ /  Cline, Ibid., revised 1972.
21/ Jorge Coelho, Considerapoes em Torno do Programa de Agricultura Irrigada 
na Zona Semi-Arida do Nordeste, CETREIN0, Recife, 1975*
22/ William R. Cline, "Analise de Custo-Beneficio.de Projetos de Irrigaqao 
no Nordeste", Pesquisa e Planejamento Economico, 2 (2), December, 1972,
p. 258.
~^/ Colin Clark, The Economics of Irrigation, 2nd edition, Pergamon Press, 
1970, pp. 62 - 71.
-^/ Cline, Irrigation Projects in Brazil's Northeast, revised, 1972, p. 21. 
^ /  DNOCS, Plano Anual de Explotaeao, 1975, Sao Go^alo, 1974.
Morada Nova, of 100 additional fanners to have been recruited in 1975» 
none in fact joined the project**—^ Delays such as these in the Sao 
Francisco Valley caused the cost per hectare to rise from U.S.$1,450- 
U.S.$1,950 in I965 to U.S.2,400 in 1971*“ ^  By 1971 the Bebedouro 
project was costing U.S.$ 2 million each year to maintain yet no 
farmers had been installed.-^/ This was equivalent to over half the 
total amount budgeted for irrigation in the North-East that year.-^/
Another ’hidden cost’ of irrigation schemes is the enormous 
bureaucracy which is supported entirely by the state. It is possible
- j
to argue that in a region such as the North-East, where there is little 
industrialization and employment opportunities are scarce, the 
government is justified in maintaining a large body of employees.
However, the first priority of irrigation schemes is to benefit poor 
rural producers. It seems rather absurd, therefore, that in Sao Gon9alo, 
for example, DNOCS should employ well over J00, yet the project has only 
absorbed 123 colonists. In Morada Nova DNOCS employs around 180 staff 
to serve 253 irrigation farmers. It is planned that this number will 
rise to about 230 when the project is fully operational and has 500 
families.
Such investment and administration costs are borne entirely by 
the government. Originally, it was intended that, after three or four 
years, irrigation farmers should share this burden by purchasing their 
land and houses over a period of 20—25 years. Although, six years later, 
this matter is still officially under consideration, it is quite clear 
that the majority of colonists simply cannot afford such payments. Judging
^  DNOCS, Pro/ieto de Irrigacao Morada Nova: Plano de Explotapao para o 
ano de 1975« Morada Nova, 1974*
27/ W#A> Bacchus, The Political Dimensions of Water Resource Development: 
A Study of the '■Brazilian Northeast, 1964.-;_7_lp University of 
Connecticut, Ph.D. Thesis, 1973» P» 902.
^  Ibid*t P* 935*
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from the Income figures it seems highly unlikely that they could 
withstand any more deductions beyond those made for running costs of 
production. This fact was confirmed by the administration privately, 
in conversation with officials from the accounts departments on the 
three projects although it is not a statement of official policy. Even 
if the costs of land and housing were recouped, they would account for 
perhaps 30% of total capital expenditure*
There is a drop-out rate on DNOCS irrigation projects of about 5 - 10% 
of recruits who actually receive their plots and start producing. Those 
who leave are inevitably among the least successful economically and 
incurr substantial debts. Indeed, when it appears that a farmer’s debts 
are beyond his capacity to repay what he owes, he is invited to vacate 
his plot for another recruit. The fact that DNOCS simply cancels out 
this debt without its appearing on the balance sheet points to another 
significant ’hidden cost1 of irrigation. This might appear, at first 
sight, to be an act of charity on the part of DNOCS. Vhile this 
sentiment may not, indeed, be totally absent, the principal motivation 
for writing off bad debts lies elsewhere. It is to be found in the 
agency’s concern, I suggest, for maximising profits on paper, that is, 
in the official accounts. It is unlikely that heavy debts would, 
anyway, be repaid by an out-going colonist since repayment would be 
completely beyond his means.
In order to maximize paper profits, therefore, DNOCS has chosen to 
subsidize production costs in the ways described above and to strive for 
profitable harvests. It has done this rather than concentrating on 
minimising investment and production costs. Nevertheless, the fact 
must be faced that most colonists operate in the red rather than in the 
black, and that the economic success of projects is questionable, even 
within the narrow cost-benefit framework of reference adopted by GEIDA
- 143 -
and DNOCS.
The incomes of colonists as measured by their net profits vary 
considerably, as we have seen. It is difficult to say exactly why 
the income of a particular farmer is different from that of his 
neighbour who uses similar methods of production. Nevertheless, a number 
of major factors may be identified which have an important bearing on 
the distribution of income.
Perhaps the first major reason which helps to explain variations in 
rthe economic performances of irrigation farmers is differences in the 
amount of capital possessed by new recruits. Ex-landowners and 
their sons, for example, who are likely to receive some compensation 
for the loss of their property, will probably have more resources at 
their disposal than landless labourers who join. In Sume ex-landowners and 
their sons accounted for 60% of project members, while in Sao Gonqalo the 
figure was 5%* In Morada Nova 15% of colonists were ex-landowners.
Apart from this group, other recruits may enter with resources that give 
them additional support during the initial stages of production. In 
Sume, for example, over 20% of farmers had been working in non-agricultural 
occupations before joining. It is difficult to determine the importance 
of this factor because it is correllated with others such as time of 
entry into the scheme and quality of the land. That is, ex—landowners 
and other ’better1 recruits are liable to be among the first to join 
and to receive the more fertile plots.
A second factor which influences income differentials is variations 
in soil quality, particularly fertility affected by salinization. The 
sites of irrigation schemes were not chosen according to the criteria 
of highest soil fertility and consistency. It was, rather, the presence 
of a reservoir with the capacity to irrigate a given hectarage of land that
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was the main factor behind the choice of locations. It also meant that 
a large part of the capital expenditure had already been made.
However, despite their relative fertility, alluvial soils in the sertao 
are highly varied in composition both horizontally and vertically.
This creates a lack of consistency which has serious repercussions on 
controlled, irrigated crop production unless the planning and technical 
abilities of those involved are exceptional.
Salinization of soils is a serious obstacle to improving productivity. 
The soils of the sertao have a naturally high concentration of saline 
elements derived from the region’s crystalline rock structure.
Salinization takes the form of an impervious layer of saline, crust-like 
deposits which sits between 50cm. and T|- metres below the surface, 
rising sometimes to appear on top as a white substance. This layer must 
be broken up before the land can be cultivated, an expensive and time- 
consuming operation which, however, never solves the problem completely. 
Once recovered, saline soils are often not economically viable and are
30/
usually reserved for salt-resistant fodder crops such as elephant grass. ' ^
With good drainage it is possible to keep saline deposits well below the
surface so that crops are not harmed, but if drainage of the land is
inadequate, the water table rises and the saline moisture reaches the
roots of the plants, severely reducing yields.
Salinization of soils, according to one estimate, affects no less
31/than 30% of the land in the sertao*s valleys.-*-' Large sections, totalling 
several hundred hectares, had to be taken out of production on all three 
projects visited. As a result, colonists who had incurred heavy losses 
through crop failure caused by salinization were transferred to other
22/ Interview with project engineer, Sao Gon?alo, 24th January, 1975. 
22/ Coelho, Conslderayoes em Tomo do PragiS&t P* 15*
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irrigated, plots. Their debts, however, remained with them. One study-
concluded that the poor condition of plots when they were handed over
to colonists explains, to a large extent, the poverty of the poorest
52/
minority of farmers I also found that those colonists with the
heaviest debts had, almost without exception, experienced problems of 
poor drainage and salinization on their lands.
In Sao Gontpalo soil fertility is so varied that 'Hidroservice' 
advised against a division into individual holdings because the firm 
felt that unlucky colonists with poor soils would be under a serious 
handicap. It suggested, instead, cultivation of the area as one single 
property as the best way of evening out the otherwise inequitable 
distribution of plots The company felt so strongly on this point
that, even when asked to reconsider some of its conclusions by DNOCS 
after publication of the major study, 'Hidroservice' still stressed 
the advisability of a communal land-holding system rather than individual 
family p l o t s j t  was added that distribution of different-sized 
plots as compensation for varying soil fertility would be of little use 
since during the preparation stage poor soils would require more work 
and expense, making it difficult to convince farmers with heavier cultivation 
and repayment responsibilites that their plots would be as productive as 
more fertile areas. The company also made the point that the tradition 
already existing in Sao Gonqalo for rural labouring under irrigated 
production obviated the necessity of having individual family farms.
Distelhorst, op cit«, p, 168.
•^ 2/ HIDROSERVICE, Recuperapg-o Hidroagricola da Bacia de Irrigaqao de SSo 
Gon^alo: Relatorio Final - Carta de Apresentapao, Sao Paulo, 1971•
HIDROSERVICE, Recuperacao Hidroagricola da Bacia cie Irriggqao de Sao 
Goncalo: Vol. IX, Viabilidade Tecnico-Economico, Financeira__e
e Administrative da Reciroerapao Hidroagricola; Alternativa^ Sao Paulo,
19717TT85.
146 -
The project could, rather, be run by a cooperative and employ workers 
on a salaried basis
Despite the enthusiasm of the consultants for collective 
cultivation of the land, however, DNOCS ignored their advice and went 
ahead along established lines, distributing five-hectare plots to 
individual families. The first batches of colonists on Sao Go^alo 
received plots with low indices of salinization and nearly all showed 
a profit in 1974* Later recruits were given land which had heavier, 
sandier soils and greater problems of salinization. The level of 
indebtedness is much higher in this latter group, due mainly it seems to higher 
cultivation costs and reduced yields Until February, 1975 three
colonists had been transferred from their original plots to other areas 
in Sao Gon^alo because poor soils had made cultivation impossible.
Furthermore, 800 hectares of land were declared unrecoverable because 
of prohibitive costs, approximately Cr.$30,000 to Cr.$40*000 per hectare.-^/
In both Sume and Morada Nova areas were taken out of production and 
farmers transferred for the same reason.
Lack of technica.l ability to recuperate soils fast enough and well 
enough to ensure high crop yields compounds the natural problems of 
valleys whose suitability for irrigation is already dubious. DNOCS's 
problems in this respect have often not been helped by feasibility studies 
which have sometimes underestimated the variations in soil quality 
and, consequently, the costs of recuperation. The pedalogical study made
by SCET in Morada Nova, for example, was based on an analysis of only
38/
the top 20cm. of soil. Soil-type variations provied to be much greater than
Ibid.. p. 86.
DNOCS, Balanco de Encerraroento (1974) and Plano Anual de Exploraqao 
(1975), Sao Gonqalo, 1974*
Interview with project engineer, Sao Gon<jsalo, 24th January, 1975o 
38/ SUDENE-SCET, Vale do Banabuiu? Anti-Pro,ieto de Valorizacao, Hidroagricola, 
SUDENE, 1969
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the study indicated, and had implications for the subsequent
adaptibility of crops chosen to suit certain areas. A study of 1-g- metres
in depth would have provided a more realistic basis for planning crop 
39/
production.-*^
Low yields caused in part by poor soil fertility and salinization
have undoubtedly contributed to the fact that production targets
have fallen far short of expectations. It was estimated that in 1975 the
total value of agricultural production on Sao Gonipalo would be Cr.#10
million. However, production during 1974 only reached Cr.#1,750,000
and the number of colonists remained constant from one year to the 
40/
next.-3— ' There was no possibility of these optimistic targets being 
achieved. In Sume during 1974 income fell short by 20% of planned 
levels.-4^ / On Morada Nova this gap was considerably larger since by 
July, 1975 only 18% of its total predicted income for that year had 
been netted although half of the year’s production had been sold.4-^/
A third and related factor which helps explain variations in income 
amongst irrigation farmers is differences in production costs. These vary 
considerably per hectare of land under cultivation and are influenced 
by a number of considerations such as soil fertility, techniques used 
and types of crop cultivated. The cost element for irrigation farmers 
is made up of a number of inputs including seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, 
tractor hire and employment of outside labourers. Soil-type will have an 
important bearing on the amounts of seed and chemicals needed to ensure 
adequate yields. The fact that soil quality varies sharply caused parallel
^  Interview with IRYDA (Spanish Ministry of Agriculture) agronomist on 
contract to DNOCS, Morada Nova, 26th September, 1975.
42/ DNOCS, Plano Anual de Exploragao (1975), Sao Gonqalo, 1974.
4^/ DNOCS, Plano de Explotacao Agronomica (1974), Sume, 1974.
4~/ Pluno de Explotayao para o ano de 1975, and Balancete de Verificaqao dos 
Saldos, Julho 1975, Morada Nova, 1975*
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differences in the amounts of these inputs needed.
The cost of hiring additional farm labourers is one which many 
colonists have difficulty in meeting. A recent study concluded that 
between 35 - 50% of irrigation farmers experienced problems in hiring 
diaristas to supplement their family l a b o u r . 4 4 /  In tacit recognition 
of this difficulty, DNOCS tries to select families with several children 
old enough to help their fathers in the fields, theoretically minimising 
the amount of extra labour that must be hired. It has been suggested 
that in practice recruitment of outside labour by irrigation farmers is 
not correllated with family-size nor with the farmer's level of economic 
p r o s p e r i t y . 4 4 /  Variations in labour cost, it is maintained, are more 
the result of poor training by DNOCS technicians who do not instruct 
farmers properly on the use of additional workers .45/
The cost of employing wage-workers is, nevertheless, likely to 
fall more heavily on the shoulders of families as their children grow 
up, leave the land and go to work in the towns. Many colonists I 
spoke to had older children receiving their education in the larger 
towns, some even at college or university. While this may testify to 
the 'elitist' nature of recruitment to irrigation schemes, it is 
indicative of the fact that fewer siblings are likely to want to continue 
in their parents' footsteps as agricultural producers. In Morada Nova, 
for example, only 30% of parents anticipated that their children would 
stay on the land.4^/
This figure would probably be higher if the economic rate of return 
on irrigated land offered sufficient incentive, but not as long as most
4 2 / Distelhorst, op cit.
44/ Ibid., p. 184.
4 5 / Ibid.
4£/ Ibid., p. 183. Parental response as an indicator of future trends 
should, however, be treated with caution.
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families continue in debt. It also raises serious problems for 
DNOCS who originally intended that plots of land should be passed on from 
father to son to take advantage of the knowledge of irrigation techniques 
acquired by children through their assistance on the land. If replacement 
farmers from outside are needed the time, expense and uncertainty of 
training new colonists from scratch will add to their problems. If this 
were the case, however, irrigation would be more likely to reach those 
affected by the drought. If a self-perpetuating 'elite' of irrigation 
families is created this would not be so.
The training and supervision of irrigation farmers provides the 
fourth factor which affects income differentials. After being accepted 
into an irrigation project the new colonist is given a training course 
of just two weeks, which consists of lectures and practical demonstrations. 
Unfortunately there is often a long delay, possibly a year .or more, 
between this training and the time that the farmer takes up his plot.
A person's training might be rendered almost useless by this time. In 
Sao Go^alo 20 colonists trained in January, 1974 could not hope to 
receive their plots before September of tha,t y e a r . 4 2 /  Inefficiency 
on CODEVASF's Bebedouro project in the Sao Francisco Valley concerning 
selection and training has also been noted. By March, 1971, although 
the agency claimed to have settled 39 families, it was discovered that
none had been enrolled or trained, and classes had been postponed
indefinitely* Due to be completed by the end of 1970, it had not even
been half-finished by the end of 1971.42/
Once installed, colonists are supposed to receive regular supervision 
and assistance from rural technicians (praticos rurais). Such contact is
4 2 /  interview with social worker, Sao Gon^alo, 24th February, 1975* 
42/ W.A. Bacchus, op cit., pp. 717 ani 932.
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frequently discriminatory and some farmers receive far more help than 
others* Distelhorst found that the better-off farmers tended to 
receive more attention than the less wealthy, which helped to generate 
mutual distrust between colonists and praticos.^/ Despite formal 
training, it was discovered that only 20% to 40% of irrigation farmers 
had adequate knowledge of soil-types and specialized techniques*-*^/
Bad planning can sometimes be seen to compound the debt problems
of colonists in very obvious ways. In Sao Gonpalo during the first
year of production, for example, plots were prepared out of season.
This caused delays which prevented the planting and harvesting of a banana
crop, the project’s main money-earner. This lead to much heavier debts
than would normally have been expected and was a severe liability on the
farmers. On the same scheme the administration decided to prohibit the
farmers from growing their own subsistence crops, going totally
against tradition. Apart from causing widespread discontent amongst
the colonists, their reaction was simply to grow their beans and com
secretly on spare patches of land such as on the sides of earth drainage
canals. Given the fact that most farmers were in considerable debt, it
seems surprising that the administration should have taken such
action, apparently assuming that the farmers had the cash to buy food
51/
on the open market, which is more expensive a n y w a y C o l o n i s t s  on 
the other two projects studied were encouraged to grow their own 
subsistence crops.
Another phenomenon which pointed to the difficult economic 
circumstances of many colonists’ families on Sao Gon9alo was that social
^  Distelhorst, op cit., pp. 206 - 7*
*52/ Ibid.* p8 220.
■^—/ Interview with social worker and praticos* Sao Gon^alo, 28th February,
1975.
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workers received complaints about the hard time they had under the
system of advance loans for family maintenance/labour costs. A
significant number protested quite openly that they simply could not make
ends meet and that their families' health was suffering as a result.
The inconsistencies of this system, which is used on all DNOCS projects,
derives from the fact that money for paying outside labour and family
support is advanced together in one lump sum at regular intervals.
This amount is calculated according to the number of man-hours estimated
by the administration to be needed by a colonist for his land, taking
into account the type of crop, methods of cultivation, etc. A table
52 /of fixed payments is drawn up and rigidly adhered to.‘*L-/ If a farmer 
has a few children to help him it is assumed that he will have more 
money left over to spend on outside labour and he will need less for 
family maintenance. If the colonist has many children to help him, the 
money that would otherwise have been spent on paying diaristas is left to 
support his family.
However, although fine in theory, in practice the system is full of 
anomalies. This method is inflexible and takes no account of actual 
family needs. If a farmer cannot be sure of his children's help, through 
illness or whatever reason, this forces the farmer to hire extra labour 
and leaves him with insufficient for family support. Furthermore, 
in order to help their parents, children are often obliged to forgo 
their education, although some progress has been made towards adjusting 
the agricultural and educational calendars to minimise this. DNOCS 
frequently underestimates the number of man-hours needed on plots because 
of poor soils which require additional treatment, but for which the
12/ eg. Discriminatpao das Parcelas de Credito para Mao de Obra, Sao 
Gonqalc, 1975*
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official table makes no provision. In Sao Gon9alo during 1974 
families received, on average, only half the official minimum salary 
of Cr.$265 per month with which to feed their families. It seems 
understandable, therefore, that farmers should resort to selling their 
produce privately for an immediate income rather than market their 
crops through the cooperative, have to wait months and possibly have 
nothing to show for it at the end.
One determinant of income differentials which has so far not 
been discussed is the individual ability of the farmer. Adaptability to 
irrigated agriculture is obviously crucial since for most recruits, farming 
on a project represents a strong contrast to what they were used to as 
semi-subsistence producers. Such an analysis is, however, beyond the 
scope of this study. My intention has been, rather, to indicate broader 
trends and factors which characterise irrigation schemes. It was 
for this reason that, in addition to general data, limited case-studies 
of three projects were made as opposed to a more detailed analysis of a 
single scheme.
DNOCS irrigation schemes may have been largely unsuccessful in raising 
farmers’ incomes, but it should be pointed out that the agency has 
conferred other benefits to those absorbed by projects. In conjunction with 
state and local authorities DNOCS has established schools for farmers1 
children and has improved health-care. Project members are encouraged to 
be vaccinated against diseases such as smallpox and cholera, while 
medical attention has been made accessible locally for the handling of 
routine complaints. Problems do arise on projects situated some distance 
from the nearest town, since schemes do not have permanently staffed 
medical posts. Treatment is given by local doctors under the FUNRURAL 
scheme in cooperation with DNOCS. In such cases, as in Sao Gon^alo
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for example, transport is usually arranged for the colonists by the 
social service division.
Education is another aspect of rural life which has been improved 
by the setting up of primary schools on projects, staffed by state- 
employed teachers. One obstacle to the childrens’ eduction, however, 
is that their labour is often needed by parents on the irrigated plots, 
resulting in low attendance rates. Some progress has been made towards 
combining scholastic and agricultural calendars so that they do not 
conflict. There is, nevertheless, the possibility that an inbuilt 
contradiction exists between providing education for colonists’ children 
and the official aim of trying to persuade irrigation farmers’ sons to 
take over the plots in order to ensure some continuity. The 
likelihood exists that, once children are educated and literate, they 
will wish to leave agriculture and seek higher status employment in the 
towns. DNOCS would then have to spend additional time and money training 
recruits unfamiliar with irrigation techniques. This, however, is only 
a hypothesis, since it is too early to judge longer term trends in the 
educational field of project activities.
The foregoing discussion on incomes represents, for most colonists, 
the failure of projects to fulfill the promises made to them as aspiring 
irrigation farmers. The continued indebtedness of the majority has left 
many little better off than previously and, if anything, serves to 
reinforce the suspicions of iarmers outside, originally fuelled by the 
earlier expropriations and dislocations. The inability of irrigation 
schemes to commercialize their produce with the profit margins predicted 
for them is perhaps the main reason for their lack of economic success, 
and it is to this aspect that discussion now turns.
CHAPTER VI
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
The third main objective of government irrigation schemes in 
Brazil is to increase agricultural production. This, it is argued, 
will serve two purposes. Firstly, it will satisfy excess demand 
capacity in future years and, secondly, this production will bring in 
high incomes, justifying the heavy capital costs of investment.
This high income-earning potential is based on the assumption that 
most revenue will be derived from the production and sale of high- 
value fruits and vegetables which non-irrigated agriculture in the North- 
East cannot produce on any significant scale. The GEIDA proposals 
concluded that in the North-East production of traditional crops such 
as cotton, rice and beans would be comparatively small because the
demand for such crops is already well catered for by non-irrigated
agriculture and irrigation projects would have little relative 
advantage ^
In order to determine the feasibility of producing large quantities 
of fruits and vegetables, the PPI study calculated the probable level 
of excess demand for 25 products in 1976 and 1980. This was done by 
projecting ahead trends in general crop production, productivity and
2/
areas cultivated, which had been observed during the previous years 
The growth in population, said to account for 70% of the expansion in
demand for food products, was also projected ahead by rural and urban
-i/ GEIDA, Programa Plurianual de Irrigapao (PPl), Vol. I» P» 20 and 
Vol. II, Annex 5, p. 1. Sao Paulo, 1971.
^  PPI» Vol. P* 20 ^  Vol. II» Annexes 3 and 4.
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sectors. Per capita incomes were estimated for 1976 and 1980 on the 
basis of their growth during the previous 20 years Probable 
demand was set against expected production levels to give a set of 
figures showing the likely excess demand which irrigation will be 
able to help meet.^/
Substantial margins of excess demand are predicted by the PPI
analysis for all the major urban centres of the North-East, Although
existing levels of consumption of high-value fruits and vegetables
are still relatively low, it was predicted that traditional agriculture
would be incapable of meeting the demand predicted for 1976 and 1980,
especially in relation to oranges, other fruits, potatoes and other 
5/v e getables.At the same time, however, limited internal markets would 
impose demand constraints on certain crops such as grapes, onions 
and tomatoes.^
On the basis of these calculations, GEIDA envisages a large and 
extremely diversified output for irrigation projects in the North-East, 
By 1980 citrus fruits, it is predicted, will be the principal source 
of revenue with a production of 605,000 tons p.a,, followed by 
vegetables (585,000), tomatoes (502,000), cotton (254,000), potatoes 
(225,000) and mixed fruits (102,000), The remainder, in order of 
importance, includes melon, fodder crops, grapes, bananas, sunflowers, 
onions, peanuts, beans, wheat, pineapple, garlic, rice, corn and 
sorghum.-^ High-value, non-traditional crops will account for 84% of
^  PPI. Vol. II, Annex 5, PP* 2 - 5 .  
4/ PPIt Vol. I, p. 20.
^  Ibid., p. 25. See Table 16.
^  PPI. Vol. H » Annex 5» P* 4.
PPI, Vol. I, graph 4 - 1 1 .
of irrigated production in the North-East, compared with 48% in
q/
the Centre-South*—' It was estimated that the 56 projects in the 
North-East would generate an income of Cr.$1,040 million at 1969 values, 
or U.S.$248 million,-^/ quadrupling per capita incomes for irrigation 
farmers and their families.
In its 1971 study GEIDA calculated that by 1976 irrigation projects 
in Brazil would be exporting their produce to Europe and the U.S.A., 
taking advantage of their theoretical ability to supply high-value 
crops of superior quality during inter-seasonal periods in Northern 
Hemisphere markets.-^/ By 1976 exports of fruit and vegetables to 
the U.S.A., Canada, the E.E.C. and Scandinavian countries would reach 
over U.S.$19 million.-^/ Grapefruit produced under irrigation in 
Brazil, for example, would account for 100% of Swiss imports of 
the fruit, 16% of France’s, 10% of Germany’s, 17% of the Benelux 
countries' and 11% of the U.K.'s.-^/
It was also proposed that a new system of commercialization 
be established which would eliminate some of the intermediary stages 
between producer and consumer typical of traditional agriculture.
This would reduce marketing costs and ensure that irrigation farmers 
received a fair return. In Chapter II it was shown, for example, how 
small farmers are placed in an inferior bargaining position by their
^  PPIt Vol. I, graphs 4 - 11 and 4 - 1 2 .
^  PPI* Vol. V. Annex 27, p. 19.
^  PPI, Vol. I» PP* 31-2.
^  Ibid.
Ibid., Table 3 - 5, P* 33*.
lack of ^ resources to store and transport their produce. Very few
are organized into cooperatives. Wholesalers and retailers of
various types take the lion's share of the price paid by the consumer,
as much as 60 - 70% or more.-^/
This new commercilization network was to be organized around local
marketing centres to which projects would send their produce for
classification, storage and processing. From these centres* the
crops would go directly to supermarkets and other retail outlets
for the domestic market, as well as for export. They were to be
administered by a centralized institution (unnamed) possibly in
cooperation with SUDENE, which has similar plans for improving marketing 
14 7procedures.— ' The administration in charge of these centres would be 
responsible firstly for coordinating the collecting of agricultural 
produce from irrigation projects. Secondly they would organize the 
internal activities of storing and processing, etc. Thirdly, and very 
importantly, they would be responsible for organizing the sale of
15/produce, transport to markets and planning ahead with market research.— 5^ 
There is no doubt that irrigated agriculture in the North-East 
has resulted in greatly increased yeilds for high-value crops at the
1 3 / PPI, Vol. II, Annex 7, Table 1, p. 9. In Fortaleza it was found 
that intermediaries made 70 - 80% of the profit on perishable crops 
and 30% on cereals. See: SUDENE, Aspectos da Commercializapao de 
Produtos Horti-Fruti-Granjeiros e Cereais na Cidade de Fortaleza,
DAA, Fortaleza, 1973, and Ibid., 1972. Similar trends were observed 
in Recife, See: SUDENE, Commercializapao de Alimentos na Cidade do 
Recife, Recife, 1972.
M/ By the setting up of CIDA's, Companhias Integradas de Desenvolvimento 
Agricola. (See Chapter VII for fuller details").
^  PPI. Vol. I, PP« 43 - 5 *
* Centros Micro-Regionais de Commercializapao.
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the experimental stage, as well for more traditional crops in the 
actual production phase^  Following GEIDA's guidelines, DNOCS has 
made considerable efforts towards producing higher-yielding varieties, 
on the explicit assumption that only these crops will bring in 
sufficient revenue to compensate for the high capital and cultivation 
costs compared with the non-irrigated sector.-—^  However, despite 
the desirability of such a production pattern, DNOCS has been unable, 
by and large, to successfully grown and commercialize high-value crops 
on a significant scale. Instead, projects have marketed crops which 
are already widely cultivated in the interior such as cotton, rice, 
maize and bananas. There is little relative price advantage to be 
gained with theee crops, and this is perhaps the main reason behind 
the generally low income-earning capacity of irrigation schemes.
The crops most widely cultivated under irrigation have not been 
the citrus fruits and vegetables which head the list of GEIDA priorities. 
Cotton, rice and bananas account for about 70% of the total hectarage 
on DNOCS projects.-^/ Data from the two largest case studies confirms the 
general trend. In Sao GonQalo rice accounted for 55% of total revenue 
and bananas for a further 55% in 1974• Along with cotton, it was 
planned that these three traditional crops should bring in 97% of the 
project's income during 1975*-^ In Morada Nova during 1975 cotton (47%)» 
rice (19%) and maize (l6%) earned 82% of the scheme’s revenue.-^/
^  See Table 17.
DNOCS, Relatorio Anualt Pesquisas Agropecuarias, Recife, 1974*
18/ Jorge Coelho, Considerapoes em Torno do Programa de Agricultura 
Irrigada na Zona Semi-Arida do Nordeste, CETREINO, Recife, 1975» P« 58, 
SUDENE, Relatorio Sintetico: Andamento do Programa de Irrigapao no 
Nordeste, Recife, 1974*
DNOCS, Plano Anual de Expiotapao, 1975* Sao Go^alo, 1975.
^  DNOCS, Balancete de YerificapSo dos Saldos, 1975» Morada Nova, 1975.
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c* *Sume is the exception to this general rule in that it obtains 
8Cf)o of its income from selling tomatoes, a crop which is not 
produced locally outside the project nor in the sertao as a whole.
These are mainly industrial tomatoes sold to canning factories, but a 
smaller proportion is marketed for domestic consumption. The 
relatively high yields on Sume combined with the facility of producing 
two harvests per year, gives the project an advantage over other non- 
irrigated areas in the agreste region which produce tomatoes. At 
the same time, irrigated production in Sume does not compete with local 
agriculture, competition vhich might depress prices. Although not 
without its disadvantage, tomato production in Sume has assured the 
project a relatively high income, very much along the lines envisaged 
in the PPI plans. It must be borne in mind, however, that the 
distribution of this income is highly concentrated into the hands of a 
very small minority, for reasons already outlined in the previous 
chapter.
It is not easy to say exactly why Sume has had more commercial 
success than either Sao Gon9alo or Morada Nova, or indeed any other 
DNOCS project. I would suggest that the reason lies principally in 
the fact that considerable technical resources have been devoted towards 
making tomatoes grow successfully here. At the same time, the project 
has remained very small (26 families) and easy for the administration 
to supervise and control. This has made it easier to coordinate 
production and marketing, especially having found a few outlets for the 
crop at what the administration reckons to be good prices.-^
A major explanation for the inability of DNOCS's projects to
21/ Interviews with administration and cooperative personnel, Sume, 
December, 1974*
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commercialize high-value fruits and vegetables is the fact that 
feasibility studies appear to have overestimated the probable effective 
demand for such crops. Market liciitations have undoubtedly been 
partly responsible for the changed emphasis away from luxury crops to 
more traditional varieties for which markets and commercialization 
channels already exist. If planned output of major luxury crops is 
set against projected demand capacities it seems clear that these 
expectations are unrealistic. Comparing columns B and E of Table 18, 
for example, it may be seen that the planned output of melons is 
fifteen times the prospective demand in 1980. Irrigated production 
of tomatoes, pineapples and onions is equivalent to two-thirds of 
market capacity. Other studies have contradicted the GEIDA 
conclusions, suggesting that rather than a high level of excess demand 
for certain crops (See Table 16) there will be a surplus production even 
without any further contribution to supply from irrigated agriculture. 
This applies to bananas, pineapples, grapes and melons
These demand constraints are reflected in the current production 
pattern of irrigation projects, where high-value crops account for 
perhaps 10% of total income instead of the predicted 77% Paradoxically, 
this changed emphasis may prove to be roughly in line with future 
needs if independent market studies are correct in their calculations.
It has been forecast that by the end of the decade there will be a 
deficit in the supply of various traditional crops such as cotton, rice 
and maize.— ^ From the point of view of economic returns, however, the 
profit-earning potential of these will always be limited compared with
22/ BNB, Perspectivas de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste ate 1980: Sintese, 
Fortaleza, 1975* PP» 49 - 50*
^  Ibid., p. 50.
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luxury products.
At the level of individual projects there is also a considerable
difference between existing production patterns and those suggested
by respective feasibility studies. Although traditional crops
account for 90% of total production in Sao Gon^alo the pilot study
placed far greater emphasis on the marketing of higher value fruits
and vegetables such as goiaba and onions, which could be commercialized
during the inter-harvest period outside Similarly in Morada Nova,
large-scale production of fruits and vegetables were predicted on
the assumption that, "Production in the Banabuiu Valley will always be
25/inferior to potential demand."— ' In reality such crops form an 
insignificant part of the project's output. Part of the reason for 
this discrepancy must lie, once again, in the over-optimistic 
predictions of future demand. Indeed, it is not clear whether these 
estimates are based on, calculations of effective demand which take 
into account consumption patterns, income elasticies and competition from 
other sources, or whether they simply represent normative guesses as 
to what the population should be able to absorb. The latter 
alternative would seem to be nearer the truth.
Having laid part of the blame for existing production patterns on 
the optimistic predictions of feasibility studies, both at regional 
and project levels, it should be added that this is only part of the 
answer. Whatever the precise forecasts of market potential, there 
is undoubtedly room for expanding the production and sale of high-value
HIDROSERVICE, Recuperacao Hidroagricola da Bacia de Irrigapao de Sao 
Gongalot Relatorio Final - Carta de Apresentagao, Sao Paulo, 1971, p. 10.
23/ SUDENE-SCET, Vale do Rio Banabuiu? Anti-Projeto do Valorizapao 
Hidroagricola, Relatorio Geral, Texto, Sudene, 1969* P® 222.
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fruits a^ nd vegetables. To cite one example, Sao Paulo competes 
strongly with local suppliers in Recife, providing the North-Eastern 
city with 92% of its potatoes in 1970.— / This crop could be 
produced under irrigation in the North-East instead of its coming 
1,300 miles by road from the South of the country. Another reason, 
therefore, for the failure of projects to sell more high-value crops 
lies in their lack of technical and organizational ability to produce and 
market these crops. This problem is compounded by the increased size 
of irrigation schemes as they expand and become more difficult to 
manage with the resources that DNOCS has at its disposal.
The limitations imposed by such factors on any possibility of 
diversifying production along the lines suggested by GEIDA become 
apparent when the record of attempts to market high-value crops is 
examined. In order to obtain the best possible prices and to maximise 
incomes it is necessary to market crops produced by irrigated 
agriculture during the off-season outside. Bad planning, however, has 
often resulted in these potential advantages being thrown away.
During 1975 in Sao Gonpalo, for example, a 30 ton harvest of onions 
had to be sold at a fraction of the predicted market price (Cr.^0.30 
instead of Cr.^2.50 per kilo) because it coincided with that of the 
major onion-producing area of the North-East in Pernambuco, the 
neighbouring state. This resulted in a considerable loss of income 
for the colonists. Poor planning was entirely responsible for this 
minor disaster because the feasibility study had earlier recommended
Clovis Cavalcanti, Aspectos da Commercializapao de Alimentos na 
Cidade do Recife, SUDENE-ANCARPE, Recife, 1971.
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quite specifically that the crop should be marketed in the inter- 
27/
harvest period, A similar experience was had with an experimental 
tomato crop in the same year.
Marketing crises have also been caused by the over-dependence 
of projects on a particular crop, whether traditional or luxury. In 
Sume the processing factories (’Peixe’ and ’Rosa1) which bought the project’s 
tomato production, suddenly cancelled their contracts in 1973* For a 
while there were fears of an economic disaster but a crisis was averted 
when a contract was eventually signed with another plant ('Cica Norte’), 
which now takes 90% of tomato production. In Sao Gonq ilo a similarly 
disastrous situation seemed imminent when the factory in Arcoverde 
(Pernambuco) which purchased 90% of the banana crop refused to buy a 
particularly large harvest. Only after considerable searching and 
the direct intervention of the central DNOCS administration in Fortaleza 
was a buyer found.
One of the main causes of the haphazard nature of marketing procedures 
on irrigation projects is that DNOCS has made no systematic attempt to 
coordinate the activities of irrigation projects in the field of 
commercialization, GEIDA proposed, as we have seen, a series of 
local centres responsible for collecting, grading and marketing farmers’ 
crops, thereby diminishing costs and increasing profits for the actual 
p r o d u c e r s I n  reality, however, there is no such coordination 
amongst DNOCS schemes, either locally or regionally. Each project 
appears to evolve its own production and marketing pattern based on a 
compromise between on the one hand what cultivation system is considered
^  HIDROSERVICE, op cit., p. 10. 
^  PPI* Vol* I> PP« 43 - 5«
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technically and organizationally feasible by the administration, and 
on the other what outlets for such crops the heirarchy can secure.
There is no concerted attempt to coordinate the production patterns ■ 
of projects so that particularly lucrative markets may be efficiently 
exploited. One such attempt was in fact made to organize a form 
of collaboration between the producers cooperatives of projects in the 
state of Paraiba, notably Sume and Sao Gonqalo, However, their 
totally different agricultural plans, combined with practical problems 
of communication resulted in the collapse of this short-lived 
experience.
Another handicap at the marketing stage which decreases potential 
profits lies in the fact that irrigation projects do not yet have the 
facilities for processing and industrialising the crops they produce. 
Morada Nova has managed to partially circumvent this problem v/ith 
cotton, its main money-earner, by sending it to a central cooperative 
(privately-owned) in Fortaleza,* The project recently made a special 
arrangement whereby 30% of the profit obtained from processing the 
cotton will be returned to the scheme. No such arrangements are 
possible for rice, hov/ever, most of the profits from which accrue to 
the intermediary wholesalers and the processing factories. Bananas 
and tomatoes are also sold at relatively low prices, most of the profits 
going to the canning factories. Until DNOCS manages to set up its own 
processing plants or make special arrangements with private factories, 
the income-earning potential of these more traditional crops will 
always be limited. This will probably only be economically viable 
once production has reached much higher levels than at present.
One of the ways in which DNOCS hopes to aid the efficient functioning
Cooperativa Central de Beneficiamento.
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of its irrigation projects appears to be by means of promoting 
what it calls ’cooperativism', Although the agency has not made 
any official committment to this effect, it lays considerable emphasis 
on encouraging cooperativismo in its publicity material. It does 
not, nevertheless, define precisely what it means by the terra.
Generally speaking, however, it refers to a vaguely defined spirit of 
collective cooperation amonst colonists which is, ideally, conducive 
towards greater harmony and economic success. Simultaneously, 
cooperativismo also implies that irrigation farmers should follow 
unquestioningly the guidelines set down by the administration, secure 
in the knowledge that such policies are in their best interests.
In theory at least, DNOCS tries to select candidates who are thought
to have a predisposition towards ’cooperativism* • During the final 
stage of the selection process interviewers try to assess qualitative 
personality traits of applicants such as their ’degree of initiative’, 
’receptiveness to change’, ’sociability’ and their level of ’cooperativism’ 
These qualities are graded, along with other qualifications such as age, 
experience and family size, and a grand total of points is arrived at 
which is used as a basis for choosing colonists. In practice the system 
is clearly full of flaws, especially the very simplistic attempts to 
classify personality characteristics and grade them numerically. Even 
in its most sophisticated form such a process is open to serious criticism
and DNOCS staff, however good their intentions, have neither the ability
nor the time to undertake such a task efficiently. In fact many 
selectors realize the inherent futility of such attempts and classify 
aspiring colonists more according to their other more easily identifiable
DNOCS, Selepao de Agricultores: Fichas Para Classificaqao de
• Candidatos, Fortaleza, 1975*
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qualifications, although this is frequently supplemented by 
superficial impressions about personality. It has been noted that, as 
a result, more extrovert candidates have sometimes received preferential 
treatment on the basis of their apparent ability to communicate more 
easily.-^/
DNOCS is liable to regard potential deviation from the ’cooperativist’ 
ethic in an unfavourable light. During the selection interviews DNOCS 
staff try to ascertain whether candidates are willing to accept the 
administration’s authority and guidance. In fairness, it should be 
said that interviewers also look for some justification from an 
applicant as to why he would follow advice given him, rather than 
accepting his blind acceptance of authority as good enough. The point is, 
however, that DNOCS does not appear to assume that farmers may 
have constructive contributions to make to the project which might differ 
from accepted, official policy. This intolerance of suggestions from 
below, detectable even at the selection stage, strongly contradicts any 
pretensions towards a ’cooperativist' spirit, however loosely defined.
A significant illustration of how the agency reacts to threats, 
real or imagined, to its monopoly over decision-making on projects, was 
provided in Morada Nova. The application of one farmer had been ignored 
by DNOCS for three years because of allegations that his political 
record made him a potential danger to the ’smooth functioning' of the project. 
The person in question had been secretary of the Federation of Rural 
Workers of Ceara, subsequently ’intervened' by the military government.
He was later elected leader of the Rural Workers’ Syndicate in the
32/ Interviews with social workers, Sao Gonqalo and Morada Nova, 
February - September, 1975*
nearby^town of Limoeiro do Norte* Eventually he gained admission 
to the project by pre-empting attempts to delay consideration of his 
application so that he could be made ineligible on the grounds of 
his age. This he managed with strongly-worded letters of his own, 
supported by statements that he had committed no criminal offences 
as a union leader. Reluctantly, the administration accepted him, and 
it now seems that he is a ’model' irrigation farmer.
Once colonists have been selected and installed on their plots, 
there are two main areas where DNOCS, in theory at least, tries to 
encourage a ’cooperativist’ spirit. In the work area this is done 
through the cooperative, which is responsible for distributing credit 
to project members and for commercializing their produce. In the non­
work field attempts are made to promote community development with the 
participation of families in group meetings. In fact, the department 
responsible for the social welfare of colonists is called the 'Service 
of Social and Cooperativist Promotion'.*
Apart from its commercialization and credit functions a project
cooperative is supposed to stimulate 'cooperativist education’ and
encourage colonists to ’’place collective interests above individual 
31/interests."— ' The cooperative is run by an administrative council 
which consists oC five elected members; a president, vice-president 
and secretary as well as two advisers from the project administration. 
Members meet once a year at the AGM to discuss general policy, carrying 
out elections of new representatives every two years. The AGM is
21/ DNOCS. Estatuto da Cooperativa dos Irrigantes do Yale do Banabuiu, 
Morada Nova, 1972. DNOCS, Estatuto da Cooperativa dos Irrigantes da 
Paraiba, Sao Gon<palo, 1973*
Servitpo de Promotpao Social e Cooperativista.
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virtually the only opportunity which colonists have to exert any 
influence on policy formation. They do meet briefly every two 
weeks or so to receive their credit allowances and to hear any special 
announcements by the gerencia. At these meetings, which would be a 
good opportunity to sound out popular opinion on various matters of 
concern to all colonists, the emphasis is placed very heavily in 
the opposite direction, the issuing of instructions. Criticism of 
existing policies is neither invited nor encouraged in Sao Gonqalo or 
Sume. In Morada Nova, credit is distributed in small batches to 
groups of colonists, who do not have these regular meetings.
One of the main handicaps towards developing such forms of 
communal expression stems from the sheer size of projects as they grow 
and the geographical dispersal of families. In Sao Gon9alo, for 
example, 77 of the 125 colonists had been housed in two nucleii, while 
the remainder lived in isolated huts scattered both within the 
irrigated zone and outside of the hydraulic basin altogether. In Sume 
this was no problem given the smallness of the project. As schemes 
expand to their full size, however, limits are bound to be imposed upon 
the regularity and significance of such meetings.
The whole system of irrigated agriculture in the form of 
individualized, family plots, combined with very rigid planning 
from the top down, conflicts strongly with DNOCS’s official 
preoccupation with encouraging cooperativismo. The ideas behind 
these two concepts are basically self-contradictory. From the moment a 
colonist enters a project he is told exactly how much land he should 
cultivate, what crops he should grow and in what quantities, what 
treatment to apply, when to harvest and to whom he should sell his crops. 
A high degree of direction is to be expected given the novelty of
i
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irrigated agriculture for recruits and the marketing constraints, hut at 
the same time almost no room is left for individual initiative or free 
choice. The faimer is not expected to make his own decisions 
regarding production, nor is he encouraged to make suggestions as to 
possible alternative methods. After all, he has been admitted to the 
project on the assumption that the administration and agricultural 
technicians know best. In practice, of course, the farmer often does have 
to use his individual initiative, albeit unofficially. I would suggest 
that colonists frequently have to make do with their little acquired 
knowledge when assistance from praticos is not forthcoming. Another 
practice which illustrates the need for farmers to exercise individual 
initiative is the private marketing of crops out of economic necessity, 
already mentioned in Chapter V.
A typical illustration of the absence of collective discussion behind 
decisions taken by DNOCS administration, was provided by a meeting 
of the Sume project director with the colonists. DNOCS had decided 
that it would be a good idea to introduce a compulsory savings scheme to 
set aside 4-0% °f colonists’ net profits at the end of the year. Half of 
this would be pooled to pay for additional labour, obviating the need 
for bank loans, which charged interest (although at a negative rate, in 
fact). The remainder would be deposited with the Bank of the North-East 
(BNB). While his audience listened in silence, the director tried 
to get across the advantages of saving, both for their families’ sakes 
and as a contribution towards "national development". He repeated 
several times the idea that nordestinos were not used to saving but 
that this must change if they were to become successful colonists.
It was no use hoarding cash or buying cars. One or two colonists, who had
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bought jeeps at considerable subsequent expense, were cited by the director 
as examples of bad spenders, their search for "status" having overcome 
prudence. How much better it would be, he argued, if the surplus were 
invested into buying vehicles which could be used to transport their 
crops for marketing instead of replying on DNOCS. He took great pains 
to stress the need for the farmers to break with .the old ideas of 
paternalism, of doing away with their dependence on the generosity and 
help of the administration. Some modifications were made to the details 
of the savings scheme after a brief discussion involving the director 
and four colonists of the 24 present. At the end of the meeting the 
cirector rebuked the majority for their lack of participation, 
stressing the need for collective decision-making. The savings 
plan would start in the near future. No vote was taken.
The second area of ’cooperativist’ action comes under community 
development. This is the responsibility of social workers, whose 
job it is to hold regular group meetings with housewives, to encourage 
discussion of common problems and to communicate such feedback as there 
is to those in charge of planning and administering the project.
Within each housing community the social workers try to hold regular, 
monthly meetings to discuss various aspects of life on the irrigation 
scheme such as health and sanitation problems, vaccination, purchase of 
water-filters, their children’s education and cost of living problems.
The social arm of DNOCS does appear to be making a genuine attempt to 
promote group discussions and the open expression of opinion.
An illuminating insight into the potential usefulness of such 
meetings was provided by my attendance at a discussion amongst a group 
of housewives in Sao Gon9alo, concerning a recent decision taken by 
the directive council of the cooperative. This prohibited outright the
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keepingt>f goats, dog's, cats and poultry on the housing nucleii. As 
with the failure to provide families with subsistence plots, bad 
planning had resulted in houses not having small, fenced enclosures 
where such animals may be kept. Families need goats* milk and 
chickens’ eggs to supplement their poor diets, and they reacted by 
keeping animals running loose in the housing settlements, an 
annoyance to some and a health hazard to all. The decision to forbid the 
keeping of animals, taken without consultation of project families, 
was greeted with considerable hostility by the meeting and, as a result, 
the matter was going to be reconsidered by the cooperative. The social 
worker suggested that the problem could be solved by each family building 
its own enclosure. This, in turn, brought protests that their husbands 
had no time to spare given the heavy work load involved with keeping 
an irrigated plot, nor the money to buy wood and wire fencing materials. 
The meeting closed with the suggestion that they might cooperate with 
each other to build the enclosures.
Social workers, then, constitute the only real channel through which 
the interests and everday problems of colonists and their families may 
be communicated to the DNOCS administration. Unfortunately, the concern 
shown by social workers for promoting genuine cooperation amongst project 
members at the grass roots is not mirrored at higher levels of the 
administration, where lip service seems to be the only contribution.
At a recent regional meeting of the social work division of DNOCS 
irrigation projects the coordinator from central administration deemed 
the matter of 'cooperativism1 unworthy of comment because of a "lack of 
cencrete data".-^/ Project administrations are designed to issue orders 
to colonists rather than listen to their points of view. Instead of 
exerting collective pressures in support of their own interests,
32/ DNOCS, Relatorio de Atividades do Serviqo de Promopao Social e
Cooperativista, Recife, 1974» P« 72.
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irrigation farmers have to be content with expressing: their opinions 
in a highly fragmented, sporadic and indirect fashion.
The aim of increasing agricultural production, thereby generating 
higher incomes for irrigation farmers, has, therefore, met with very limited 
success in relation to the optimistic forecasts made by feasibility 
studies. At the same time, 'cooperativism1 as a means of aiding this 
process exists more in the pages of DNOCS brochures than in the 
everyday activities of irrigation schemes. This is, I suggest, 
principally because the heirarchical way in which the agency is 
organised is fundamentally antagonistic towards the development of a 
cooperativist spirit amongst farmers and administration.
CHAPTER VII
IRRIGATION AGAINST THE DROUGHT:
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
The purpose of this thesis has been two-fold. Firstly it has 
attempted to analyse the nature of the so-called 'drought problem' in 
North-East Brazil and, secondly, it has examined the efficacy of 
government irrigation schemes as a means of countering the drought 
effects. Chapter II broke down the 'drought problem' conceptually 
into its climatic and socio-economic aspects, thus trying to get away 
from the type of analysis, common amongst civil engineers, for example, 
which sees the drought as simply a problem of water supply. V/ater 
shortages are certainly important but not the only factor which sets 
in motion migratory movements of flagelados from drought-hit areas to 
the towns and emergency work fronts. Lack of water for domestic 
consumption and for the subsistence crops upon which most small farmers 
depend for their food supply may be the final 'push' factor which forces 
them off the land, Hov/ever, the fact that such migrations take place 
if the winter rains are delayed by even a few weeks, let alone if 
a drough is declared, indicates that the malaise is far deeper than that 
of water shortage.
It lies in the extremely precarious economic positions of large 
sectors of the sertao agricultural labour force, particularly sharecropper 
and smallholders, which makes them highly vulnerable to variations in 
the rainfall regime. The 'drought problem', then, is not solely, nor 
even principally, a climatic phenomenon in North-East Brazil, but rather 
one of a weak agrarian structure unable to support its members living at
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the margin during times of crisis.
Subsequent chapters examined the effectiveness of the irrigation 
programme, the governmentsfs principal anti-drought strategy, in 
alleviating problems of poverty, unemployment and rural-urban 
migration. This was done by systematically analysing the achievements 
of irrigation in three basic aread within which both GEIDA and DNOCS 
have explicit objectives; (l) increasing rural employment and tying 
people to the land, (2) increasing rural incomes, and (3) increasing the 
production and sale of high-value fruits and vegetables grown under 
irrigation.
The evidence gathered concerning these official goals from three 
case-studies of DNOCS projects in the North-East shows that irrigation in 
its present form is, on balance, a rather costly method, both 
financially and in human terms, of making an extremely small-scale and 
marginal contribution towards alleviating the drought problem. Chapter IV 
demonstrated that recruits to irrigation projects consist primarily of 
those small farmers from the humid valleys who already enjoy relatively 
privileged positions, protected from the worst of the drought effects 
by the presence of rivers and dams to regulate their flow. In the 
case of Sao Gon9alo, a project which irrigated privately-owned land 
already existed, giving even more protection to those working the 
property. The agricultural population most vulnerable to the drought, 
sharecroppers and smallholders in drier areas away from the rivers, 
remains almost totally untouched by irrigation schemes.
' In addition, irrigation in its present form is capital-intensive, 
employing relatively little labour in a region where this factor of 
production exists in abundance. Not only are few permanent jobs created
by this ^ strategy, but irrigation actually displaces from three to 
six times the number of families from the humid valleys by the process 
of expropriation than are eventually absorbed by the schemes established 
there. These facts stand in total contrast to the government's stated 
intentions that irrigation should help stabilize the rural population 
and cut down the rate of rural-urban migration. Little room is 
left for the sort of optimism which recently led on major Brazilian 
magazine to herald irrigation as, "a solution for unemployment" in the 
North-East.^
Regarding the goal of improving rural incomes and living standards, 
Chapter V concluded that limited progress has been made, but that the 
benefits of these achievements are very unevenly spread. Most 
colonists are in debt to DNOCS while a minority show a profit. Within 
this profit-making group the distribution of income is very unequal, 
with only a small minority of some 5% of irrigation farmers earning the 
high incomes predicted for them by the feasibility studies. However, 
the provision of health services and education on irrigation projects 
has contributed to an improvement in the living standards of colonists 
generally.
Apart from problems of poor soil quality, salinization and technical 
inefficiency, one of the main factors which helps to explain both 
the skewed income distribution and low income-earning capacity of 
irrigation projects was found to be marketing. In Chapter VI it became 
clear that, instead of producing high-value, luxury fruit and 
vegetables, approximately 90% of total revenue is derived from the sale 
of crops already traditional to the sertao such as cotton, rice, 
bananas and maize. These products enjoy relatively secure markets but
Visao, 22nd December, 1975. "Irrigapao, Uma Solufao para o 
Desemprego", pp. 68 - 75*
earn little revenue in relation to the high costs of irrigation.
Projects do not exploit their potential advantages over non-irrigated 
agriculture, either because of marketing constraints on the sale of 
luxury crops or because of DNOCS's technical and organizational 
incapacity to produce and commercialize them efficiently. Although 
it costs three times as much per hectare to irrigate land in North-East 
Brazil as in certain other parts of the world, the whole capital 
expenditure is paid for by the government. In addition, because of 
the low economic returns on DNOCS projects, the state also provides 
various hidden subsidies which help colonists to cover costs and 
improve official income statistics.
Even if DNOCS achieves its optimistic goal of irrigating 100,000 
hectares and settling 24,000 families by 1980, the above evidence 
suggests that the impact on countering the drought will be best 
marginally positive and at worst marginally negative. Positive if 
rural workers are stabilized and their incomes raised; negative 
if they continue in debt and/or if, as the case-studies indicate, the 
implementation of irrigation schemes necessitates the dislocation of 
thousands of families from the relative security of the valleys. If the
'drought problem', defined as a socio-economic malaise, is to be
effectively tackled by Brazilian planners, they must rid themselves of 
the preoccupation with v/ater supply at the expense of every other 
consideration. There exists a danger that DNOCS will commit the same 
mistake with irrigation as it did with its anti-drought strategy based on 
reservoir-building, prevalent until the 1960's. The benefits of
apudagem accrued to a tiny minority of landowners with access to lands
surrounding the reservoirs where they could pasture their cattle. In 
a similar fashion, the benefits of irrigation are being channelled into
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the hands of a small sector of the sertao's rural population who are, 
even before becoming irrigation farmers, amongst those least at 
risk to the drought.
If the government is serious in wishing to implement policies 
of rural development which will help to stabilize the agrarian population 
of the North-Eastern interior during drought periods, alternative 
longer-term strategies are necessary. These policies, whether they 
replace or complement irrigation in its present form, would have to 
ensure that the specific rural groups most at risk to the rigours of the 
drought are helped in ways which increase their resistance. Current 
strategies manifestly do not do this. Planners should take into 
account the broad, socio-economic nature of the drought phenomenon, 
identify those groups most in need of direct assistance on this basis 
and provide the vulnerable population with the means to acquire economic 
resources that enable poor farmers to build up food and cash reserves 
to iide them over, difficult periods such as those of acute rainfall 
shortages. Complementary improvements in domestic water supply would 
also help to discourage migration. This goal can be achieved either 
with or without irrigation but the fundamental point is, to repeat, 
that any anti-drought strategy must- reach those at risk and not 
benefit the already privileged.
DNOCS's irrigation programme is not the only example of a rural 
development strategy which tends to improve the lot of those farmers 
who already enjoy relatively better positions. In the Sao Francisco 
Valley it also appears that irrigation schemes have a similar selection 
procedure designed to pick out those farmers considered to have the 
skills necessary for irrigated agriculture. Successful applicants are
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usually those in better health, with more capital and who demonstrate 
more of the individual, entrepreneurial initiative needed for the 
family plot system. With a rejection rate of J0% on the Bebedouro 
project, for example, CODEVASF has plenty of scope for careful 
selection of its recruits.^ Medical and aptitudinal tests eliminate 
many small farmers who are precisely those most likely to be affected 
by the crisis conditions such as drought. In North-East Brazil 
as in other parts of the world, "supplying irrigation water is very 
much a matter of 'to him that hath shall be given' — it is most 
valuable in the hands of the already wealthy".-^ Unfortunately, the 
cost-benefit approach to irrigation adopted by GEIDA, DNOCS and CODEVASF 
will probably always mean that the narrow criterion of economic 
success will prevail above considerations of social need.
Chapter V also showed that the income derived from irrigated 
agriculture in the North-East tends to become concentrated in the 
hands of a small minority of colonists. Once again, this is certainly 
not a new phenomenon and has been observed, for example, in the 
irrigated lands of Africa and Mexico as well as in Asian 'green revolution' 
rural development. Even on what is considered to be the world's largest 
and most successful irrigation project, in the Gezira region of the 
Sudan, the incomes and life-styles of tenant farmers have become sharply 
differentiated. The more prosperous, with consumption patterns to match 
their new status^/ regard themselves as 'gentlemen managers'
v/.A. Bacchus, The Political Dimension of Water Resource Development?
A Study of the Brazilian Northeast. 1964 - 71, University of Connecticut, 
Ph.D. thesis, 1971* P« 718.
■2/ Colin Clark, Starvation or Plenty? Seeker and Warburg, London, 1970, p. 117 
Clark's observations concern irrigation based on the family plot syotem 
rather than collective means of agricultural production.
4/ Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira: A Story of Devejxmnent in the .Sudan, London, 
Faber and Faber, 1959*
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rather than rural workers. In contrast to the Brazilian experience, 
however, this scheme has benefitted millions of rural producers 
and covers 720,000 hectares, irrigated between 1958 - 62. It is 
the cheapest irrigation project in the world at £20 per acre and 
tenants1 incomes the largest for comparable environments^
Millions of nomads and semi-nomads are also being benefitted by 
supplementary development scherns,6/
Another example is provided by the Tepalcatepec river basis 
development of Central Mexico where the government has irrigated and 
provided the infrastructure for 64,000 hectares of land, which yields a 
13% return on capital investment. Differential access to credit has 
meant, however, that a handful of large, private farmers monopolized 
production and income, while the mass of small landowners and 
ejidatarios progressed very little. '^  Feder has also observed that in 
irrigated areas of Mexico improved agricultural techniques based on 
sophisticated technology have resulted in the benefits of increased
5/ R.J. Harrison-Church, "Observations on Large-Scale Irrigation Development 
in Africa", Agricultural Economic Bulletin for Africa (FAQ). No. 4» 
November, 1 963 , p. 35*
^  Georges Brausch, "Change and Continuity in the Gezira Region of the 
Sudan", I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e  J o u r n a l .  16, 3* 19&4» P® 335•
^  David Barkin, Los Beneficiarios del Desarrollo Regional. Sep/Setentas, 
Mexico City, 1972, pp. IbO - 76. Irrigation was started here by 
Italian immigrants earlier in the century, but in 1938 the Mexican 
government expropriated the valley lands and collectivised production 
under the e.jido system. From 1950 - 70 the government expanded the 
irrigated area by six times and built an extensive infrastructure of 
transport facilities and social services. Large numbers of private 
farmers were attracted to the region. The original inhabitants of 
the valley, the e.jidatarios, could only secure a limited amount of 
credit to finance cotton production from official sources, the 
Banco Nacional de Credito E.jidatal (BHCE) because they only had a 
limited amount of collateral to offer as security. Private landowners, 
on the other hand, expanded production rapidly, acquiring all the 
credit they needed from private banks for sowing and for setting up 
cotton gins to extract the maximum amount of profit. The ejid atario.? 
eventually found that they were better off renting out their lands to 
private producers, although this was illegal, rather than cultivate 
cotton themselves. The BNCE built a small processing plant in 1956 and has 
increased the supply of credit to £jidos but the private sector has 
continued to dominate the cot '.-on
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production accruing to small groups of rural landowners and non-
rural industrialists. While the export of luxury crops produced
under irrigation has been encouraged, investment into peasant
agriculture and land reform has declined. Under the new 'green revolution1
technology, it is argued, labour is replaced by machinery and terms of
employment on modern farms, which require seasonal manpower, become
worse. These factors have been responsible for increasing mass poverty,
rural unemployment and social unrest in Mexico
Other studies of the effects of technological improvements on
traditional agriculture suggest the emergence of similar trends, the
beginnings of which are already clearly observable in DNOCS's irrigation
programme. In Colombia, for example, the introduction of new methods
of coffee cultivation benefitted the already privileged. In this case, as
in the Mexican example, farmers with the most land and capital were able
to secure credit in order to purchase higher-cost inputs of new
9/varieties and fertilizers necessary to obtain higher incomes.'"  In 
India a small minority of farmers prospers through cultivating 
high-yielding crops but the new agriculture, which is capital-intensive, 
does 'not help to relieve the problem of massive seasonal unemployment, 
thus exacerbating mass poverty in rural areas in that country.-^/
In all of these examples it appears that social needs of the wider
8/ Ernest Feder, The New Penetration of the Agricultures of the 
Underdeveloped Countries by the Industrial Nations and Their Multi- 
National Concerns,"mimeb., Institute of Social Studies, Den Haag, 1976,
■2/ E.A. Havens and W.L. FIinn, Green Revolution Technology and Community 
Development: the Limits of Action Programs, rnimeo., n.d.
12/ T#J. Byres, "The Dialectics of India's Green Revolution", South Asian 
Review, V, 1971 - 72> pp. 99 - 116.
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agricultural populations affected by such technological changes have 
*
been largely ignored. The pattern of production has been determined 
by factors such as profitability, export markets, foreign exchange 
earnings and productivity rather than consideration of the nutritional 
needs of the population or the distribution of higher incomes. 
Assumptions that somehow the benefits of improved technology will 
'filter down* to the poorer sectors have not so far been realized.
Any alternative anti-droiight strategy in North-East Brazil should 
respond more directly to the central causes of rural unemployment, 
poverty and migration. As a starting point, therefore, one possibility 
lies in the modification of existing irrigation strategy in order to 
correct some of its basic faults. After all, considerable amounts have 
been invested into irrigation and it seems reasonable to suggest 
changes which might enable projects to assist groups particularly 
vulnerable to the drought, thus capitalising on government expenditure 
made so far.
The individual, family plot system might, for example, be replaced 
by a more collective form of cultivation. It will be remembered that 
one firm of consultants, 'Hidroservice', emphasized several times in 
its reports to DNOCS that the only way of eliminating the inequalities 
and unfairness inherent in dividing the land into seperate plots was 
to cultivate the whole area as a single unit using salaried labour. The 
justification for their advice is reflected in the extremely skewed 
income distribution amongst colonists caused to a large extent by 
differences in soil quality. Several schemes in Africa, for example, 
have mechanized farming with paid labour and no settlers. The Richard— 
Toll scheme in Senegal producing rice and the Tendaho project in Etheopia 
for cotton are both situated in dry areas and show that such a system
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can function efficiently.-^/
The whole system of irrigated production on DNOCS schemes
emphasizes individualism; the division of the land, of individual
'entrepreneurial' responsibilities and of income. High-income
colonists are held up as examples for their less successful colleagues
to follow. Yet such a system is divisive amongst farmers and is itself
antagonistic towards any attempts at encouraging cooperation. . Studies
of irrigation in other parts of the world have shown that sometimes the
small plot system leads to conflicts amongst farmers and greater economic 
12/
polarization.— ' Conversely, equalization of access to factors of 
production under irrigated agriculture has been found to diminish 
such conflicts.-^/
Collective cultivation would in theory have several advantages over 
existing methods. The land would not have to be sub-divided, each plot 
with its own particular cultivation pattern requiring individual guidance 
and supervision. The land could be prepared and cultivated in larger 
units, diminishing production costs and losses through individual 
inadaptability. Wage-payments could be related to productivity and all 
produce marketed through a cooperative. Most importantly, from an 
anti-drought point of view, larger areas could probably be brought under 
production and more labourers per hectare absorbed, provided that 
production techniques did not become too capital-intensive. Rural 
workers would not have to undergo an expensive and time-consuming 
selection procedure, allowing poorer sharecroppers and smallholders from 
drier areas of caatinga to be absorbed more easily0
^ /  R.J. Harrison-Church, op cit., pp. 41 - 5*
12/ Henry Orenstein, "Notes on the Neology of Irrigation Agriculture in 
Contemporary Peasant Societies", American Anthropologist, 67,6(l), p. 1529*
Burton Pasternak, "Social Consequences of Equalizing Irrigation Access", 
Human Organization, 27*4*1968.
It would, in theory, be possible to irrigate humid valleys in the 
North-East without the expropriations and dislocations typical of current 
DNOCS strategy. In the Mysore region of India 125,000 acres of river 
valley lands have been irrigated, resulting in the transformation of a 
subsistence agriculture into a cash economy, thereby increasing incomes 
and living standards, as well as integrating the.region into the national 
market.—^/ No expropriations or dislocations took place; irrigation 
facilities were provided by the government and superimposed upon the 
existing property structure, which consists exclusively of smallholdings 
below 15 acres. Irrigation did tend to reinforce economic 
differentiation but overall incomes were raised and there are certain 
inbuilt obstacles to the accumulation of individual wealth (such as 
inheritance laws, the disappearance of the joint family and increased 
population size) which have resulted in the benefits of new technology 
being perhaps more evenly spread than in many irrigated areas of the 
world. In addition, 'dry* villages outside the irrigated zone have 
developed economically by providing secondary and tertiary services 
to 'wet' villages, thus sharing in the regional prosperity.
The situations in Mysore state and North-East Brazil and difficult 
to compare directly since the pattern of development subsequently 
established in the former region was influenced by the caste system, the 
structure of economic values and their receptivity to economic change.
As far as the present thesis is concerned, however, the one important 
lesson which may be drawn from the Indian example is that it is possible 
to successfully irrigate land without the need for modifying the 
property structure or for elaborate and time-consuming selection procedures
W  T.s . Epstein, Economic Development and Socis,l Change in South India, 
Manchester U.P., 19&2
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which tend to eliminate poorer, less qualified farmers who are those 
most in need of assistance. If such a system were tried in Brazil, 
however, it would have to be in areas where the distribution of 
landholdings was fairly even, minimising the possibility of wealth 
accumulating in the hands of a small minority. Where DNOCS originally 
tried this system, such as on the Sao Gonqalo project from the 1930*s 
onwards (discussed in Chapter III), income was highly skewed because 
of the heavy concentration of land ownership.
However, in order to make a significant impact on the population 
most vulnerable to the drought, irrigation projects would have to 
be installed not in the relatively fertile, densely populated 
valleys as at present, but on the dry caatinga. This would avoid 
many of the social pitfalls currently associated with expropriation 
and dislocation of valley populations, while at the same time ensuring 
that those poorer farmers with fewer resources would be the first to 
benefit and not the last, as is currently the case. The initial costs 
of pumping water to higher areas might be greater, but there would 
be fewer delays caused by muddy and flooded valleys during winter 
months. A collective system of production would, furthermore, obviate 
the need for selecting farmers with special skills or abilities, 
providing stable employment for all those with a committment to the 
project.
A move away from family plots to a collective system of land tenure 
and agricultural production is, however, likely to be resisted by 
DNOCS for several reasons. Firstly, agency staff argue that the nordestino 
is an individualist, unsuited to any type of collective system. One 
factor which suggests that there is more room for such cooperation amongst
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small producers than DNOCS cares to admit, lies in the tradition
~ 15/°^ * nmtirao or mutual self-help amonst peasants*—^  A second reason
which favours individualised units, one suspects, is fear of political 
mobilization* Although DNOCS pays lip service to the principle of 
cooperation in the field of working activities, in practice it does little 
to encourage a true collective spirit. It may well be that DNOCS 
views the collective organization of labour as a challenge to its 
authority.
It has been argued that the sort of paternalistic attitude which 
DNOCS adopts towards its colonists, denying them any real participation in 
decision-making, can have a positive effect. Galjart suggests that 
local development agencies should assume the role of patron, thus 
preventing a relapse into the traditional, boss-dominated social 
structure and mediating with higher levels in the patronage system.^/ 
Although it has to be admitted that tenant farmers on irrigation 
projects appear to be as dependent upon the government as they were on 
their old, private landlords, such a tendency should not be accepted as 
inevitable. Official paternalism in the form of strong direction 
from the top down perpetuates what Erasmus calls the ^nco.jido syndrome1, 
the continued dependence of the peasantry on officials rather than the
17/autonomous decision-making characteristic of true voluntary organizations.— t/ 
In the Gezira, for example, an independent tennants* union sprang up as a
15/ See for example, Helio Galvao, 0 Mutirao no Nordeste, S.I.A., R.J., 1959. 
16/ Benno Glajart, "Old Patrons and New", Sociologia Ruralis, 7,4, 1967.
±U Charles Erasmus, "Community Development and the Encojido Syndrome",
Human Organization, 27,1, 1968.
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reaction against official paternalism, which demanded increased 
participation in the control and management of the project.
Fundamental issues such as cropping methods, sales and village 
improvements are discussed.-^/
Even without making drastic changes, DNOCS could take steps which 
would ameliorate some of the obviously negative effects of current 
irrigation strategy. Small farmers who qualify for little compensation 
when their property is expropriated, or none at all if they cannot 
prove de jure ownership, should receive fairer treatment. Ideally, 
the expropriation laws should be ammended to give planners the 
authority to see that the dispossessed have sufficient resources to re­
establish themselves elsewhere. In the case of non-landowners in 
particular, a relocation policy is badly needed which would rehouse and 
re-employ the thousands of families forced off the land. In this 
respect CHESF has set a precedent in the Sao Francisco Yalley by giving 
those families dispossessed by-the building of the giant Sobradinho 
dam the option of moving to new towns constructed nearby. Apart from 
improving monetary compensation and relocation, another potential 
improvement lies in associating outsiders with irrigation schemes.
In the Gezira, for example, nomad farmers are allowed to pasture their
19/livestock on the project.— '^ On DNOCS schemes perhaps non-member farmers 
could be granted access to water supply facilities.
Another major area for improvement is in the commercialization of 
produce. One of the principal causes of projects* limited income-earning
Gaitskell, op cit., and Harrison-Church, op cit., p. 18.
Harrison-Church, op cit., p. 19«
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capacity in the North-East lies in their inability to produce and 
market high-value crops, despite attempts to do so# Every large 
project should have a pilot scheme to evaluate the suitability of 
proposed strategies. The success of the Gezira scheme has been 
partially attributed to careful advance p l a n n i n g . I n  the Kafu 
project, Northern Rhodesia, seventy acres were carefully studied and 
experimental farms established to consider alternative cropping and 
irrigation methods before the major scheme was started.-^/ In the 
Medjerda project, Tunisia, advance £>roduction and marketing studies
enabled artichokes, an exiremely high-value crop,to be successfully
22/ * produced on a large scale.— ' DNOCS's own Sume scheme has
achieved similar results with tomatoes, albeit on a far smaller scale.
There is, therefore, the scope for expanding production of fruit
and vegetables on irrigation projects in the North-East, even if
predictions of market capacity have been over-optimistic. The onus rests
on DNOCS to exploit these possibilities. In the Sao Francisco Valley
private companies have shown that grapes and other luxury crops can
23/
be successfully grown and marketed.— ' Irrigation projects might also
benefit from recent government proposals concerning the establishment
of new centres for processing high-value produce such as tomatoes, cotton,
24/
pineapples and other fruits.—3'
Anti-drought strategy need not, however, necessarily be based on
^2/ Gaitskell, op cit., p. 43•
21/ Harrison-Church, op cit., p. 11.
22/ Ibid., p. 12.
22/ For example, the fazendas Catalunha, Milano and others in the Valley. 
See Bacchus, op cit., p. 937 - 945 and VisSo, 22nd December, 1975*
24/ Montor-Arthus D. Little, Pro.ieto de Desenvolvimento de Agroindustria no 
Nordeste do Brasil. IPLAN, Brasilia, 19/4»
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irrigation. If the drought problem consists essentially, as defined 
here, of impoverished rural groups whose members living at the 
economic margin have few resources to see them through crisis periods, 
there are a number of other possibilities which the government could
/
explore. These policies would be aimed at improving the lot of 
vulnerable sectors, such as sharecroppers and smallholders, so that they 
would not be forced to migrate except when the most serious of droughts 
strike. These strategies would increase cash incomes and food stocks 
by such means as better farming technology, agricultural credit, 
cooperatives and possibly land redistribution. Although not as 
'glamorous' as irrigation, these alternatives have several potential 
advantages. They would be far less costly to implement, requiring 
none of the expensive and time-consuming engineering work needed to 
build irrigation schemes. A far greater number of people could be 
easily and more quickly reached since there would be no laborious 
selection procedure. Nor would those in most need be excluded on medical 
or aptitudinal grounds.
Much more efficient use could be made of river valley lands without 
recourse to expropriating and irrigating large sectors. This is 
especially so in perennial river valleys such as the Sao Francisco and 
Jaguaribe, as well as in those where dams regulate the water flow 
so that farmers receive a more balanced supply all year round. Even with 
no additional inputs, banana yields in some non-irrigated valleys are 
comparable with those on DNOCS projects. In the Moxoto and Piranhas-A^ 
valleys yields of 45 and 47 tons per nectare are common^/ compared 
with maximum figure cited by DNOCS of 55 tons.^ Studies have suggested
25/ SIRAC, Diagnostico e Potencialidades: Fase II, Vale do Moxoto, and 
Vale do Piranhas—Apu, Recife, 1975*
^  See Table 18.
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that the productivity of many food crops could be doubled or tripled 
using more modern methods.^/
A recent analysis was made of the probable effects of introducing 
more modern techniques in two areas of the sertao, Serra Talhada and 
Brejo Santo. The study concluded that if manual labour was supplemented 
by animal traction, use of fertilizers and disease control, 
agrictural production could be increased by between 50% and 100%.
As the result of larger areas brought into production, more labour 
would be employed.^/ Larger property owners would tend to benefit more 
because of the greater quantity of land at their dispose 1, but on 
balance, it is suggested, incomes of all groups would be increased in 
absolute terms.
In order that smaller farmers should be able to take advantage of 
more modem inputs, a complementary programme of agricultural credit 
would be needed. At present rural credit is monopolised by large 
landowners, who are able to offer collateral to the banks. Even 
emergency drought credits, as Chapter II showed, are monopolised by the 
bigger establishments whose resources in the form of cattle offer 
security, both for the landowner and the lending institutions. As soon 
as a drought seems imminent, banks call in loans to smaller farmers, 
increasing further still their vulnerability. The resources of many 
sharecroppers and smallholders are whittled away by the obligation to
SIRAC, jDiagnostico e Potencialidades: Fase II, Vale do Ceara-Mirim. 
Recife, 1975» P* 26.
28/ George F. Patrick, "Efeitos de Programas Altemativas do Govemo sobre 
a Agricultura do Nordeste", Pesquisa e Plane.jamento Economico.
4, February, 1974» PP* 6 1 - 5 *
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receive credit privately at punitive interest rates, as well as to
sell their crops at prices well below the market value,
A system of small-scale loans is badly needed, therefore, which
would break this vicious circle and the monopoly over credit and
commercialization arrangements held by private landlords and merchants.
What is required is not a general increase in levels of credit for all
farmers, but a system of allocating loans at preferential interest
rates to specific groups most in need. If there were no discrimination
along these lines, the danger would exist of agricultural loans being
used for other purposes such as land speculation. The demand for
agricultural credit could be artificially stimulated, reducing the
amount available for small farmers and increasing the importance of
political influence as a means of securing loans
The apparently 'primitive’ methods of agricultural production
used by sharecroppers in the sertao represent rational responses to
the limitations imposed upon their behaviour by their economic and
30/political environment.-^—' It follows that any new system of agricultural
technology or credit can only be implemented successfully if such
methods are demonstrably profitable for the recipients. Government
authorities cannot legitimately present blind adherence to 'tradition'
on the part of peasants as an excuse for the failure of rural producers
31/to follow official policies.^-' It is up to the planners to devise 
stragegies which make innovation profitable and risk-free for farmers. 
Increased risks v/hich accompany new credit schemes are, for example,
22/ Carl H. Gotsch, Credit Programs to Reach Small Farmers",
Development Digest, 12, 1, January, 1974*
12/ See Chapter II, and A.W.Johnson, Sharecroppers of the Sertao.
32/ Sutti Ortiz, "The 'Human Factor' in Social Planning in Latin America", 
in R. Apthorpe, Planning a n d  Development Studies, Prank Cass,
London, 1970, and S. Ortiz," "Reflections on the Concept of 'Peasant 
Culture' and Peasant Cognitive Systems", in T Shanin (ed), Peasants a n d  
Peasant Societies, Penguin, 1971.
- 191 -
a common cause of default on loan repayment because inadequate 
attention has been paid to marketing, prices and other support 
facilities
Such support may be provided by cooperatives and similar 
organizations which help small producers to organize, increase their 
bargaining power and bypass the long chain of intermediaries which 
absorb a large proportion of the crops' marketable value. In the North- 
East there are approximately 65O cooperatives, but few of these make 
any impact upon the monopoly over commercialization held by the 
network of traditional intermediaries.-^/ There are isolated examples 
of producers cooperatives which manage to become independent of 
landlords and merchants. In the sertao of Aratuba, Ceara, for example, 
a large farm was bought by the parish and the land redistributed to 
sharecroppers of the region who work it commercially and are purchasing 
it collectively on a mortgage basis. The communal cotton crop is 
deposited with a local cooperative to await inter-seasonal price 
increases, when it is sold.
Ronald Tinnemeir, "Technology, Profit and Agricultural Credit", 
Development Digest, 12, 1, January, 1974*
At the regional level the Companhia de Abastecimento do Nordeste 
(CANESA) v/as created by SUDENE but the only unit in operation is 
the Central de Abastecimento do Recife (CARE). Similar projects for
Salvador and Fortaleza were never implemented. Certain national
organizations operate in the North-East such as CIBRASEN, COBAL,
SUNAB and the Bank of Brazil, which participates in the government 
programme of minimum prices as an agent for Commisao de Financiamento 
de Producao (CFP). See Manoel Figueroa, Cuestiones de Political 
Agricola: Nordeste do Brasil, SUDENE/DAA, Recife, 1973» P* 203.
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Generally speaking, however, small producers in the sertao are
not organized and the cooperatives which do exist suffer from serious
defects. Their administrative personnel are poorly trained and local
political patronage prevents their reaching a broader clientele. Their
small scale of operations and lank of financial resources or public
backing are further obstacles. Furthermore, they deny any participation
in policy formation or decision-making to the agriculturalists themselves.-^/
One possible way of helping small and medium-sized producers to
receive a larger share of their crops' value lies in the setting up
of cooperatives on a state-wide basis, or Companhias Integradas de
Desenvolvimento Agrioola (CIDA's). These centres resemble in many ways
those envisaged in the GEIDA proposals for irrigation farmers but never
implemented. They would, according to SUDENE, transport farmers' produce,
provide grading and storage facilities as well as process crops. Technical
assistance would be given to farmers, credit made available and the
produce marketed directly by the CIDA's. Run by professional administrators,
those centres would be situated in state interiors and have large-scale
operations, involving participation of producers in the fixed capital
of the enterprise.^/ One of the practical limitations, and one of
which SUDENE is fully aware, is that CIDA's would have to be located in
areas where small producers are free, or could free themselves, of
obligations to landlords, enabling them to choose through which channels
36/
they wish to market their crops
^ /  Figueroa, op cit., pp. 200 - 204# 
» PP« ^95 ~ 225*
Ibid., p. 206.
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An additional means of assisting small producers to maximise the 
economic return on their crops, whether marketed through cooperatives 
or otherwise, is a system of minimum prices. Since the early 1960's 
in North-East Brazil official attempts to create a structure of 
minimum prices for farmers have been made through the Grupo Executivo 
de Modernizapao do Sistema de Abastecimento (GEMAB) and more recently 
with the Sistema Nacional de Centrais de Abastecimento.-^/ It was 
intended that commercialization centres should be established in the 
largest cities to receive produce, organize buying and selling, provide 
farmers with technical services and guarantee minimum prices to them.
Such institutions exist in Recife and Fortaleza but their overall effect is 
marginal, especially in relation to the distant sertao.
Apart from using these centres farmers may borrow from the Bank 
of Brazil, which acts as agent for the Commissao de Financiamento de 
Producao (CFP). There are two credit systems in operation. Under the 
first, farmers may obtain 70% to 80% of the value of their future 
harvest, calculated on the basis of guaranteed prices. In this case 
the producer may sell part or all of the crop within the loan 
period as long as he covers his debts to the bank. Once the 180-day 
loan period has expired, the crops do not pass automatically to the CFP. 
Under the second type of arrangement, farmers may receive 100% 
financing but if debts are not paid within the time limit set (90 -300 days) 
the crops, v/hich are held in government bond, pass into CFP hands
•12/ Ginaldo Cavalcanti, "CommercializaqSo Agricola", Boletim de 
Agriculture., SUDENE, January — June, 1974> P* 94*
PP* 9 5-6.
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These programmes, however, do not at present benefit 
significant sectors of the rural population but have remained extremely
39/small-scale. It is possible, nevertheless, that large numbers, 
of small producers in the sertao might take advantage of minimum price 
supports if such a system could be made to operate through an 
institutional framework such as the proposed CIDA’s for example under 
the authority of SUDENE. This would be one way of helping to break 
traditional landlords’ monopoly over dredit and marketing, and provide 
many potential drought victims with extra financial support. In order 
to be effective, however, considerable efforts would ha\e to be 
devoted towards reaching those in need of assistance, rather than 
letting the already better-off rural groups monopolize new facilities. 
This implies a process of selection which may well prove difficult to 
undertake because of political constraints. It seems unlikely that 
powerful groups will allow significant privileges to be granted to 
poorer producers while they themselves are denied access to such 
concessions, unless reforms are backed up by authority from the 
highest levels.
Land redistribution, by providing credit for land purchases by 
small farmers, is another method which could strengthen the 
resistance of potential flagelados. It has been shown that in the 
North-East small establishments cannot fully utilize their family 
labour because of the limited land and other resources available.
Indeed, the ability of small farms to absorb this 'excess' labour, as 
Chapter II showed, gives them a certain strength and ability to support
Figueroa, op cit., p. 209.
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dependents in the face of scarce employment opportunities.
One study of two sertao municipalities has suggested that if small 
farmers acquired additional lands the value of their production 
and, consequently, net incomes would be increased substantially.-^/
In order that new lands could be effectively utilized, however, credit 
would also have to be made available for the purchase of other inputs 
such as seeds and fertilizers.-^/
The biggest difficulty would be actually obtaining the land needed 
by the farmers. This might necessitate expropriations from larger 
landowners, which may or may not be politically feasible. DNOCS 
has set a precedent with its activities in this field, however, so that 
in theory expropriation is possible. Secondly, the quality 
and quantity of land would have to be balanced to ensure that land 
and labour could be most efficiently used. Finally, the size and 
composition of the family labour force would have some bearing on the 
size of establishment created in order to ensure full employment.^/
In spite of the potential advantages, however, the government's 
record on land purchases for smaller farmers is not encouraging for 
the future. The PROTERRA programme, for example, started in 1971» was 
designed to provide subsidized credit for the purchase of modern inputs 
and land to be redistributed to small and medium-sized landowners. 
However, nearly all of this credit has been used for large cattle and 
sugar estates, a portion of this having been channelled into short term,
42/ g.f. Patrick, "Efeitos de Programas Alternativas", pp. 76 - 80 
41/ Ibid., p. 79.
42/ Ibid.. p. 79.
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speculative and. non-agricultural purposes. Landless workers have
been totally ommitted from the scheme because they cannot offer
guarantees to the banks. Small landowners are in a similar position
since their properties are of little marketable value and they have
nothing else to offer as collateral.^/ By 1974 in the Worth-East
only 74 land titles had been distributed to small farmers.^/
The possibility of establishing more family farms in the future
is also likely to be undermined by the official policy of providing
credit for the setting up of large cattle estates. Under SUDENE’s
34/18 fiscal incentive scheme 90% of loans to agriculture are used
45/for livestock enterprises.These projects, far from absorbing 
excess labour, are capital intensive and tend to create more unemployment 
by displacing semi-subsistence farmers from the lands which they 
take over with the aid of official credit. In Maranhao, Bahia and Piaui 
cattle estates averaging 35*000 hectares have been established, 
reminiscent of the trend towards hughe latifundia in the Amazon region.
It has been estimated that if 34/18 funds were applied to land 
redistribution, 175*000 families could be absorbed, creating 350,000 jobs.^/ 
Colonization of previously unsettled areas by rural families from 
the North-Eastern interior is another strategy which has been given 
much consideration by Brazilian planners. The first official mention of
^  Jorge Coelho, Untitled document, mimeo., SUDENE/DAA, Recife, 1975*
4 4 / Helvecio Dornas, 0 Processo da Reforma Agraria na Regiao Nordeste, 
SUDENE/DAA, Recife, 1975.
45/ Coelho, op cit., and SUDENE, Pro.jetos Agro-Industriais e Agro- 
Pecuarios Aprovados: Situacao ate Jnnho de 1974. SUDENE, Recife, 1974.
4 6 / Dornas, op cit.
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colonization specifically in relation to the sertao and its drought 
problem was made by the GTDN report which saw in it, "a means of 
absorbing the excess population of the semi-arid zone and producing 
foodstuffs which would help feed that r e g i o n " I n  the early 
1970's renewed emphasis was made on colonizing the Amazon region, 
especially in new rural communities (agrovilas) along the Trans-Amazon 
Highway. This was formalised in the POLAMAZONIA plan under the Second 
National Development Plan (II PND) in 1974*
The main justification for colonization has rested in the fact 
that the North-East is considered to have an excessively large rural 
population which the region's limited resources cannot support. A 
recent study calculated that by 1980 the sertao would have an excess, 
low-income rural population of 952,000.^/ It is possible to debate 
whether the concept of 'excess' population is justified in the context 
of a largely semi-subsistence agriculture in which the family sector 
absorbs a large proportion of the labour force. Nevertheless, there can 
be little doubt that the strain imposed on resources by the large 
population, especially during drought crises, exacerbates the problems 
of poverty, unemployment and rural-urban migration. Although by no 
means a total solution to the drought problem, selective colonization 
appears to offer a partial answer, particularly in crucial areas where the 
pressure on land makes the local population especially vulnerable to the
41/ GTDN, Uma Politica de Desenvolvimento Economico para o Nordeste. 
2nd ed., SUDENE, Recife, 1967, p. 82.
4§/ Vincenzo d'Apote, Eases Para Uma Politica de Colonizapao e Reforma 
Agraria no Nordeste do Brasil, SUDENE, Recife, 1972, pp« 115. "* 18*
- 198 -
drought. Ideally, a greater redistribution of under-utilized land within 
the North-East would serve the same ends but this unlikely to be 
politically feasible on any significant scale. Otherwise, according 
to one estimate, perhaps over half the ’excess1 population could be 
resettled within the North-East itself, in Maranhao, Bahia and Piaui, 
the remainder going to Amazonia.^/
One advantage which colonization offers over, say, irrigation is that 
it is less costly. Several studies of non-irrigated colonization 
suggests that the investment costs incurred in settling one family are 
one-sixth those on irrigation schemes Non-irrigated colonization,
of course, absorbs labour, whereas irrigation projects tend, on 
balance, to displace rural workers.
In spite of the theoretical advantages of colonization, however, 
several reservations should be borne in mind. Firstly, the availability 
of uninhabited areas for such projects may well be limited by the 
PROTERRA and 34/18 schemes, already discussed, which tend to encourage 
the establishment and perpetuation of latifundia which are basically 
capital-intensive and devoted to livestock production. It is 
precisely in the more fertile areas of Maranhao, Bahia and Piaui,
Ibid.* PP* 86, 98. The author calculated that 3*800,000 hectares 
are available for colonization in the states of Bahia, Piaui and 
Maranhao, which could absorb 259*000 sertanejos.
^  The costs of colonization have been put at U.S.$2,547 per family, 
against U.S.$12,300 - 15,300 for irrigation, see Tavares et al, 
Colonizapao Dirigida no Brasil, IPEA/INPES, Rio de Janeiro, 1972, 
pp. 114- 116. Another estimate gives figures of Cr.$17,400 and 
Cr.$104,400 respectively, see Jorge Coelho, Considerayoes em Torno do 
Programa de Agricultura Irrigada na Zona Semi—Arida do Nordeste, 
CETREIN0, Recife, 1975, p. 29.
currently viewed as regions for settlement by families from the arid
interior, where cattle estates are springing up. Secondly, many
migrants from the sertao have suffered harsh treatment at the hands
of unscrupulous employers, truckers and boarding houses, a system
which has been labelled as "motorised slavery" by its more extreme 
• • 51/critics."-' If such abuses are widespread they call into question the 
whole value of colonization. However, if relatively infrequent, 
as some observers m a i n t a i n , t h e y  do not detrant from the general 
value of colonization as a means of reallocating human resources. In 
the ten years that colonization has received official encouragement, 
however, only 200,000 hectares have been settled and 5,000 families
53/absorbed.-*" Unless it receives more government support along the 
lines envisaged by d'Apote, its impact on relieving economic pressures 
in the sertao will be very limited.
The improvement of agricultural productivity in drier areas of the 
sertao, as opposed to the more humid valleys, is one strategy whose 
potential has so far been largely ignored. Two areas where such 
improvements might increase the drought-resisting capacity of the rural 
population are cotton and cattle production, activities which are 
already resistant to rainfall shortages. This resistance could, however, 
be greatly increased if more efficient use were made of the land and 
other resources available. The productivity of aboreal cotton (moco). 
the variety traditionally cultivated in the interior, could be greatly
Jornal do Brasil, July, 1968,
&  W.H. Nicholls, "The Brazilian Agricultural Economy", in R. Roett, 
Brazil in the Sixties, Vanderbilt U.P., Nashville, 1972, P* 175*
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increased by the careful selection of seed varieties and the 
application of fertilizers Cotton has a virtually guaranteed
market and enjoys access to credit facilities which food crops do 
not have. If small rural establishments, those most vulnerable to 
the drought, could be induced to participate more directly in the 
cash economy by the provision of such improved technology, backed up by 
credit and marketing facilities which ma,de it profitable for the producer, 
then some significant progress might be made towards reducing the impact 
of the drought overall. That is, by providing the means whereby the 
low-income rural population may generate increased purchasing power, 
saving capacity and socio-economic independence.
Livestock production might be improved in drier areas, encouraging
a certain amount of labour stabilization in caatinga which is at present
thinly populated. Two major reasons for the extremely low productivity
of animals in the sertao are, firstly, overgrazing and, secondly,
lack of dry season forrage. Overgrazing has harmful side-effects upon
vegetation, soil fertility and on water available for consumption by
forrage species. The failure to store fodder leaves cattle vulnerable
during the dry season, and especially during drought years when emergency 
55/feed issential.-^
Among the solutions which have been suggested for improving 
livestock production are more efficient use of rainfall and water resources, 
as we11 as more efficient use of fodder crops. Optimum use of the 
annual rainfall could be achieved by preventing run-off and improving
54/ Ruy Miller Paiva, Anreciapao Preliminar dosProblemas da Agricultura 
Brasilelra, U.IT.(CEPLA), Rio de Janeiro, 1955.
55/ p. Guilbride, FAO/lPEANE Project for Livestock Development in the 
North-East: Objectives and Implementation^ Reciie, 19/3*
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vegetation. In the latter case it has been suggested that the
replacement of herbaceous, annual species (which have short roots and
dry up quickly) with deep-rooted perennials would increase the duration
of the green season and provide fodder* Existing fodder resources could
also be more efficiently used by storing roughage, limiting overgrazing
and utilizing by-products to feed cattle.-^
DNOCS has plans for regulating the supply of forrage crops by
combining large areas of drier caatlnga with the agricultural calendar
of its irrigation projects. The basic idea is that during winter (wet)
months project cattle would be grazed on the caatinga, while part of the
irrigated land would produce roughage that would be stored and used
to feed the animals during the summer months when dry pastures are
i n a d e q u a t e T h i s  combination of dry and wet land (area seca/area
irrigada) would enable fuller utilization of the captial resources
invested into irrigation, with a ratio of one hectare of irrigated
land to 20 - 100 hectares of dry p a s t u r e D N O C S  hopes to
incorporate 274*000 hectares of dry land to complement 100,000
59/hectares of irrigated land by 1 9 8 0 . Similar suggestions have been 
made for improving caatinga pastures, in areas of the interior 
untouched by irrigation, through improved water supply facilities by 
means of boreholes and r e s e r v o i r s T o  date, however, no areas
rbifl*« PP* 6 - 7*
^  Interview with Dirceu Pessoa, Director of SIRAC, the major outside 
consultants to DNOCS in this field.
5§/ SIRAC, Projeto de Desenvolvimento Rural Integrado do Nordeste (Areas 
Prioritarias'), Recife, 1975* PP* 26 - 7 *
^2/ DNOCS, Irri-gacao, Fortaleza, 1975.
60/ SIRAC, Diagnostic0 e Poetencialidades: Fase II; Sertoes Cearenses, 
Recife, 1975*
of pastureland have been incorporated into irrigation projects* In 
theory such a strategy would provide additional employment, but it is 
difficult to estimate how much more in the absence of any concrete 
examples•
For the foreseeable future, therefore, it does not seem that either 
irrigation or any of the alternative strategies briefly discussed 
above will have a significant irnpa<?t on countering the drought effects* 
Large sectors of the low-income rural population of the interior 
will remain vulnerable to even the smallest variation in the rainfall 
regime because of their highly precarious, marginal economic positions* 
SUDENE, for example, still expects to play a key role in providing 
emergency relief to hundreds of thousands oi flagelados on its work 
fronts* The agency’s latest scheme plans the allocation of resources 
on work fronts and for other relief measures to accomodate 900*000 men 
in any future drought, .compared with the 500,000 employed during 
the 1970 drought
The only other path open to those forced off the land is to 
migrate from the drought-afflicted areas altogether, either to towns 
within' the North-East or further afield. In 1970 the net migratory 
loss for the North-East stood at 5,500,000, this figure having increased
62/
from 5% of the region’s population in 1950 to 12% twenty years later.—  
Within the North-East, furthermore, 43% of migrants during the 1950 - 70 
period were rural in o r i g i n . ^ /  The largest proportion of nordestino
61/ SUDENE, Plano de Acao Para Emergencia Contra as Calamidades de Seca e 
Enchentes - 1975* Recife, 1972, p* 46*
62/ Helio A. de Moura, 1,As Variapdes Migratorias no Nordeste, 1940 - 70", 
Revista Economica, IV, 14* October/December, 1972, p. 23*
£2/ Milton da Mata et al*, Migrapoes Internets no Brasilj— Aspecto^
Economicos e Demograficos* IPEa/INPES, Rio de Janeiro, 1973* P* 70*
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migrants went to Sao Paulo (39%) and Rio de Janeiro (23%), although Parana 
and the Centre-West regions are becoming importantUnfortunately 
there is no concrete, demographic evidence to show how strong migration 
from the sertao is compared with other regions in the North-East.
However, one study suggests that emigration to the state of Sao Paulo, 
at least, may be stronger from the interior semi-arid zone than either 
the agre3te or the zona da mata, ^
Intra-regional migration within the North-East itself has been of 
paramount importance in the spontaneous reallocation of labour. From 
1950 - 10 the 3*500,000 rural migrants to the towns accounted for 50% of 
urban growth.^/ During the period i960 - 70 20% of the region’s 
population had made at least one move, and it appears that intra-regional 
migration is increasing at a faster rate than inter-regional migration.—^' 
Once again, very little data exists showing the importance of emigrants 
from the sertao in relation to movements within the North-East. Some 
indication of its intensity is given, nevertheless, by a study which 
shows that direct rural-urban migration in Fortaleza, Ceara, the state 
worst affected by droughts, reached 36% in the period I960 - 70. This 
compares with 22% for Salvador and 14% for Recife.^/ The intensity of
— Moura, on cit., p. 26.
£ 5 /  Manoel de Souza Barros, Exodo e Fixapao, Servipo de Informaqao 
Agricola, R.J., 1957, p. 39. The author gives a coefficient per 
100 emigrants from Pernambuco to Sao Paulo from 1941 - 50 of 2.95 
(sertao), 1.84 (agreste) and 0.45 (zona da mata).
£ 2/ Helio A. de Moura, Migracoes para as Grandes Cidades do Nordeste:
Intensidade e Caractensticas Demograficas, mimeo., MINTER, R.J., 1974, p.4
Ibid.t pp. 50, 55* 156. 
^  Thid., pp. 3 - 4 .
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emigration from rural areas in Ceara state is attributable both to the 
charging agrarian structure which places more inhabitants in marginal 
positions, and to the 1970 drought which took its toll on the weakened 
population.
Tradition has it that the sertanejo always returns home from 
whichever part of Brazil he has emigrated to with the first news that 
the winter rains have arrived in the sertao. In other words, seasonal 
migration appeared to predominate over permanent migration. Again, 
although very little information is available which could confirm or 
refute the popular image, there may be grounds for assuming that 
this trend has been reversed. A case study of the lower Tocantins 
region of Piaui, for example, noted the gradual replacement of 
temporary by permanent migration of rural workers.^/ If such a 
tendency were more general it would follow logically from the changes 
in the sertao rural structure discussed in Chapter II. It was noted 
that the fragmentation of small properties and expansion of latifundia in the 
interior, both clearly observable phenomena, tend to displace labour, 
increase the economic marginality of the population affected and feed 
the rural-urban drift.  ^ ■
The droughts v/hich periodically strike the sertao. then, dramatise 
deep-seated problems of rural weakness and the consequent vulnerability 
of its population. Drought in the North-East is not a simple climatic 
phenomenon which can be successfully tackled independently of this 
consideration. To say that the 'drought problem1 is a total myth would 
be a gross exaggeration. However, it is true that many people have 
had, and continue to have, a vested interest in perpetuating the popular
§2/ E.w.Gonzales and M.I. Bastos, Migracao Rural e o Trabalho Volante 
na Agriculture Brasileira, mimeo., University of Brasilia, 1974*
(parer presented at Encontro Brasileiro de .pstudos Populacionais, 
Rio de Janeiro, 1974).
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conception that the drought is the central cause of rural underdevelopment 
in the interior. Landowners and. government planners anxious to promote 
water storage at the expense of every other development strategy 
use the seca as a convenient mask with which to obscure the basic 
causes of poverty and unemployment. Irrigation, as it has been 
implemented in Brazil, does not specifically'benefit the drought-affected 
population of the interior and can only have, at best, a marginal impact 
in alleviating these hardships. Unless government planners can devise 
strategies capable of tackling the problem of economic marginality 
on a broader front and in a more direct fashion, migration will remain 
the only escape route for the flagelados of North-East Brazil.
00O00
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TABLE I
Variations in Total Production.
North-East Brazil. 1948-71
YEAR AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES TOTAL
1948 4.7 4.2 2.5 3.1
1949 4.8 8.8 2.0 3.9
1950 4.6 3.3 5.4 4.8
1951* -9.9 -5.9 8.2 —0.8
1952 4.8 8.4 11.0 8.7
1953 4.4 0.0 -5.3 -1.6
1954 12.4 10.0 14.4 12.9
1955 2.8 8.7 3.2 4.1
1956 5.3 21.0 4.9 7.4
1957 7.3 9.4 17.8 13.0
1958* -9.7 10.0 2.5 0.3
1959 18.0 20.5 4.6 9.3
I960 7.6 1.4 14.8 9.9
1961 4.4 2.4 8.5 7.0
1962 7.6 -6.9 11.5 3.8
1963 6.6 2.7 4.6 6.6
1964 1.2. 14.7 2.2 2.6
1965 8.4 1.9 3.4 4.9
1966 -0.9 -7.3 2.8 1.5
1967 14.8 4.2 8.9 10.2
1968 6.2 16.3 8.7 9.4
1969 1.3 8.4 10.4 7.3
1970* -16.9 11.9 3.2 -0.9
1971 18.4 8.4 5.7 10.2
Source: Clovis Cavalcanti and Dirceu Pessoa,
Carater e Efeitos da Seca Nordestina de 1970# 
SIRAC/SUDENE, Recife, 1973, p. 74.
Notes: Variations are at factor cost. Asterisks indicate
drought years. Figures for 1948-67 are based on 
estimates by the Fundaqao Getulio Vargas; 1968-71 
data is from SUDENE.
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TABLE 2
Variations in the Volumes and Prices 
of Major Crops During Drought Years
CROPS VOLUME PRODUCED 
(°/o)
1970 1958 1951 1970
PRICES
(%)
1958 1951
1. Crops vulnerable 
to the drought:
Cotton -87 -55 -44 +24 +45 +31
Corn -86 -32 -27 +57 +11 +25
Beans -78 -41 -18 +84 +17 +22
Manioc -86 -11 -12 +115 +6 +14
2. Crops unaffected 
by drought:
Sugar-cane -2 +3 +3 +2
Cocoa — 0 -22 — +16 +4
TOTAL — -16 -18 — +18 +12
Sources: 1958-51 - D. Goodman and R. Cavalcanti,
Incentivos a Industrial!zacao e 
Desenvolvimento do Nordeste.
IPEA, RJ, 1974, p. 117.
1970 - Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit«. p. 175-
Notes: Figures refer to percentage changes in volume and
prices during drought years over preceeding year.
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TABLE 3
Origins of Work Front Recruits 
Compared With General Occupational Structure 
Sertao, 1970
O C C U P A T I  0 N
Proportions Land­
owner
Wage­
worker
Tenant
farmer
Share­
cropper Squatter
i
Other
1. % front 
recruits 30.68 8.43 5.02 42.18 2.64 11.05
2* % general 
occup. 
structure 19.29 8.0 * 3.25 7.2 4.65 57.61
Sources:
1, Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit.» table 5*6, p. 111*
2, Calculated from Agricultural Census, 1970*
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TABLE 4
Origin of Work-Front Recruits by Property Size 
Compared With General Distribution of Landholdings.
Sertao, 1970
Proportions
P R O P E R T Y  S I Z E S  (ha)
0.1 - 10 10.1 - 100 100.1+
1. Origin of work
front recruits
m 85.09 12.94 1.97
2. General distrib.
of landholdings,
Sertao, 1970 61.0 55.59 5.41
3# Area covered % 4.61 26.33 69.06
Sources:
1. Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit.« p. 114.
2# & 3* Calculated from Agricultural Census, 1970*
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TABLE 5
Geographical Origins of Work Front Recruits, 
Sertao. 1970
STATES •
% area 
affected 
by drought
% pop. 
affected
% mun 
aff.
No. work fronts No • flagelados
Total % N.E. Total % N.E.
% state 
pop.
Piaui 46 31 44 8 6.8 28,772 7.5 1.66
Ceara 74 57 90 25 19.5 '160,984 40.9 5.59
RGN 92 54 .85 15 12.7 70,450 17.9 4.57
Paraiba 74 45 61 16 13.6 70,657 19.2 5.10
Pernambuco 72 21 45 48 40.6 49,565 12.6 0.94
Alagoas 44 21 55 4 5.4 5,052 1.5 0.31
Sergipe 45 21 57 5 2.5 2,105 0.5 0.23
Bahia 24 16 18 1 0.8 1,002 0.5 0.01
SERTAO 46 52 48 118 100.0 595,587 100.0 1.55
Source: Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit.t p. 77*
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TABLE 6
Differences in the Value of Agricultural Production 
at Constant Prices in Drought Years 
Compared With Proceeding Year (%)
STATES
FOOD CROPS - INDUSTRIAL CROPS
1951 1958 I97O* 1951 1958 1970*
Piaui -24.8 -18.0 -21.4 -17.5 -35.8 -2 6.6
Ceara -58.8 -65.4 -52.1 -67.3 -62.5 -64.9
RGN -10.8 -27.6 -19.2 -34.3 -58.3 -46.5
Parana -20.1 -28.1 -24.1 -28.2 -16.5 -22.2
Pernambuco -12.2 -11.5 -11.7 - 1.0 -12.4 - 6.7
Alagoas - 0.2 - 3.4 - 1.6 - 8.8 -28.5 -18.5
Sergipe -12.5 - 6.8 - 9.5 -22.8 - 1.5 -12.0
Bahia -10.8 - 8.0 - 9.4 - 3.3 - 1.6
■'Ct*.
CM1
Source: Jose Otamar de Carvalho, Plano Integrado Para
o Combate Preventivo Aos Efeitos das S&cas no
Nordeste. MINTER, Brasilia, 1975> P* 158*
Notes: *1970 figures are an average of 1951 and- 1958*
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TABLE 7
Size and Value of Cattle Herds (Bovine) 
1969 a.nd 1970
STATE
000's Head Value (cruzeiros)
1969 1970 ^ 70%1969 ' 1969 1970
Piaui 1,792 1,755 98 128 244
Ceara 2,251 2,227 99 184 343
RGN 819 896 100 273 261
Paraiba 1,414 1,418 100 256 228
Pernambuco 1,539 1,534 100 264 246
Alagoas 810 819 100 310 274
Sergipe 824 856 101 283 272
Bahia 8,317 8,560 102 225 213
North-East 20,141 20,379 101 215 242
BRAZIL 95,150 97,864 102 196 210
Source: Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., p. 93*
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TABLE 8
Income Composition of Production Units by Property Size,
Sertao, 1969-70 (%)
Property 
sizes (ha)
Temporary
crops
Perm.
crops
Cattle Milk Wages Total
1?6?
under 10 39.2 10.9 28.6 17.4 3.7 100.0
10 - 25 32.7 11.6 29.3 25.7 0.5 100.0
25 - 50 13.2 4.7 18.0 63.7 0.2 100.0
50 - 100 19.4 7.2 34.1 38.8 0.3 100.0
100 - 1,000 24.7 11.8 29.3 34.0 0.1 100.0
1,000 - 10,000 48.6 9.6 23.4 18.2 — 100.0
TOTAL . 30.6 10.3 27.1 31.4 0.4 100.0
1970 
under 10 10.6 52.3 24.3 10.4 2.2 100.0
10 - 25 15.8 8.4 47.7 27.2 0.6 100.0
25 - 50 10.9 2.4 29.6 56.7 0.2 100.0
50 - 100 20.7 3.0 42.5 33.4 0.2 100.0
100 - 1,000 6.9 6.1 53.1 33.5 0.1 100.0
1,000 - 10,000 7.7 10.7 55.6 25.9 — 100.0
TOTAL 9.3 12.6 46.4 31.1 0.4 100.0
Source; Cavalcanti and Pessoa, op cit., p. 197*
Notes; 'Income* refers to gross real income (renda bruta real) 
which corresponds to the total volume of agricultural 
production, as well as wage payments and other income 
received by the head of household.
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TABLE 10
Changes in the Distribution of Landholdings, 
Sertao, 1940-70
SIZE OF LANDHOLDINGS (ha)
STATES/ TOTAL 0 - 2 2 - 10 10' - 100 100-1,000 1,000+
YEARS
N A N A N A N A N A N A
Pernambuco
1940
1970
100
100
100
100
8.44
15.91
0.23
0.50
38.26
41.89
4.80
5.46
43.34
34.98
31.66
31.03
8.93
6.91
46.73
46.03
1.03
0.31
16.5£ 
16.91
Paraiba
1940
1970
100
100
100
100
2.27
9.90
0.04
0.30
26.32
42.62
1.12
5.46
59.32
40.32
28.16
31.16
11.33
6.70
49.54
29.91
0.76
0.46
21.14
33.17
Rio Grande N. 
1940 
1970
100
100
100
100
5.49
16.39
0.04
0.26
18.65 
34.06
1.12
3.03
55.96
39.50
19.58
21.24
20.19
9.24
49.54
43.43
1.71
0.27
29.71
32.04
Ceara
1940
1970
100
100
100
100
5.18 
9.24
0.05
0.19
18.48
36.71
1.07
3.41
55.89
40.78
22.11
27.16
19.19
9.62
51.24
44.23
0.55
‘3.65
25.53 
25.0i
Piaui
1940
1970
100
100
100
100
5.66
44.25
0.06
0.98
32.22
25.69
1.42
2.41
39.01
21.91
11.69
18.18
20.88
7.08
47.81
43.20
2.23
1.07
39.02
34.11
Bahia
1940
1970
100
100
100
100
16.33
22.00
0.62
0.95
48.21
42.79
6.97
7.98
29.20
30.79
26.54
36.13
5.54
4.22
40.32
40.29
0.72
0.20
25.55
14.61
Sergipe
1940
1970
100
100
100
100
11.48
19.43
0.18
0.38
33.74
26.24
2.79
2.78
43.86
45.57
22.87
31.84
10.57
8.38
38.89
42.96
0.35
0.38
35.0s
22.04
Alagoas
1940
1970
100
100
100
100
10.32
39.24
0.66
2.14
54.31
34.89
15.19
9.30
32.73
22.78
43.78
36.70
2.49
2.91
26.70
38.97
0.15
0.18
13.67
12.85
TOTAL
SERTAO
1940
1970
100
100
100
100
6.85
22.24
0.10
0.54
29.82
35.88
2.20
4.07
41.70
32.28
22.60
26.33
13.88
7.27
47.94
43.56
7.75
1.33
27.16
25.5C
Source: Agricultural Census, 1940 and 1970
N = % of rural establishments 
A s= % of area covered
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TABLE 11
Increases in Areas of Rural Establishments, 
Sertao« 1940-70
STATES
SIZE OP LANDHOLDINGS (ha)
0 - 2 2 - 1 0 10 - 100 100 - 1,000 1,000+ TOTAL
Pernambuco 0.82 2.80 30.29 45.21 20.88 100.0
Paraiba 1.24 6.44 32.10 23.42 56.80 100.0
RGN 1.16 10.88 ■ 28.08 18.29 41.59 100.0
Ceara 0.48 7.98 37.00 30.57 23.97 100.0
Piaui 1.48 2.95 21.69 40.70 33.18 100.0
Bahia 1.17 ' 8.67 42.62 40.27 7.27 100.0
Sergipe 0.44 2.73 34.50 44.17 18.16 100.0
Alagoas 2.52 7.80 34.90 42.11 12.67 100.0
TOTAL 1.10 6.45 32.98 58.00 21.47 100.0
Source: Calculated from Agricultural Census 1940 and 1970.
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TABLE 12
Changes in the Rural Labour Structure, 
Sertao. 1960-70
STATES/
YEARS
TOTAL Unpaid,
family-
labour
Paid Labour
Permanent Temporary
Share­
croppers
(subordinate)
Other
terms
Pernambuco
I960
1970
100.0
100.0
63.96
88.24
2.71
1.55
29.54
9.13
2.47
O.67
1.32
0.41
Paraiba
I960
1970
100.0
100.0
62.55
77.28
4.36
3.24
18.00
5.98
12.28
12.82
2.81
0.68
R.G.N.
I960
1970
100.0
100.0
51.32
66.76
4.77
3.88
20.96
9.12
20.46
18.85
2.49
1.99
Ceara
I960
1970
100.0 . 
100.0
49.72
73.42
4.33
1.94
33.58
12.26
8.29
5.23
4.08
7.15
Piaui
I960
1970
100.0
100.0
67.85
97.42
2.49
0.17
24.14
1.44
1.96
0.61
3.56
O.36
Bahia
I960
1970
100.0
100.0
78.90
91.55
3.32
1.34
15.67
5.63
0.90
0.33
1.21
1.15
Sergipe
I960
1970
100.0
100.0
72.77
94.56
2.74
1.05
22.63
4.02
1.56
0.14
0.30
0.23
Alagoas
I960
1970
100.0
100.0
69.81
90.92
4.13
1.38
24.39
7.05
O.56
0.10
1.11
0.55
TOTAL
SERTAO
I960
1970
100.0 
100.0 *
61.54
82.78
3.64
1.75
25.92
7.99
6.24
4.58
2.66
2.90
Source: Calculated from Agricultural Census I960 and 1970*
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TABLE 12 
Key to headings
1. Unpaid family labour - the person responsible for administering
the property as well as members of his family who help without
payment of any kind*
2. Hired labour - persons, including family members, who are paid
either in cash and/or with part of the produce. This is divided
into long term (permanent) and short term (temporary) arrangements.
3* Sharecroppers - Sharecroppers subordinate to the administration of 
the establishment who are paid with a share of the crops they 
produce. Non-subordinate share-tenants who are responsible for 
administering the establishment are included within the first group 
of unpaid family labour. This distinction is useful since 
subordinate sharecroppers are far more vulnerable to the drought 
than any other group.
4# Other forms - all other types of labour.
Notes; Similar criteria were used for both I960 and 1970
Agricultural Censuses, which facilitated comparison.
1940 and 1950 figures adopt different definitions.
1
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TABLE 13
Bank of Brazil Agricultural Loans. 
Brazil and North-East, 1968-73*
CROPS LIVESTOCK
YEARS Brazil N.E. Brazil N.E.
No.
(1000's)
Av. 
Value *
No.
(1000's)
Av.
Value
No. 
(1000's) -
Av.
Value
No. 
(1000's)
Av.
Value 1
1968 473.3 10.7 65.8 9.3 102.9 11.5 15.2
"■■*■ ■ ■..
12.9
1969 448.5 10.9 59.0 9.9 118.1 10.9 18.1 12.3
1970 491.1 11.2 63.0 8.6 121.8 10.0 15.1 11.2
1971 56O.4 11.2 111.6 6.9 150.4 11.7 28.4 13.4
1972 599.6 13.7 105.3 8.7 165.0 12.4 31.0 13.2
1973 643.3 13.6 104.3 8.6 168.9 14.8 32.5 14.2
Source: Based on data from Bank of Brazil, 2nd Region,
* 1972 constant Cr.$ Thousands,
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TABLE 14 
PECRO and CRM
Special Credit for North-Eastern Agriculture. 1971*
Formation of perennial cotton
Other perennial crop formation
Acquisition of livestock
Improvements
Storage structures 3*5
Land clearance 22.5
Processing install. 3*6
Reservoirs, irrig. 38*3
Pasture formation 82.8
Rural residences 5*1
Machinery
Agricultural machinery 3*5
Traction animals 3*8
Other improvements and 
machinery
Other^/
Value
33.7
23.3
2.5
155.8
7.3
TOTAL
100.1
2.6
325.3
1.1
6.9
1.1
11.8
25.5
1.6
1.1
1.2
% of 
Total
10.4
7.2
0.8
48.0
2.3
30.8
0.8
100.0
Source: Based on data from Bank of Brazil, 2nd Region.
* in Cr.$ millions
u  Rural electrification, re-forestation, hatcheries, protection and 
restoration of soils, vehicles.
Both programmes were created in March, 1971 by Central Bank Resolutions 
175 and 181 respectively. PECRO covered the North as well as North-East 
but the latter accounted for 80% of loans. Land purchases under PECRO 
are not included in the data.
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TABLE 15
Federal Funding for Irrigation to 
North-East Agencies. 1966-70 
(Cr.$ millions)
YEARS
MINTER STJDENE SUVALE
:........... ....
DNOCS
Total A g. Irr. A g. Irr. . Ag. Irr. • Ag. Irr.
1966 50%4 23.1 0.6 10.1 - 4.9
V
0.6 * *
1967 379.9 36.6 8.3 22.4 - 11.9 8.3 * *
1968 618.9 108.1 62.2 25.5 3.1 10.1 11.5 45.5 39.5
1969 701.9 113.9 75.5 30.4 11.3 16.9 13.5 41.6 38.5
1970 557.8 78.1 50.6 27.6 11.1 12.5 11.1 26.7 23.8
* Dnocs was not in MINTER.
Ag. = Agriculture, including livestock. 
Irr.= Irrigation
Source: GEIDA, Plano Nacional de Irrigacao;
Diagnostico Prelimina
Table B5-1, p. B5-11.
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TABLE 16
North-East Brazil - Projected Excess Demand in 1976 and 1980
(’000 tons)
CROPS 1976 1980
Avocado-pears 12.8 16.3
Pineapples 12.3 17.1
Bananas 48.0 55.0
Oranges 695.5 866.4
Limes 23.0 34.2
Tangerines 38.6 52.3
Grapes 34.2 54.5
Other fruits 111.2 115.5
Garlic 39.6 52.5
Potatoes 351.9 490.8
Onions 82.1 112.4
Tomatoes 145.3 222.3
Other vegetables 338.1 451.6
Source: GEIDA, Programa Plurianual de Irrigacao (PPl).
Vol. II: Estudos de Mercado e Comnercializayao. 
Annex 3# Sao Paulo, 1971t P* 6.
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TABLE 17
Comparative Crop Yields (tons/hectare)
CROPS DNOCS
NON-IRRIGATED
N.E. South
Cotton 1.8** 0.3* ' 0.9*
Bananas 55.0 - -
Tomatoes (table) 40.0 6.1* 21.0*
11 (ind.) 35.0 6.1* -
Onions 20.0 0.6-0.8 5.0-8.0
Melons 9.0 - 4.0
Carrots 18o0 - -
Maize 12.0 0.70* 1.62*
Rice 4.5 0.8-1.9 1.5-2.3
Sweet potato ‘ 10.0 4.6-5.5 1.2-22.0
Sources: Evandro de Souza Lima, A IrrigacpSo no Hordeste.
SUDENE, Fortaleza, 1973, p. H .
** DNOCS, Irrigapao. Fortaleza, 1975*
IPEA, Agricultura Brasileira: Comportamento Passado. Situacao 
Atual e Perspectivas de Crescimento, Brasilia, 1973,
p. 20.
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TABLE 18
Prospective Demand and Planned Output: 
N.E. Irrigation Projects, Selected Crops
CROPS
A B C D • E
Grapes 10,000 228 19 539 920
Tomatoes 3,000 804 18 775 1,244
Pineapples 2,500 313 12 VM VM CD 541
Melons 3,000 334 11 12 22
Onions 3,300 274 9 273 436
Potatoes 3,100 240 8 1,606 2,394
Rice 520
Cotton 48
Key to Headings
A = profit per hectare (Cr.$ at 1969 values)
B = planned production ('000 tons, 1980)
C as % of total production value 
D = total production, Brazil 1968 ('000 tons) 
E = estimated demand, 1980 ('000 tons)
Source: W.R. Cline, Irrigation Projects in Brazilfs Northeast
Case Studies in Social Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, mimeo., IPEA, 1971, P* 27.
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